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No. 74-1055
STONE (Warden)

v.
PCWEll (Prisoner)
Respondent was convicted of second degree murder in
California.

Evidence introduced included a gun seized incident

to an arrest in Nevada pursuant to a statute found unconstitutional
by CA 9.

Although USDC had declined to apply the exclusionary rule

in these circumstances, CA 9 granted respondent's petition for
habeas corpus.
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FAC'I'S:

Respondent and three companions entered a

San Bernardino, Cali'fornia, liquor store at about midnight
on February 17, 1968.

The owner, Mr. Parsons, saw respondent

place a bottle of wine under his jacket.
him, respondent struck Parsons.

When Parsons approached

Parsons went for his ,J8 caliber

revolver, and respondent and the three other men left the store.
Respondent returned a few minutes later, and a struggle ensued
between him and Parsons over the gun.
in the wrist.
back office.

Respondent shot Parsons

Parson retreated to obtain another gun from the
He heard a shot and heard his wife scream.

Wheri

he returned to the front of the store, he discovered his wife
on the floor.
register.
('---'

One of respondent's companions was at the cash

Parsons shot at the companion, and the men fled.

Mrs. Parsons died.
_. Ten hours later, on a Sunday mo.jrning, an officer of
the Henderson, Nevada, Police Department saw respondent and
another man while on routine patrol in a shopping center
parking lot.

Respondent and his companion saw the patrol

car and turned away quickly, walking now in the opposite
direction,

They looked back several times and continued

walking rapidly.
them.

The officer made a U-turn and approached

Respondent and the other man now split up, walking in

different directions.

The officer called out to respondent

to stop, but respondent kept on going.

The officer then drove

up to respondent, jumped out of the car, and asked him to
halt.

Respondent stopped, and identified himself although

he could supply no identification papers.

He stated he had

-

J

-

been staying with s ome fri ends in nearby l a s Vefa s , but he
was unabl e to na me them.

He said he was en route to

~ ichi gan,

but Hender s on was south of Las Ve gas and thus not on th e route
of someone going east from Ve gas to Michi gan.

The officer

arrested respond ent for violatin g the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance:
"Every person is a vagrant who:
Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from
place to place without a pparent reason or business
and who refuses to identify hims elf and to account
for his presence when asked by a police officer to
do so if surrounding circumstanc es are such as to
indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety
\ demands such identification."
The officer searched respondent and found a pistol with six
expended cartridges in the cylinder.

It is undisputed that

the officer had no knowled ge of the California mur_Q,er at the
'--

time he arrested respondent.

The pistol was the Parsons'

.3 8

caliber revolver.
Respondent was char ged with second degree murder.
Mr . Parsons and at least two of the three companions (Buck ley
and Chaney) in the liquor store testified a gainst re sp ondent,
A criminolo gi s t testified that the gun taken from r esp ondent
was the same gun that had been use d to kill f,·: rs. Parsons ,
Respondent was convicted,

Cn appeal respondent attacked the

constitutionality of the Nevada ordinance; the California
Court of Appeal viewed this as an attack on the jurisdiction
of the California courts to try him, which it rejected under
Frisbie v, Collins, 342

u. s . 519.

Insofar as respondent

challenged the introduction of the gun, the court found this
was harmless error at most since other people had placed him

- 4 (
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at the scene and the evidence re garding his possession of the
gun in Nevada "was not required to establish any essential
element of the char ged crime."

App. xxv.

Habeas corpus

relief was denied by the California Supreme Court.
Respondent s ought federal habeas claiming that (1) the
Nevada ordinance was unconstitutional or (2) the offic er did not
have probable cause to believe respondent was violating it.
The USDC (Burk e) denied relief on two alternative grounds.

{~it

held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied

\ even if the Henderson ordinance was unconstitutional:

''The

purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be advanced by ex
post facto condemnation of an arrest which was apparently valid
when made • • • • [I~ the absence of a prior determination that
the statute was unconstitutional, the officer was entitled to
arres~

petitioner for violation of it if he had probable cause

to believe that the offense had been committed in his presence
and to make a reasonable search incident to that arrest."
xvii.

App.

The court reviewe.d the facts and concluded that the
~

officer did have probable cause. ~ the court concluded,
for the same reasons expressed by the state courts, that the
error if any was harmless.
CA 9 reversed.

It found the Henderson ordinance un-

~

constitutionally vague.

-------

405 U.S. 156 (1972).

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,

While exclusion of evidence would serve

no legitimate deterrent purpose with re gard to police officers
(

who were enforcing statutes in good faith, "the same [could] not

, .

- 5be said with respect to those who enact such a statute
authorizing such unconstitutional searches,

The public

7

interest , , , is served by deterring le gislators from

-

enacting such statutes," App, xi. The court cited as
'-support for this reasoning four decisions of this Court .excluding evidence in the same case in which it struck down
a statute that had been relied upon in good faith by police
officers,

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973);

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Sibron v. New
York, 392

u.s.

40 (1968); Ber P,er v. New York, 388

After an independent

r~view

u.s.

41 (1967).

of the evidence, the panel concluded

that the admission of the gun was not harmless error because it
supported the testimony of respondent's accomplices that
L

'

respondent had killed Mrs. Parsons •
./ CONTENTIONS:

Petitioner advances four contentions,

three of which are quite important:

I

(1) Kaufman v. United

States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), should be overruled.

!\espondent

had a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated his
Fourth Amendment claims in state courts and should not be
permitted to raise them in federal court via habeas.
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 251 (1973) (POWELL, J.
(2)

Schneckloth
con~urring ).

the exclusionary rule should not be applied to suppress

the fruits of a search incident to an arrest pursuant to a
then-valid ordinance since it makes no sense to speak of police
deterrence in this setting .* Cf. Pierson v.
/.-,..

~ ay,

386 U. S . 547

(1967); United States v. Peltier, No. 73-2000; (3) the Henderson
ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the admission
*Ptn at 19-20: "The crowning irony in the application of the
exclusiona ry rul e in thi s case is that th e l eFi s lators in th e
Henderson, Nevada City Council will hardly be deterred by th e
invalida tion of a conviction for murder committed in California."

- 6 of the evidence, if error, was harmless

~eyond

a reasonable doubt,

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
DISCUSSION:

Just recently the Court has declined another

invitation by California authorities to overrule

Kaufman·:~-

and

Lefkowitz v. Kewsome leans in the other direction,

The inter-

a statute

later found

action between the exclusionary rule and

to be unconstitutional generated much interest in J'ones v. Florida,
dismissec for want of a properly presented federal question,
December 23,

1974~

in which the state had not raised the issue

(BRENNAN, J., dissenting at 2),

The mechanical application of

the exclusionary rule may be at odds with this Court's most
recent articulation of a balancing test, United States v. Calandra,
414 U.s. 338 ·tl974).

Both parties seem

to agree that the

Henderson officer must have had probable cause to arrest respondent
in

or~er

for petitioner's theory to prevail assuming, arguendo,

that invalidation of the ordinance does not compel exclusion of
the evidence.

As might be expected, however, the parties disagree

on the probable cause issue.
with Response at 6-11.

Compare USDC opinion at App. xviii

CA 9 did not discuss the issue in probable

cause terms since it viewed one of the deficiencies of the ordinance
as the subversion of the probable cause requirement by its
vagueness.
If the Court is not interested in the Kaufman issue, then
a limited grant would be advisable.

If the Court were to reverse

CA 9 on the constitutionality of the ordinance, then presumably
it would be unnecessary to reach the petitioner's exclusionary
rule contention; the respondent contends that the unconstitutionality
{~solomon

v. Enzensperger, No. 74-404, cert. denied, March 3, 1975.

- 7 of the ordinance is so apparent

that it

to grant certiorari on this issue.

wou~d

be inappropriate

Response at 11.

If a grant

were limited in this manner as well, only the exclusionary rule
and harmless error contentions would remain.
There is a response.

J/22/75

Nannes
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No. 74-1222
WOLFF (Warden)

v.

~

qt_<-0LJ;{.

(Matthes, Bright & Stephenson)
Federal/Civil (Habeas)

RICE (State Pr~oner)

1.

Summary:

Timely

Resp was convicted in a jury trial in

state court of first degree murder and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.

Resp's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.

188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972).

Resp filed a 2254 petn

in dist ct alleging that his conviction was based on illegally
-i:.~ / " seized evidence.

-

The dist ct (D.Neb.; Urbom, D.J.) granted

-2-

habeas relief, and CA 8 affirmed.'

The State of Nebraska

seeks certiorari arguing that (a) resp failed to exhaust
state remedies, (b) the search and seizure were reasonable,
and (c) the exclusionary rule should be modified to allow JA

V(

introduction of the evidence.
2.

Facts:

At approximately 2:00a.m., August 17,

1970, the Omaha Nebraska Police Department received a telephone call indicating that a woman was screaming in a vacant
house at 2865 Ohio Street.
the scene.

Three patrol cars reported to

As the officers were searching the house, one

of them stooped to examine a suitcase lying in the doorway.
The suitcase, which was boobytrapped with dynamite, exploded
\

and killed the officer.

In the investigation that ensued,

the police soon learned that one Duane Peak had made the
telephone call and had been seen shortly beforehand with a
suitcase similar to the one that had been boobytrapped.
Peak was a member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism,

I

an offshoot of the Black Panthers.

The police also learned

that Edward Poindexter, Chairman of the NCCF, was knowledgeable
in handling explosives and was believed to be the person who

had constructed the boobytrap.

Warrants for the arrest of

Peak and Poindexter were issued on the afternoon of Saturday,
August 22nd.

Late that aftenloon a police task force set out

to execute the warrants.

The police first searched the NCCF

headquarters, which was deserted but did contain a large cache
of firearms and ammunition.

Tile police next visited the Peak

•.
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and Poindexter residences, with no success.
went to resp's house.

The police then

According to police intelligence files,

resp was the NCCF Mininister of Information and his house had
served as a gathering place for NCCF members.

When the police

arrived at resp's house, the lights were on and

the television

set could be heard but no one answered the door.

Two officers

left to secure a search warrant and the remainder surrounded
~esp ,.S;

house.

On the basis of an affadavit submitted by

the two officers, a city magistrate issued a warrant for the
search of resp's residence.
night.

The search was executed that same

The police did not find anyone inside the house, but

they did find 14 sticks of dynamite in a box in the basement
as well as some blasting caps, wire, a battery, and a pair
of long-nosed pliers.

A warrant was issued for

~esp's

rest on charges of possessing illegal explosives.
surrendered four days later.

ar-

Resp

......______.

The standard procedure of

taking resp' s clothes and giving him jail clothes was followed.
However, after the clothes were routinely inventoried, they
were sent by the police to the FBI crime laboratory for analysis.
The FBI tests revealed dynamite particles in the cuffs of the
trousers.

J

Resp and Poindexter were tried jointly for the mur-

der of the police officer.
with the prosecution.

Duane Peak apparently came to terms

Peak admitted planting the suitcase and

making the telephone call.

Peak testified about his own parti-

cipation as well as that ofresp and Poindexter.

The dyna-

mite and other paraphernalia seized at resp 's house was intro-

-4-

duced at the trial, as were the results of the FBI lab reports.
Resp and foindexter were convicted of first degree murder.
Peak was later processed as a juvenile.

-

v~~ed

The dist ct

separate

searches~he

resp's claims as

challenging ~

search of resp's house

----~

of his trousers (by the FBI crime lab).

an~e

search

The dist ct first

examined the affadavit supporting the search warrant.

The

affadavit, which is reproduced at p. 34 of the petition, was
the sole evidence presented to the magistrate who issued the
search

The affadavit stated that the police officers

warrant~

believed dynamite was being kept in resp's residence because:
(a) resp was an officer of NCCF, an organization that publicly
advocated the killing of police; (b) a police officer had been
killed and it appeared that NCCF members were involved; and
(c) "We have been told in the past that [resp] keeps explosives,
at his residence, and also illegal weapons, which he has said
should be used against police officers."

The eli st ct cone luded

that resp's mere membership in NCCF was insufficient to give
probable cause

to

believe that dynamite was hidden in the house.

The court rejected the hearsay information that resp kept explosives in his home because the affadavit failed to satisfy
either prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

Aguilar v. Texa s,

~

378 U.S. 108; Spinelli v.

u.s.,

393 U.S. 410.

The dist ct

rejected the state's argument that the nature of the crime
constituted an exigent circumstance that would justify the
search despite the defects in the warrant; instead the dist

-5-

ct concluded that the act of going' for a warrant indicated
the apsence of any exigent circumstances.

The court also

concluded that even if the dynamite had been found in plain
view in resp's basement, the entry into resp's residence could
not be justified on the basis of the valid arrest warrant for
Peak because the police had no probable cause
Peak was in the house.

m

believe that

Finally, the dist ct concluded that

the evidence found in resp's trousers was fruit of the poisonous

\

tree, i.e. a direct product of the illegal search of resp's
residence.
3.
A.

The CA opinion basically follows the dist ct opinion.
Contentions

Failure to Exhaust.

The state argues that the courts below

should not have reached its argument that entry into resp's
house was justified by the arrest warrant for Peak and the
dynamite was then found in plain view.

The state contends

that resp failed to exhaust state remedies on this question.
It is undisputed that resp attacked the search in state court .
•

.!:~+~
~t ~

~CSVV\l~

It is also undisputed that the state argued on appeal that the
search could be sustained on the arrest warrant/plain view

\o4..!:>.lS theory even if the warrant were invalid.

b~ e.'J.~-h~

lt8i~\rto ~

Since the Neb. S. Ct

sustained the search on different grounds, it did not address

~e.:1J.~. ) itself to the arrest warrant/plain vie~.;r theory. The state
oe~\).J\}\#6- ~argues
·
.
that the state courts should now be g~ven an opportunity
to pass on that theory.

The dist ct and CA held that petr had

exhausted because he had raised the validity of the search.
The dist ct and CA noted that the state courts had been con-

-6-

fronted with the argument.

The dist ct and CA therefore held

that resp should not be required to fight his claim in state
court in a piecemeal fashion.
of the dist ct and
B.

Resp repeats the conclusions

CA.

Reasonableness of the Search. The state apparently now

concedes the invalidity of the search warrant because it
makes no effort to argue that the affadavit was sufficient
to establish probable cause.

Instead, the state argues that

the search was reasonable under the circumstances because (a)
there were exigent circumstances; and (b) the police had infortheir
mation in / . possession at the time of the search that did
establish probable cause to believe that dynamite was concealed in resp's residence.
~umstance

Resp argues that the only cir-

advanced by the state--i.e., that a policeman had

been killed five days earlier--did not amount to an exigency
that would justify a warrantle ss search.

Resp echoes the con-

clusion of the dist: ct and CA that lack of exigent circums tances
is proven by the fact that the police went for a warrant.

Resp

questions whether the police in fact did have information that

~~~
~~

•

would have supported the issuance of the search warrant and
argues that, whatever the information may have been, it is
irrelevant because the police did not present it to the magistrate.
C.

Modifica tion of th e Exclusiona ry Rule . The state, playing

heavily on the sens ation a listic nature of the crime, argues that
the exclusiona ry rule should be modified so that this defendant

-7-

will not be turned loose despite the overwhelming evidence
of his guilt.

The state argues that the police made a good
~

faith effort to satisfy fourth amendment requirements, an

___.)

effort that the Neb. S. Ct found to be adequate.

The state

contends that the lower court decisions will not result in
the desired deterrence because the police were acting in
good faith.

Instead, according to the state, allowing the

decisions below to stand will only demoralize the police
and return a vicious criminal back to society despite the
clear evidence of his guilt.

The dist ct and CA acknowledged

the state's arguments against the · exclusionary rule, but they
concluded they were bound by Supreme Court precedent.

Resp

tracks the standard arguments in favor of the exclusionary
rule.
4.

Discussion:

The dist ct and CA seem clearly correct
turn
on the exhaustion issue. The position taken by the state would I

~~ a valid collateral attack into an intolerably circuitous game.
The reasonableness of the search, standing alone, was also
correctly decided below.

The question of modifying the exclu-

sionary rule, of course, is another matter.

It may well be

that the Court will want to hold this petn until the dust
settles in

u.s.

v. Peltier, No. 73-2000.

There is another

attack on the exclusionary rule currently being held for

.
!

Peltier.

No. 74-1055, Stone v. Powell.

This petn differs

from Stone in that it presents the tensions inherent in the

exclusiona ry rule in much more dramatic terms.

On the one

-8-

hand·, automatic application of the' rule will probably free
a.

dangerous individual despite very strong evidence that he

*I

committed an extremely serious crime.- On the

otl~r

hand,

failure to enforce the rule in this case would threaten to
eliminate all deterrence against fourth amendment violations
in the very type of case where it is most needed, the investigation of a politically radical group concerning its involvement in a very sensationalistic crime.
There is a response.
Gates

CA & DC ops
in petn

5/7/75

Resp sugge sts that application of the exclusionary rule is
not very impo 1~ tant in this case because the prime evidence
against resp was the testimony of Peak. It is unclear how
important the evidence was, but it surely must have b een vieHed
by the jury as strong corroboration of the 15 year old Peak's
testimony.
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Bill:
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The above case is about as clear a cut Bustamonte issue
are likely to see.
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Potter indicated - as he has in the past - that he would
be inclined to consider favorably my Bustamante position when- .
ever as many as six Justices are in accord. Potter also
,
agrees that this .case presents an ideal "test" opportunity.
You were quite perceptive in having the case held for
Peltier. As Byron has joined in that decision, I would hope
that after Peltier comes down, Byron will be willing to
reexamine the unjustified extension of habeas corpus to
Fourth Amendment claims which have been litigated in state
courts and in which there is no claim of innocence.
·~ ~}

1;. ;

I suggest that you and I might visit with Potter on
this subject prior to further Conference consideration of
the above petition.~

Justice .
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Stone v. Powell,
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74-1055. \ Respondent was convicted

of second degree murder in CalifiGrnia, and the evidence
introduced at his trial included a gun seized incident to his
arrest in Nevada for violation
City of Henderson, Nevada.

of a ·vagrancy ordinance of the

Respondent and three companions

entered a liquor store in San Bernardino, California, at about
midnight of February, 1968.

After a fracas between them and

the owner, the wife of the owner was shot and killed.

- 7 The following morning an officer of the Henderson,
Nevada police department saw respondent and another man while
on routine patrol in a shopping center parking lot.

Respondent

and his companion saw the patrol car and turned away
quickly, walking now in the opposite direction.
back several times and continued walking rapidly.

They looked
The

officer called out to respondent to stop, but he kept going.
The officer then jumped

m

halt, which he did.

out of the car and asked

re~ondent

He could supply no idenuification

papers, stated that . he had been staying with some friends
in nearby Las Vegas, but he was unable to name them.

He said

he was en route to Michigan, but Henderson is south of Las
-.
one
Vegas and thus not on the normal route which/would travel from
Las Vegas to Michigan.

The officer arrested respondent for

violating the Henderson vagrancy ordinance which provides:
"Every person is a vagrant who:
Loiters or wanders upon the streets or
from place to place without apparent
reason or business and who refuses to
identify himself and to account for his
presence when asked by a police officer
to do so if surrounding circumstances are
such as to indicate to a reasonable man
that the public safety demands such identification."

- 8 -

The officer searched respondent and found a pistol
with six expended cartr:k9es in the cylinder.

It is undisputed

that the officer had no knowledge of the California murder
at the time he arrested respondent.

The pistol turned out

to have been the .38 caliber revolver belonging to the
owner of the liquor store which respondent had taken.
Respondent was charged with second degree murder, and
the owner and at least two of respondent's companions in the
liquor store testified against him.
that the gun taken

~rom

A criminologist testified

respondent was the same gun that

had been used to kill Mrs. Parsons.

Respondent was convicted.

On appeal he attacked the constitutionality of the Nevada
~

vagrancy ordinance, but the California Court of Appeals viewed
fuis as an attaek on the jurisdiction of the California
courts to try him, and rejected it under Frisbie v. Collins,
342

u.s.

519.

Insofar as respondent challenged the introduction

of the gun, the court found this was harmless error at most
since other people had placed him at the scene and the evidence
regarding his possession of the gun in Nevada "was not
required to establish any essential element of the charged
crime."

-

9 -

Respondent sought federal habeas claiming that (1) the
Nevada ordinance was unconstitutional and (2) the officer did
not have probable cause to believe respondent was violating
it.

The District Court denied relief on two alternative

grounds.

First it held that the exclusionary rule should not

be applied even if the Henderson ordinance was unconstitutional:
"The purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be advanced
by

~

post facto condemnation of an arrest which was
[I]n the absence of a

apparently valid when made · ·

prior determination. that the statute was unconstitutional,
the officer was entitled to arrest petitioner for violation
of it if he had probable cause to believe that the offense

-..

had been committed in his presence and to make a reasonable
search incident to that arrest."

App. xvii.

The court

reviewed the facts and concluded that the officer did have
probable cause.
~pressed

The court also concluded, for the reasons

by the state courts, that the error if any was

harmless.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
It found that the Henderson ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague by virtue of Papachrist~u v. City of Ja~ksonville, 405
U.S. 156 (1972).

While exclusion of evidence would serve no

- 10 legitimate deterrent purpose with regard to police officers
who were enforcing statutes in good faith,

"the same [could]

not be said with respect to those who enact such a statute
authorizing such unconstitutional searches.

The public

interest • • • is served by deterring legislators from enacting
such statutes."

App. xi.

After an independent review of the

evidence, the Court of Appeals decided that the admission of
the gun was not harmless error because it supported the
testimony of respondent's accomplices that respondent had
killed the wife of the owner of the liquor store.
Petitioner Warden advances, inter alia, the following
contentions:

(1) Kaufman v. United States, 394

u.s.

217 (1969),

~

should be overruled.

Respondent had fair opportunity to

raise and have· adjudicated his Fourth Amendment claims and state
courts should not be permitted to raise them on federal
habeas.

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412

(Powell, J., concurring):

u.s.

218, 250 (1973)

(2) the. exclusionary rule should not

be applied to suppress the fruits of a search incident to an
arrest pursuant to a then-valid ordinance since it makes no
sense to speak of police deterrence in this setting:

(3) the

- 11 admission of the gun, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
The court of· Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not
discuss the issue of p10bable cause, since it viewed one of
the deficiencies of the ordinance as its tendency to authorize
arrest and conviction if there were reasonable grounds to
suspect that the accused may have committed, or if left at
large would commit, a more serious offense.
I would grant certiorari, and request that counsel
address, inter alia; the following question:
"Whether, in light of the fact that the
District Court found that the Henderson,
Nevada police officer had probable cause
to arrest respondent !br violation of an
ordinance which at the time of the arrest
had not been authoritatively determined
to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim
that the gun discovered as a result of
a · search incident to that arrest violated
his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution
is one cognizable under 28 u.s.c. § 2254."

~incerely,

~

'lJVW
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Wolff v. Rice, ~~o. 74-122: ) In August, 1970, an Omaha

~

police radio dispatcher received an anonymous telephone call
to the effect that someone had reported a woman screaming
at a particular street address in Omaha.

The dispatcher

sent two police cars to that address, which turned out to be
a vacant house.

As the police entered the structure, they

were forced to step over a suitcase lying on its side in the
doorway; one of the policemen inspected the
exploded, instantly killing him.

su~tcase

when it

Subsequent investigation

established that the suitcase had contained dynamite, which
had been wired in such a manner that any movement of the
suitcase would detonate the ~yn~ite.
Police

i~vestigation

focused upon members of the

National Committee to combat Facism, a political organization
known in the community as the Black Panther Party.
Rice was known to police as an

o~ficer

Respondent

in the organization,

police arrived at his home at 10:30 PM in search of one
Duane Peak, another member of the organization who had been
in respondent's house some weeks previously.

Lights of a

television were on in the respondent's home when police
arrived, but there was no response to the officers' knock
at the door.

The police decided not to forcibly enter the

and

- 4 house on the basis of the arrest warrant for Peak, but instead
made affidavits which they presented to a municipal court
judge in a successful effort to obtain a search warrant for
the premises.

When police finally entered the house with

this warrant close to midnight, they did so with the two-fold
purpose of searching for and arresting Peak and searching for
dynamite believed ' in the possession of the Black Panther
organization.
Peak was not in the house, but the police tound fourteen
sticks of dynamite, blasting caps, wiring, a battery, and a
pair of long-nosed pliers.

Peak was subsequently arrested,

and a few days later respondent voluntarily surrendered.
~

The clothing respondent was wearing at the time of his arrest
was seized by the police and subjected to chemical analysis
for dynamite particles.
At trial, Peak implicated respondent and one Poindexter
in the bombing plot.

As corroborative evidence, the state

introduced many of the items seized at the petitioner's
house during the search, and introduced the results of the
chemical analysis of petitioner's clothing seized at the time
of his arrest.

The analysis indicated that dynamite granules

were in the pockets of the trousers.

Both respondent and his

- 5 co-defendant were convicted by a jury in April, 1971, and
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On appeal, the judgment of conviction was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Nebraska in July, 1972.
1972, respondent filed a petition under 28

In September,

u.s.c.

§ 2254

(habeas corpus} in the federal District Court claiming that
his conviction was based upon evidence seized in violation of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
release from

The District Court granted the writ, directing
custo~y

trial by the state.

unless respondent was accorded a new
The District Court concluded (a} that

the search warrant obtained by the police did not meet the
~

tests laid down in Aguilar v. Texas, 378
Spinelli v. United States, 393

u.s.

u.s.

108 (1964} and

410, 416-418 (1969}.

The court went on to hold that there was no basis other than
the warrant which would make the search of respondent's house
lawful under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that
therefore the evidence obtained from that search should have
been suppressed.

6 -

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the order of the District Court, and petitioner Wolff (the
warden!) seeks review here.
Those who believe this to be a result mandated by the
Constitution will probably want to deny.

I would grant, and

ask counsel to address, inter alia, the following question:
"Whether, in light of the fact that the
Omaha police officers had obtained a
search warrant from a municipal court
judge prior to entering respondent's
premises, respondent's claim that such
entry constituted an unlawful search
of his premises was properly cognizable
under 28 u.s.c. § 2254."

$51tp'ttmt

'
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June 24, 1975

~

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 74-1222 - Wolff v. Rice. Heretofore
Held for No. 73-200 - United States v. Peltier

The substitute question
of my Hold memorandum, which
to by the four of us present
voted to grant Wolff, is the

for that set forth in page 6
I understand to have been agreed
1
at Con ference this morning who
following:
·•

"Whether ,the entry of respondent's premises
by Omaha police officers under the circumstances
of this case constituted an unlawful search
of his premises properly cognizable under 28
u.s.c. § 2254."

-

Sincerely~

October ·1 Oi 197 5 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
I\.___.,

No. 74-1222

Motion for Appointment
of Counsel

WOLFF
v.
RICE
SUMMARY: Resp requests that J. Patrick Green, Esq.
be appointed to represent him in this Court.

i

of Om.aha, Neb.,

The Court granted cert to CA 8 to

review its disposition of resp 1 s §2254 challenge to the validity of the entry and
search of re sp 1 s premises by state police officers.

The Court also granted re sp 1 s

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Mr. Green represented resp on his direct appeal in Neb. SC and prepared
briefs and made oral argument on resp 1 s behalf in habeas actions in the DC and CA.
However, other counsel, no longer associated with this case,was designated und e r
the Crirn.inal Justice Act to rcpre sent re sp in the federal courts below.

DISCUSSION: It appears that appointed counsel for an indig e nt in a federal
habeas proceeding is eligible for

compensat~on

1964; see 1 also 1 Rule 53 (8 ).
9/29/75
PJN
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Greg Palm

DATE:

February 26, 1976

Summary of arguments against permitting
4th Amendment Claims under § 2254
1.

History and Language:

Section 2254 provides that

courts should have the power to grant habeas writs whenever
a person is being held "in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States."

As originally

construed by this Court, this power was limited to an examination
of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.

In the leading

case of Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 203, the Court stated:

An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be
unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute
nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court
has general jurisdiction of the subject, although
it should be erroneous.
Over time the Court steadily expanded the scope of the writ
(much of the early expansion was due to the fact criminal
convictions were not generally reviewable by the Supreme Court
until the latter part of the last century) culminating in the
view developed

in~

v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), that habeas

petitioners might raise any constitutional claim, unless there
has been a failure to exhaust or intentional waiver.

This

history is important in that it demonstrates that the operative
phrase of the statute presents no immutable obstacle to the view
that you first espoused in Scheneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.
218, 250 (1972).

Moreover, read literally the language of

2.
the section would require a prisoner to be freed if confined
in violation of any law.

But it is my understanding that the

Court has never pushed the writ that far.
332

u.s.

See Sunal v. Lange,

174 (1947).

Also useful with respect to the literal language of the
statute is the idea, adhered to in Fay, that habeas is an
equitable remedy and discretion is therefore an important
ingredient:
"Discretion is implicit in the statutory conunand
that the judge • . . 'dispose of the matter as
law and justice require,' 28 U.S.C, § 2242 . • . . "
372 U.S., at 438.
Justice Black emphasized the equitable ' nature of habeas in
his dissent in Kaufman.

Of course, when Fay talked of discretion

it was quite clear that this discretion was not meant to include
the

right~ consider 4th Amendment claims.

But the

principle that heabeas is equitable in nature has recently
been applied by Justice Stewart in Francis v. Henderson to say
that a state prisoner can't challenge the composition
(w\.fM \..4.

grand jury on habeasf
some use here.

.W...\U ~no.~~ c:W- '"' ~·~

-~,the

c::..-·"

Consequently the principle may be of

Justice Black made the argument that the

possibility of the applicant's innocence must be an important
factor in the equitable balance.
a similar position.

In Bustamante you opted for

The innocence position is useful in that

it permits a balance to be drawn against allowing
habeas claim:

ca.

particular

the arguments in favor of finality of state

court judgments outweigh the need for habeas relief in the
context of 4th Amendment claims since the evidence is often

3.
the most probative available and there is no question of
innocence.

(There is a problem with the innocence rationale

to the extent that Justice Stewart declined to join Justice
Black's reliance on that idea in Kaufman; he was willing,
however, not to permit 4th Amendment claims in §

225~

petitions;

perhaps his only point was to limit the scope of his dissent
to the Fourth Amendment.)
In Bustamonte you examined the legislative history of the
1966 Amendments to § 2254 and concluded that there was nothing
there which is inconsistent with the innocence rationale.

I

agree that there is no compelling evidence that the innocence
rationale is wrong.

But I do not think that that history is

very relevant to the issue here.

It is true that the amendments

were designed to limit habeas in certain respects, but Congress
was not concerned with the kind of claims that might be asserted.
Moreover, the House and Senate Reports recognize

that

this Court's cert jurisdiction does not permit adequate review
· of federal claims.

Finally, I think that the reliance placed

on the state of the law regarding § 2255 cases at the time of
the 1966 Amendments is misplaced.

It is true that 8 of 10

Circuit Courts of Appeal did not permit 4th Amendment claims
by federal prisoners under § 2255.

It is also true, however,

that many, if not most, of the circuits that did not permit
such claims to be raised in § 2255 permitted them to be raised
by state prisoners under § 2254.
statistic is relevant, it

~

Thus, to the extent that

in fact cuts the other way.

4.
2.

Policy:

A.

Federalism Principle:

friction between state and

federal courts (Bustamonte):
The weight accorded this factor, as well as the side of
the scale on which it is placed, turns entirely on the
perceptions one has regarding the need to have federal courts
pass on federal constitutional claims.

The argument will be

that whenever the State affords the individual an adequate
process for presenting his constitutional claims there is no
need to have them re-tried in a federal forum.

This assumes

that state court judges will be as vigilant as federal court
judges in adhering to the Constitution and that any slippage
can be caught on review by this Court.

(A related notion is

the idea thathaving one more court pass on a claim does not
assure that the final result reached is correct; it only
increases the likelihood of a different result).
B. Finality: Balance between finality interests and interest
in freeing those convicted because of evidence seized in violation
of the 4th Amendment weighs in favor of the former.

These

finality interests include:
1.

duplication of judicial effort

2.

delay in setting the criminal proceeding to

3.

postponed fact limitation; inherently less

rest

reliable: (a) respecting the postconviction claim
itself; (b) respecting the issue of guilt if the

.
5.
collateral attack succeeds in a form which allows
retrial.

These

finall~ interests

outweigh the interest

in freeing a person whose guilt is not in question.
The only real interest under this Court's recent
decisions is the deterrence value of the exclusionary
rule as a protector of 4th Amendment values.

The

argument will be that the federalism and finality interests
identified above outweigh the marginal deterrent effect

*

of applying the exclusionary rule in this context.

G.P.
ss

lfp/ ss

Bustamante Analysis

2/26/76

28 U.S.C. 2254 provides for federal habeas review on
behalf of a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution • • . of the United
States".
A prisoner who has had a fair opportunity to assert his
Fourth Amendment claim in a state trial and on appeal to a
state court is not in custody in violation of the Constitution.
He may be in custody in violation of the Exclusionary Rule,
but we have said three times (since
a personal constitutional right.

~)

that this Rule is not

See Calandra, Tucker and

Peltier.
The Exclusionary Rule was developed by this Court as a
means of implementing the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

There can be no doubt

that Congress could modify the Rule (for example, as suggested
by the American Law Institute) or substitute some other means
of implementing the constitutional provision.
Unless this is true, a good many extremely thoughtful
scholars and judges have been wasting a lot of time in considering
the problem of the societal injury resulting from the mechanical
or absolutist application of the Exclusionary Rule.

See, for

example, articles by Friendly, Oaks and - most recently - by
Professor Monaghan i~:~ivember issue of the Harvard Law

Review; the protracted by t e ALI, and the like.

"
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Attys., were on the brief, submitted on
the brief for appellee.
Before BASTIAN, Senior Circuit Judge,
and WRIGHT and LEVENTHAL, Circuit
Judges.
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:
[1] In this case we are asked to reconsider our doctrine 1 that ordinarily a
claim of iiiegal search and seizure may
not be raised collaterally under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. Our prior holdings (supra, note
1) are in accord with the opinions of
most of the other circuits, which have
ruled that collateral review is not available, either on the law or by way of evidentiary hearing.2 However, there have
been recent statements to the contrarytechnically in dicta-in circuit opinions 3
based on views believed to be inherent in
and required by recent Supreme Court
opinions. Accordingly we have reexamined our earlier position. We confirm
that generally a claim by a federal prisoner that evidence admitted at his trial
was the fruit of an unconstitutional
search or seizure is not properly the
ground of a collateral attack on his conviction. As further noted below, this
rule is subject to an exception for special
circumstances which are not present in
this case.
On June 1, 1960, appellant Charles J.
Thornton was arrested at his home by
Federal narcotics agents. After indict1. E.g., Plummer v. United Stutes, 104 U.S.
App.D.C. 211, 260 F.2d 729 (1958);
Jones v. United Stutes, 103 U.S.App.D.C.
326, 258 F.2d 420, cert. denied, 357 U.S.
932, 78 S.Ct. 1377, 2 L.Ed.2d 1374
(1958) ; Edwards v. United Stutes, 103
U.S.App.D.C. 152, 256 F.2d 707, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 847, 79 S.Ct. 74, 3 L.Ed.
2d 82 (1958); Wilkins v. United Stutes,
103 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 258 F.2d 416, cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 942, 78 S.Ct. 1396, 2 L.
Ed.2d 1557 (1958); White v. United
States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 235 F.2d
221 (1956).

2. E.g., United Stutes v. De Fillo, 182 F.
Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y.1959), uff'd per curium on opinion below, 277 F.2d 162 (2d
Cir. 1960); United Stutes v. Jenkins, 281
F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1960); Nash v. United
Stutes, 342 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1965);
Armstead v. United Stutes, 318 F.2d 725

ment on thirty-seven counts of conspirac,
and substantive violations of the dru .
laws, he and four co-defendants wer
tried and found guilty on all counts. Ar
pellant was sentenced on January 1, 1961
to eighteen years in prison, but this tern
was later reduced to the eight year con
finement he is presently serving. An ap
peal was taken from the judgments o
conviction, and in the course of a brief o
over eighty pages, eleven major ground
for reversal were urged. Although thi
court found errors as to two of the de
fendants, appellant's conviction was af
firmed, sub nom. Brown v. United State1
112 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 299 F.2d 43
(1962). Certiorari was denied. 370 U.~
946, 82 S.Ct. 1593, 8 L.Ed.2d 812 (1962:
In the intervening years, appellan
filed several motions and petitions, seek
ing various kinds of relief on numerou
grounds. The present proceeding bega;
when, on January 18, 1965, he filed
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacat
or set aside his sentence, alleging firE
that evidence illegally obtained by the a1
resting officers had been admitted a
his trial, in contravention of the Fourt
Amendment; and, second, that tri~
counsel neglected to file a pre-trial rna
tion to suppress the purportedly uncon
stitutionally seized evidence, and this cor.
stituted ineffective assistance of coun
sel, violative of the Sixth Amendment.4
The District Court appointed counsE
and held an evidentiary hearing at whic:
(5th Cir. 1963); Eisner v. United Stutes,
351 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1965); Thompson
v. United States, 315 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 843, 84 S.Ct. 93,
11 L.Ed.2d 70 (1963); Kapsulis v. United Stutes, 345 F.2d 392 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 946, 86 S.Ct. 406, 15 L.
Ed.2d 354 (1965) ; Sinks v. United States,
318 F.2d 436. (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 946, 84 S.Ct. 355, 11 L.Ed.2d 279
(1963); Cox v. United States, 351 F.2d
280 (8th Cir. 1965); Warren v. United
Stutes, 311 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1963);
Williams v. United Stutes, 307 F.2d 366
(9th Cir. 1962).
3. United Stutes v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221
(4th Cir. 1963); Gaitan v. United Stutes,
317 F.2d 494 (lOth Cir. 1963).
4. At the hearing appellant abandoned the
claim that he never received a prelim-

THORNTON v. UNITED STATES
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appellant was pei·mitted to testify. Because of the intimate relationship between the illegal search and inadequate
counsel points the court allowed counsel
to probe the circumstances of the arrest
and search without ruling whether this
kind of issue might properly be raised on
a Section 2255 motion. Appellant testified that he was awakened at 4 :30 A.M.
on June 1, 1960, by a loud rapping at his
front door. While he arose to answer the
knock, he heard someone "busting" or
"kicking" in the porch door. When he
opened the door, his visitors identified
themselves as federal officers and claimed they had a warrant for his arrest.
They were invited · in, and proceeded to
search appellant and his apartment. In
the course of their examination, they discovered and seized personal effects, and
in addition an address book and a slip of
paper linking appellant to some of his codefendants. The admission of these two
items in evidence at the trial is the basis
of appellant's Fourth Amendment claim.
The Government did not cross-examine
appellant on the circumstances of the arrest.
On the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel, appellant testified that his
counsel had not queried him about the details of the arrest, and despite assurances
that he would recover appellant's personal
effects made no motion to that end. Appellant admitted that he might not nave
requested his counsel to recover the address book and slip of paper, or mentioned their incriminating potential.
[2] Appellant's former counsel, called
to the stand, had no recollection of the
details of the consultations and proceedings of five years ago. The court and the
parties agreed to let the record speak for
itself. The transcript of the original
trial revealed that counsel for the co-deinary hearing before a United States
Commissioner, and was thus not accorded
due process of law.
5. A fed eral prisoner may not seek habeas
-if a motion to the sentencing court is
"authorized." 28 U.S.C. § 2255, V 7
(1964).
368 F.2d-52 '1z

fendants did most of the questioning;
that although the suppression motion was
not made by appellant's lawyer, yet that
attorney concurred in the motion of counsel for co-defendants, who indeed served
as lead counsel during the entire trial.
The court held that the failure to file an
independent motion in appellant's behalf
to suppress the evidence in question did
not under the circumstances amount to a
constitutional inadequacy of counsel. We
affirm this ruling, and do not consider
the point to require further discussion.
Insofar as the motion rested on the
unreasonableness of the search and seizure, it was denied with a ruling by the
court that as a matter of law the admission in evidence of the fruits of an illegal
arrest, search, or seizure cannot serve as
the basis of a motion under § 2255.
[ 3, 4 ] The extent of relief and review
available on a § 2255 motion is the same
as that'open to a petitioner seeking vindication of his right3 by the habeas corpus
route.5 The only difference is that Congress enacted § 2255 in the 1948 Judicial
Code in order to provide a less cumbersome remedy, through consideration by
the sentencing court rather than the district of confinement. United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219, 72 S.Ct. 263,
96 L.Ed. 232 (1952); Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427- 428, 82 S.Ct.
468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962).
[5, 6] Many opinions declare that collateral attack, as by habeas corpus, is
available to correct the denial of a constitutional right.a This is the general
rule but it is not an a!llioiute. 'these
pressrO'Iis d o not ofi'Ifterate the doctrine
that the normal and customary method
of correcting trial errors, even as to constitutional questions, is by appeal, and
that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for the regular judicial process of
trial and appeal in the absence of cir-

rx-

6. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 409,
83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Hill
v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82
S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962); Hawk
v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 274, 66 S.Ct. 116,
90 L.Ed. 61 (1945).
.
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cumstances indicating collateral attack is
needed to provide an effective mean's of
preserving constitutional rights. Sunal
v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 179- 180, 67 S.Ct.
1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947); Waley v.
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-105, 62 S.Ct.
964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942); United
States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 321- 323
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 857, 83
S.Ct. 1906, 10 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1963).

I

[7, 8] As noted in Smith v. United
States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 85, 187 F.2d
192, 197 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
927, 71 S.Ct. 792, 95 L.Ed. 1358 (1951):
"Where the alleged error of the trial
-court is in the admission of evidence subject to correction on appeal, and there
is representation by counsel, habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy." Collateral review is available, however, for
the denial of a constitutional right accompanied by "weakness in the judicial
process which has resulted in the 'conviction", such as lack of counsel, perjury un·discovered, mob domination, etc. ld. at
.86, 187 F.2d at 198.

federal judiciary. Sunal v. Large, supra,
332 U.S. at 182, 67 S.Ct. 1588.
[10] Our rejection of the availability
of collateral review for claims of unreasonable search and seizure (in the absence of exceptional circumstances) is
not attributable to a low regard for the
significance of the Fourth Amendment
in our times and civilization. On the contrary; the magnitude of the Fourth
Amendment in our constitutional constellation has prompted unusual remedies
by Congress, as well as the courts. For
more than fifty years, evidence secured
by unconstitutional means has been held
inadmissible at trial.s Exclusion at trial
was supplemented, not in time but in effectiveness, by unusual remedies permitting pre-trial suppression of the items
unlawfully seized. These remedies were '
developed both through the 12ower of
~ to forestall injury, and through a
dynamic jurisdiction built on an inherent
supervisory authority over the prosecution, an authority construed to embrace
not only the attorney in court but to reach
back to the previous activity of the enforcement agents underlying the prosecution. This judicial fountainhead of authority is now crystallized in and survives Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Smith v. Katzenbach, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 117-119, 351
F .2d 810, 814- 816 (1965).

[9] Whether collateral attack is permissible depends on the nature of the
-constitutional claim, the effectiveness of
the direct remedies, and the . need for
-choices among competing considerations
in quest of the ultimate goal of achievement of justice. The decision is not predetermined by the absolute availability of
judicial power, but reflects the need to
fathom and delineate the claims and cir-cumstances that make the exercise of
power appropriate.' The courts are called
·on to evolve and provide procedures and
remedies that are effective to vindicate
-constitutional rights. However, where
effective procedures are available in the
direct proceeding, there is no imperative
to provide an additional, collateral review,
leaving no stone unturned, when exploration of all avenues of justice at the behest
of individual petitioners may impair judi·cial administration of the federal courts,
.as by making criminal litigation interminable, and diverting resources of the

Thus the diligence and dynamism of
the federal courts have provided remedies
to maximize protection of these particular constitutional rights. Remedies are
available not only during the trial, but at
its commencement and indeed prior to
the inception of the trial and if need be
the indictment. The corollary, however,
is a contraction of the need for enlarging
collateral review in order to assure effective vindication of the constitutional
interests involved.
At the same time it becomes appropriate to consider the substantial disadvantages of collateral review in terms
of judicial administration. First in time

7. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27, 59
S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455 (.1939).

8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 38.'1,
34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). ~

THORNTON v. UNITED STATES
Cite ns 368 F .2d 822 (196Gl

there is the reasonable anticipation of a
larger number of hearings on petitions
that will prove to be insubstantial in fact .
We would resolutely breast a flood of
frivolity to rescue the stray meritorious
claim if that were needed for effective
vindication of constitutional protection,
and there were no comprehensive procedure available at and before trial. Compare Machibroda v. United States, 368
U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473
(1962). Here as already observed that
effort is not required to vindicate the
rights involved, and on the contrary this
use of the courts would defer other cases
that do present substantial claims and
calls on judicial time.9 Second is the difficulty of belated determinations. The
ascertainment of what constituted "probable cause," typically a subtle and indeed
elusive question, is made incomparably
more difficult and often artificial as recollections dim and witnesses are unavailable.10 The difficulty is not eradicated
by noting that the accused would have
the burden of proof. The narration of
the events which he now provides, after
protracted and intense rumination, may
unwarrantedly overshadow the cloudy recall of officers for whom this was but
one case among hundreds. When the inquiry is made at trial or seasonably ordered on direct appeal, there is enough
proximity to the problem to permit at
least the probabiiity of a searching inquiry. But postpone the adjudication
Until some collateral proceeding years
9. For n recent article commenting on the
difficulty faced by Fede ral courts in
keeping up with the volume of judicial
business, see 'Vright, The Federal Colt1·ts
-.1 Century After Appomattox , 52 A.B.

A.J. 742. 743 (1966).
We appreciate that the adminis trative
considera tions outlined in thi s paragraph
apply to collateral review gen erally, and
specifically indeed to collateral attack on
this ground of ineffective assistance of
counsel, which may be intertwined with a
search and seizure contention. But as
this case illus trates the evidence as well
as the determination may be diffe rent
when the court is considering only ineffe<'tive assistance of counsel; here, for
example, there was no need to cull the
arresting officers as witn esses. The
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hence and the examination is likely to
be phantasmic. See generally Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637, 85 S.Ct.
1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); Hodges v.
United States, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 377,
282 F.2d 858, 860 (1960) (en bane), cert.
dismissed, 368 U.S. 139, 82 3.Ct. 235, 7
L.Ed.2d 184 (1961). Last but by no
means least is the fact that the court can
take timely corrective action without jettisoning the trial if a valid search and
seizure claim is presented at or before
trial. But if the claim were entertained
on collateral attack it would not only
scrap the completed trial but also, taking
into account the possible subsequent unavailability of witnesses present or available at the original trial, might well imperil the public interest in securing a just
convict! on.
Courts should be reluctant to let general considerations of administration require injustice in the particular case.
That reluctan::e is overcome by the
weighty consideration, diluting the fear
of particular injustice, that the claim of
unreas:.mable search and seizure does not
weaken the probative value of the evidence against the accused. It is partly
because the rule of exclusion is not a
truth-protecting device that the Supreme
Court decreed last year that Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.
2d 1081 (1961), would be given only
prospective effect in State convictions.
Linkletter v. Walker, supra. Collateral
attack is negatived not only by the rule
heavy burden resting on the appellant
claiming ineffec tive assi s tance of counsel
is not likely to be ignored. Hence ineffective a ssistance of counsel is not likely
to be tol e rated as a backdoor for arguing
search and seizure claims. In any event
the balancing of interes ts involved leads
to different conclusions as to availability
of collateral review for these different
contentions.
10. There is a corres ponding "increased
difficulty of proving perjury" when testimony about the disputed event comes
years afterward. See Wright & Sofaer,
F edeml Habeas Corpus tor State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 920-21

(1966).
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against retrospectivity, which is relevant
but not controlling, but by the consideration that collateral attack would be of little if any weight in achieving the pattern
of lawful conduct by enforcement officials which is the objective of the exclusionary rule.
Enforcement officials
know that evidence unreasonably seized
is subject to exclusion by resort to a
variety of motions. There is no basis
for s upposing that their conduct will be
substantially influenced by the additional
possibility of an inquiry years hence. 11
Compare Amsterdam, Search, Seizure,
and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U.Pa.
L.Rev. 378, 389- 90 (1964), who suggests
that additional deterrence, if any, has
passed the point of diminishing returns,
and inflicts disproportionate harm on the
public interest in confinement and rehabilitation of wrongdoers. That courts
will not pursue ad infinitum the objective
of deterring a blundering constabulary
is vividly illustrated by the rule that prohibits an accused from objecting to evidence obtained by the unreasonable
search of another, so long as his own
property or privacy was not disturbed,
even though the evidence incriminates
him and may be a critical ingredient in
the prosecution's case against him.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U .S. 471,
491- 492, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
(1963).
In our view the rule here applied is
fully consonant with the spirit as well as
holdings of recent Supreme Court decisions. Nothing in Sanders v. United
States, 373 U .S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.
2d 148 (1963), points in the opposite direction. The Court there merely reconfirmed the principle th:;tt notions of res
judicata have no bearing on habeas or §
2255 inquiries. Therefore the fact that
a point was not raised in the first collateral petition is no bar to later consideration. Accordingly if a point could
have been considered if it had been presented in the first collateral motion or
II. If it is hypothesized that an officer
might be ready to cope with an inquiry
at trial but unwilling to grapple with a
post-trial hearing when his memory has

petition, its omission from the first petition is not by itself a bar to its consideration in a subsequent application. Here,
however, the type of error is one, we
think, that is not appropriate for consideration in any § 2255 motion.
One Circuit has focused on a reference
in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,
428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962),
that an error was "neither jurisdictional
nor constitutional," as a declaration that
a claimed violation of any constitutional
right is subject to collateral review under
§ 2255. See United States v. Sutton, 321
F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir. 1963). We do not
interpret this isolated remark in HiU to
reflect a radical extension of relief under
§ 2255. It is noteworthy that this phrase
was immediately qualified by the more
traditional standard, when the Court
noted that the deficiency was not "a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,
nor an omission inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure."
368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471.
Nor is our result contrary to the recent Supreme Court opinions markedly
extending the power of federal courts to
inquire by habeas corpus into the validity
of state convictions assailed on the
ground that federal constitutional rights
have teen violated. See, e. g., Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.
Ed.2d 837 (1963); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770
(1963). We assume for present purposes
that federal habeas corpus will lie, at
least to some extent, to consider the claim
of a state prisoner that he was convicted
on the basis of the fruits of an unconstitutional search and seizure. Compare
Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965).
We do not read these cases, however, as
portending a change by which federal
convictions would be laid vulnerable to
collateral attack. Rather they recognize
a different and fundamental concern, and
dimmed, that would suggest he might be
likewise deterred by such prospect from
making even searches and seizures he
considers reasonable.

THORNTON v. UNITED STATES
Cite as 368 F.2d 822 (1966)

reflect the principle that except in the
most flagrant cases of waiver or default,
such as "deliberate bypassing" of the
state forum, a state prisoner is entitled to
a federal forum on his federal constitutional claims. The significance of fact
finding in a federal forum on the all-important constitutional facts has resulted
in the unique, and at first encounter
startling, consequence that·federal collateral review is apparently preferred over
direct appeal (to the Supreme Court) as
providing optimum federal judicial consideration.12 In any event, the recent
decisions broadening collateral review as
an assurance of the federal judicial process to state accused afford no comparable
collateral machinery to federal prisoners
who have already had access to the federal judicial process: access to a federal
trial judge- indeed undei· § 2255 to the
same federal judge if available; access
to an array of effective federal remedies
for rooting out the fruits of unreasonable
searches; and access to the federal appellate system.
The exceptional circumstances that
may warrant reference to § 2255 for the
claim of unconstitutional search and seizure would include instances of "weakness in the [Federal] judicial process
12. The exaltation of collateral review re-

flects the disadvantages in direct federal
appeal from state courts-practical limitations on shaping and review of the factual record, as well as the Supreme
Court's staggering case load.
As to the need that a federal court be
involved in the details of discovery and
determination of "constitutional facts,"
it has been suggested that it is because
state courts have not adequately performed their role that the Supreme
Court has called upon the federal district
courts as a back-stop 'for the vindication
of federal rights. See Wright and Sofaer, supra note 10, at 898, quoting
Professor Bator's "thoughtful comment
on why federal judges may be better suited to pass on federal issues." Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus 101- State P1·isoncrs. 76

HARV.L.REV. 441, 510 (1963).
It may be noted that at the state trial
of Billie Sol Estes the judge, in reject-
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which resulted in the conviction." Smith
v. United States, supra. Such instances
would include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in a denial
of Sixth Amendment rights. The proper
limits of such a claim need not be defined
here. It suffices that the Sixth Amendment claim by appellant has not prevailed.13 We do not undertake to consider
what other "exceptional circumstances"
may warrant an evidentiary hearing in a
collateral review based on unreasonable
search or seizure.u In this case there
was access to the federal court system, no
showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and no other allegations indicating that appellant was frustrated
from presentation of the claim of unreasonable search or seizure at or before
trial. We see no exceptional circumstances leading us to stretch an exception to the general rule against collateral
review.
Affirmed.
J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
This appeal from denial of a motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 presents two
questions. The first, whether counsel at
Thornton's trial was ineffective, is easily
disposed of. It is based almost entirely
ing defendant's claim that his rights under the Federal Constitution were being
violated, remarked that the case was "not
being tried under the Federal Constitution." Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 556, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1639, 14 L.Ed.2d
543 (1965) (Warren, C. J., concurring).
The Supreme Court may be concerned
that other state judges, though not saying so overtly, likewise fail to provide
an understanding and objective consideration of Federal constitutional claims.
13. Appellant does not contend that the

failure to appeal the denial of the suppression motion establishes ineffective
assistance of counsel. We examined the
record on the original appeal, and found
a number of substantial points ably presented. Of course even a strong point
at trial may be weak on appeal if the issue is one of fact and there is evidence
both ways_
14. See Amsterdam, supra, at 391 n. 60.
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Fourth Amendment Claims under
§ 2254
Three years ago in Bustamante I concluded:
"I would hold that federal collateral review
of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claims claims which rarely bear on innocence - should
be confined solely to the question of whether the
petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to
raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts."
Four members of this Court agreed with the foregoing
Court
view. A majority of the/concluded in Bustamante, however,
that it was unnecessary then to confront this issue.
Argument in favor of 4th Amendment Claims
Few people - judges or scholars - argue that societal
interests are served - on balance - by the absolute, mechanical
rule that is now followed.

This rule authorizes federal

collateral review, usually years after the crime, of a prisoner's
claim.

He will have presented this claim to a state trial

court, it will have been reviewed by the state appellate
court and perhaps certiorari denied by this Court.

Often

many years later, a single district judge will find some
defect in the search warrant and order an admittedly guilty
defendant released.

At this time, the state may not have

the evidence to retry him.
The end result:

a single federal judge has overruled

two state courts; a defendant, not entitled under our

2.
Constitution even to a right of appeal, in effect has had
three or four chances - not to show his innocence but to prove
some technical fault by law enforcement; judicial systems,
federal and state, further have been burdened; the convicted
defendant, rather than focusing on rehabilitation while in
prison, is filing habeas corpus petitions; the objective of
finality in the law is frustrated; the defendant, often a
professional criminal, is put back on the street; and public
respect for the law understandably suffers.

No one possibly

could sustain the affirmative of an argument that this
mechanical, blind type of justice, serves society.
But the argument for continuing what I deeply believe is
an injustice to societal interests also seems to me to be
mechanical rather than rational.
It starts with a ruling by four Justices in

~'

applying a rule of evidence - the Exclusionary Rule - to the
states in constitutional terminology.
argued

in~

The issue had not been

nor discussed in Conference.

Without ever

reexamining the issue, the Court has now followed
than a decade.

It is said that

~

~

for more

now controls these cases.

The Statute - § 2254
§

2254 provides for federal habeas review on behalf of

a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution".
~

The argument goes that

constitutionalized the Exclusionary Rule, and therefore

3.
§

2254 compels habeas review.

Recent Authority to the Contrary
Three times within the l a st two years, a majority of this
Court (six Justices in one instance) have said - in effect that

~

cannot be read as creating a personal constitutional

right in the Exclusionary Rule.

Nothing in the 4th Amendment

itself supports the Rule, and certainly nothing supports an
absolute, unbending rule.

In any event, we have decided -

unless the Court now wishes to change its mind - that the Rule
itself is not a constitutional right.

Calandra, Tucker and

Peltier.
Distinction between Trial and Habeas Corpus
One may concede some tension between what was said in
~

and what has been said in Calandra, Tucker and Peltier.

But the tension can be resolved in several ways, without
overruling

~·

May I say here that I have no disposition

to abolish the Exclusionary Rule in trials and direct appeals,
although I would read some rationality into the Rule.

We

need not address this issue today.
The Exclusionary Rule is simply a means - one means of implementing the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

In effect, it is a

rule of evidence - and certainly one not engraved in marble.

4.
This Court has never expressly held, in an opinion addressing
the issue, that the Rule must be applied in habeas corpus.
There is a footnote in Kaufman, but this is dictum.

To be

sure, courts have applied it in habeas, but without confronting
or addressing the reason for doing so.

As stated in my

Bustamonte opinion, I would not extend the Rule to collateral
review - certainly of 4th Amendment claims that have been
reviewed in the state courts.

But it is unnecessary, perhaps,

to go as far as I would be willing.
Habeas Corpus has characteristics of an equitable remedy
As noted in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438:
"Discretion is implicitr in the statutory command
that the judge 'dispose of the matter as law and
justice require' 28 U.S. § 2242 . . . "
Justice Black emphasized the equitable nature of habeas
in his dissent in Kaufman.

Justice Stewart, recently, in

Francis v. Henderson, recognized the equitable nature of habeas
in holding that a state prisoner cannot challenge the composition
of the grand jury on habeas.
There are few equities on the side of a defendant
who asserts a 4th Amendment claim on habeas, usually years
after his conviction.

The deterrence rationale of the

Exclusionary Rule is virtually non existent at that time.
There are powerful equities on the other side:

the interest

of finality of judgments; federalism; and the overwhelming
public interest of compelling guilty defendants to serve
their terms.

s.
But there can be cases - even 4th Amendment cases when the equities would justify applying the Exclusionary
Rule on habeas review.
I suggest that reverting to equitable principleswould
be consistent with history, justice, common sense and the
public interest.
L. F. P., Jr.

ss
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Three years ago in Bustamonte I concluded:
"I would hold that federal collateral review
of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claims claims which rarely bear on innocence - should
be confined solely to the question of whether the
petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to
raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts."
Four members of this Court agreed with the foregoing
Court
view. A majority of the./concluded in Bustamonte, however ,
that it was unnecessary then to confront this issue.
Argument in favor of 4th Amendment Claims
Few people - judges or scholars - argue that societal
interests are served - on balance - by the absolute, mechanical
rule that is now followed.

This rule authorizes federal

collateral review, usually years after the crime, of a prisoner's
claim.

He will have presented this claim to a state trial

court, it will have been reviewed by the state appellate
court and perhaps certiorari denied by this Court.

Often

many years later, a single district judge will find some
defect in the search warrant and order an admittedly guilty
defendant released.

At this time, the state may not have

the evidence to retry him.
The end result:

a single federal judge has overruled

two state courts; a defendant, not entitled under our

2.
Constitution even to a right of appeal, in effect has had
three or four chances - not to show his innocence but to prove
some technical fault by law enforcement; judicial systems ,
federal and state, further have been burdened; the convicted
defendant, rather than focusing on rehabilitation while in
prison, is filing habeas corpus petitions; the objective of
finality in the law is frustrated; the defendant, often a
orofessional criminal, is put back on the street; and public
respect for the law understandably suffers.

No one possibly

could sustain the affirmative of an argument that this
mechanical, bli nd type of justice, serves society.
But the argument for continuing what I deeply believe is
an injustice to societal interests also seems to me to be
mechanical rather than rational.
It starts with a ruling by four Justices in
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applying a rule of evidence - the Exclusionary Rule - to the
states in constitutional terminology.
argued in
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The issue had not been

nor discussed in Conference.

Without ever

reexamining the issue, the Court has now followed
than a decade.
The Statute §

It is said that
§

~

~

now controls these cases.

2254

2254 provides for federal habeas review on behalf of

a state prisoner ''only on the ground that he is in
in violation of the
~

for more

~onstitution".

cus~tody

The argument goes ·that

constitutionalized the Exclusionary Rule, and therefore

3.
§

2254 compels habeas review.

Recent Authority to the Contrary
Three times within the .!L ast·· •tw® years, a majority of this
Court (six Justices in one instance) have said - in effect that

~

cannot be read as creating a personal constitutional

right in the Exclusionary Rule .

Nothing in the 4th Amendment

itself supports the Rule, and certainly nothing supports an
absolute, unbending rule .

In any event, we have decided -

unless the Court now wishes to change its mind - that the Rule
itself is not a constitutional right.

Calandra , Tucker and

Peltier.
Distinction between Trial and Habeas Corpus
One may concede some tension between what was said in
~

and what has been said in Calandra, Tucker and Peltier .

But the tension can be resolved in several ways, without
overruling

~·

May I say here that I have no disposition

to abolish the Exclusionary Rule in trials and direct appeals,
although I would read some rationality into the Rule.

We

need not address this issue today.
The Exclusionary Rule is simply a means - one means of implementing the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

In effect, it is a

rule of evidence - and certainly one not engraved in marble .

4.
This Court has never expressly held, in au opinion

addressi~

the issue, that the Rule must be applied in habeas corpus.
There is a footnote in Kaufman, but this is dictum.

To be

sure, courts have applied it in habeas, but without confronting
or addressing the reason for doing so.

As stated in my

Bustamante opinion, I would not extend the Rule to collateral
review - certainly of 4th Amendment claims that have been
reviewed in the state courts.

But it is unnecessary, perhaps,

to go as far as I would be willing.
Habeas Corpus has characteristics of an equitable remedy
As noted in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438:
''Discretion is implicity in the statutory command
that the judge 'dispose of the matter as law and
justice require' 28 U.S. § 2242 • • . "
Justice Black emphasized the equitable nature of habeas
in his dissent in Kaufman.

Justice Stewart, recently, in

Francis v. Henderson, recognized the equitable nature of habeas
in holding that a state prisoner cannot challenge the

compositio~

of the grand jury on habeas.
There are few equities on the side of a defendant\V'ho
who asserts a 4th Amendment claim on habeas, usually years
after his conviction.

The deterrence rationale of the

Exclusionary Rule is virtually non existent at that time.
There are powerful equities on the other side:
of finality of judgments; federalism; and the

the interest
overwhel~ing

public interest of compelling guilty defendants to serve
their terms.

5.
But there can be cases - even 4th Amendment cases when the equities would justify applying the Exclusionary
Rule on habeas review.
I suggest that reverting to equitable principleswould
be consistent with history, justice, common sense and the
public interest.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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Justice Powell:
I assumed Conference was to begin at 10:~~.
In any case I was not able to locate a whole
lot. Att~hed is the portion of Stewart's
opinion to whic~ I referred. Also attached are
relevant parts~ Fa~ where the x equitable
principle is referred~to. Obviously Fah used xkl
this in a more limited sense.
Stewart as
exoanded the concept in Henderson.(Also the
oortion of Blacks dissent in Kaufman that is
relevant.).
Greg
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practice in this area has been far from uniform, 38 and even
greater divergency has characterized the practice of the
lower federal courts. 37
For the present, however, it suffices to note that rarely,
if ever, has the Court predicated its deference to state procedural rules on a want of power to entertain a habeas
application where a procedural default was committed by
the defendant in the state courts. Typically, the Court,
like the District Court in the instant case, has approached
the problem as an aspect of the rule requiring exhaustion
of state remedies, which is not a rule distributing power
as between the state and federal courts. See pp. 417-420,
supra. That was the approach taken in the Spencer and
Daniels decisions, the most emphatic in their statement
of deference to state rules of procedure. The same considerations of comity that led the Court to refuse relief to
one who had ~t yet availed himself of his state remedies
likewise prompted the refusal of relief to one who had inexcusably failed to tender the federal questions to the state
courts. Either situation poses a threat to the orderly
administration of criminal justice that ought if possible to
be averted. Whether in fact the conduct of a Spencer or
36 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, is the most striking example
of the Court's seeming refusal to give effect to a state procedural
ground, though the Court's language is ambiguous. 261 U. S., at
91-92.
37
Compare, e. g., United Stat es ex rel. Kozicky v. Fay, 248 F. 2d
520 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1957); Whitley v. Steiner, 293 F. 2d 895 (C. A.
4th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Stewart v. Ragen, 231 F. 2d 312
(C. A. 7th Cir. 1956); and United States ex rel. Dopkowski v. Randolph, 262 F. 2d 10 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1958), with, e. g., Ex parte Houghton, 7 Fed. 657, 664, 8 Fed. 897, 903 (D. C. D . Vt. 1881); Pennsylvania v. Cavell, 157 F. Supp . 272 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1957), aff'd
mem., 254 F . 2d 816 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1958); Johns v. Overlade, 122 F.
Supp. 921 (D. C. N. D . Ind. 1953); Morrison v. Smyth, 273 F. 2d
544, 547 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1960); United States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen,
158 F . 2d 346, 352 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1946).
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a Daniels was inexcusable in this sense is beside the point,
as is the arguable illogicality of turning a rule of timing
into a doctrine of forfeitures. The point is that the Court,
by relying upon a rule of discretion, avowedly flexible,
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, yielding always to "exceptional circumstances," Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19,
27, has refused to concede jurisdictional significance to
the abortive state court proceeding.
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III.
We have reviewed the development of habeas corpus
at some length because the question of the instant case
has obvious importance to the proper accommodation of
a great constitutional privilege and the requirements of
the federal system. Our survey discloses nothing to suggest that the Federal District Court lacked the power
to order Noia discharged because of a procedural forfeiture he may have incurred under state law. On the
contrary, the nature of the writ at common law, the
language and purpose of the Act of February 5, 1867, and
the course of decisions in this Court extending over nearly
a century are wholly irreconcilable with such a limitation. At the time the privilege of the writ was written
into the Federal Constitution it was settled that the writ
lay to test any restraint contrary to fundamental law,
which in England stemmed ultimately from Magna
Charta but in this country was embodied in the written
Constitution. Congress in 1867 sought to provide a
federal forum for state prisoners having constitutional
defenses by extending the habeas corpus powers of the
federal courts to their constitutional maximum. Obedient to this purpose, we have consistently held that federal
court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an
unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by anything
that may occur in the state court proceedings. State pro-
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edies available to him when he applies for federal habeas
corpus relief gives state courts the opportunity to pass
upon and correct errors of federal law in the state pris:oner's conviction. And the availability to the States of
· eventual review on certiorari of such decisions of lower
federal courts as may grant relief is always open. Our
function of making the ultimate accommodation between
state criminal law enforcement and state prisoners' constitutional rights becomes more meaningful when grounded
in the full and complete record which the lower federal
courts on habeas corpus are in a position to provide.

v.
Although we hold that the jurisdiction of the federal
courts on habeas corpus is not affected by procedural defaults incurred by the applicant during the state court
proceedings, we recognize a limited discretion in the federal judge to deny relief to an applicant under certain
circumstances. Discretion is implicit in the statutory
command that the judge, after granting the writ and holding a hearing of appropriate scope, "dispose of the matter
as law and justice require," 28 U. S. C. § 2243; and discretion was the flexible concept employed by the federal
courts in developing the exhaustion rule. Furthermore,
habeas corpus has traditionally been regardea as ioverned
by eguitable principles. United States ex rel. S · v.
Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573 (dissenting opinion). Among
them is the principle that a suitor's conduct in relation to
the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he
seeks. Narrowly circumscribed, in conformity to the historical role of the writ of habeas corpus as an effective and
imperative remedy for detentions contrary to fundamental law, the principle is unexceptionable. We therefore
hold that the federal habeas judge may in his discretion
deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed
the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing
has forfeited his state court remedies.
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decision had become what is generally considered
"final"- he filed in the Federal District Court the present
motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, asking that his sentence be vacated on the ground, among others, that
the trial court had committed error in not suppressing
the evidence against him because the articles had been
obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. Despite the
fact that he has never, either in his trial or in this proceeding, asserted that he had not actually physically committed the robbery with a pistol, and despite the fact that
this plainly reliable evidence clearly shows, along with the
other evidence at trial, that he was not insane, the Court
is reversing his case, holding that he can collaterally
attack the judgment after it had become final. I dissent.
My dissent rests on my belief that not every conviction
based in part on a denial of a constitutional right is
subject to attack by habeas corpus or § 2255 proceedings
after a conviction has become final. This conclusion is
supported by the language of § 2255 which clearly suggests that not every constitutional claim is intended to
be a basis for collateral relief.l And, as this Court has
said in Fay v. N oia, with reference to habeas corpus,
"Discretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge . . . 'dispose of the matter as law
and justice require,' 28 U. S. C. § 2243 .... " 372
u. s. 391, 438.
Of course one important factor that would relate to
whether the conviction should be vulnerable to collateral
1
"If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law
or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such
a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner
a.s to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court
shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or · correct the sentence
as may appear appropriate." 28 U. S. C. § 2255. (Emphasis
supplied.)

KAUFMAN v. UNITED STATES.
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attack is the possibility of the applicant's innocence.
For illustration, few would think that justice requires
release of a person whose allegations clearly show that
he was guilty of the crime of which he had been convicted.
I agree with the Court's conclusion that the scope of
collateral attack is substantially the same in federal
habeas corpus cases which involve challenges to state
convictions, as it is in § 2255 cases which involve challenges to federal convictions. The crucial question, however, is whether certain types of claims, such as a claim
to keep out relevant and trustworthy evidence because
the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure,
should normally be open in these collateral proceedings.
This question was fully and carefully considered by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114,
368 F. 2d 822 (1966), and I agree substantially with the
opinion of Judge Leventhal for the majority of that
court, which states: 2
"[G]enerally a claim by a federal prisoner that evidence admitted at his trial was the fruit of an
unconstitutional search or seizure is not properly
the ground of a collateral attack on his conviction.
As further noted below, this rule is subject to an
exception for special circumstances . . . .

.t would relate to

"Many opinions declare that collateral attack, as
by habeas corpus, is available to correct the denial
of a constitutional right. This is the general rule
but it is not an absolute. . . .

erable to collateral
.vas rendered without
not authorized by law
t there has been such
rights of the prisoner
eral attack, the court
all discharge the pris. correct the sentence
§ 2255. (Emphasis

"The courts are called on to evolve and provide procedures and remedies that are effective to vindicate
constitutional rights. However, where effective procedures are available in the direct proceeding, there
2

125 U. S. App. D. C., at 116-118, 368 F. 2d, at 824-826.
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v. POWELL
v. RICE

As these two cases present the same issue, we
deal with them in a single opinion.
Courts of Appeals,

on~

Both come from U.S.

from the Sixth and the other from

the Ninth Circuit.
Each of the respondents was convicted of murder
in trials in California and Nebraska state courts, and
their convictions were affirmed on appeal .

Thereafter,

each sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.

They contended that evidence seized during illegal
searches and seizures - the murder weapon in one case, and
dynamite particles in the defendant's pocket in the other should have been excluded from evidence under the exclusionary
rule.

The federal courts of appeals agreed , and granted

the writs of habeas corpus.
Petitioners here, wardens of the state prisons,
contend that the exclusionary rule - at least in Fourth
Amendment cases - should not be applied in federal habeas
corpus proceedings.

Although this Court, in several prior

cases, has assumed the application of the rule, we have
never heretofore specifically addressed this issue.
The primary justification for the Exclusionary Rule
is the deterrence of unlawful police conduct.

·.

The rule

2.

was created by this Court as a'means of effectuating
the important rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.
For many years the rule was not deemed applicable in state
courts.

But 15 years ago,

in~

v. Ohio, the Court extended

the rule to trials and appeals in the state courts.
Decisions subsequent to

~

have established that

the Exclusionary Rule is not a personal constitutional
right.
Even at trial and on direct review the cost of
applying the Exclusionary Rule are not insubstantial:

the

focus of a trial is diverted from the ultimate question of
guilt or innocence, that should be the central concern in
a criminal proceedings.
Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be excluded
under the rule often is the most probative information bearing
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Kaufman v. United
States (1969), eight years

after~'

stated:

'~ claim of illegal search and seizure is
crucially different from many other
constitutional rights; . . . often [the
evidence seized]
. . . alone establishes
beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that
the defendant is guilty."

Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process, and often frees the guilty.

3.

These costs of the Exclusionary Rule apply with
special force when, following conviction and appeal in a state
court, the issue is again presented on ha4eas corpus.
Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the rule
is to deter police misconduct, we conclude that the contribution
of the rule toward restraining police misconduct is minimal
when applied on collateral attack - long after trial and appeal.
We make clear the limited scope of our decision.
We do not consider in this case the habeas corpus
statute as a means for relitigating constitutional claims
generally.

We hold only that a federal court need not apply

the Exclusionary Rule, on a Fourth Amendment claim, absent a
showing that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity
for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and
on direct review.
In short, the application of the rule on habeas
is limited to cases in which there has been both such a showing
and a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Chief Justice has filed a concurring opinion.
Mr. Justice White also has filed a dissenting opinion.
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Mr. Justice Marshall has joined.
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TO:
FROM:

Greg Palm

DATE:

June 2, 1976

Powell, Jr.
Powell and Rice
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Do you think there should be any cross reference in
our cases to Justice Blackmun's opinion Janis?

.iu:pTttttt <!fcurt cf tqt ~ttittb

~agqmgtmt. ~.

Of.

.ita;ttg

2ll&TJ!.'

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 4, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1055 & 74-1222 - Stone v. Powell

Dear Lewis:
I shall write separately in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

j

~u:.prtntt
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

/

June 11, 1976
PERSONAL

Re: 74-1055 -Stone v. Powell

Dear Lewis:
I write you without copies to the Conference at this
time because if you are not prepared to make the suggested
change, there is no point in adding to the "paper flood."
Page 24 for me puts more "glue and gloss" on the
exclusion rule. It is unnecessary dictum. At most, no one
has a right to ask any more than something like: "This case
does not present any question as to the validity of the
exclusionary rule as applied at trial • • . . " in place of
the first two lines, second paragraph, page 24.

Mr. Justice Powell

Nos. 74-1055 and 74-1222 -- Stone v. Powell
To: The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr

Chief Justi ce
J uatice Brennan
Justice St3\'Jn.rt
Justice lh:r sha ll
J ustice Bl J.c- kmun
~r. J ustice Po·.':e ll
Mr. Ju~; tice TI .;hncpis t
Mr. J usti ce Stevens

From: Mr . Justice

~h i te

Circulat ed:
Recircul at ed: _ _ _ __ _

'
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MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

For many of the reasons stated by
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, I cannot agree that the
writ of habeas corpus should be any less
available to those convicted of state crimes
where they allege Fourth Amendment violations
than where other constitutional issues are
presented to the federal court.

Under the

amendments to the habeas corpus statute, which
were adopted after Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), and represented an effort by Congress
to lend a modicum of finality to state criminal
judgments,

~cannot disti~uish be~een ~u:fh ~

-----

Amendment and other constitutional issues.

'
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Suppose, for example, that two confederates
I

in crime, Smith and Jones, are tried separately for
I

a state crime and convicted on the very same evidence,

tO~ including evidence seized incident to their
\
~legedly made without probable cause. 1Their

arrest al-

con;titutional

claims are fully aired, rejected and preserved on appeal.
Their convictions are affirmed by the State's highest court.
Smith, the first to be tried, does not petition for certiorari, or does so but his petition is denied.

Jones, whose

conviction was considerably later, is more successful.

His

petition foi certiorari is granted and his conviction reversed because this Court, without making any new rule of
law, simply concludes that on the undisputed facts the

-----

arrests were made without probable cause and the challenged

......._.

evidence was therefore seized in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

---.......

The State must either retry Jones or release

him, necessarily because he is deemed in custody in violation
of the Constitution.

It turns out that without the evidence

illegally seized, the State has no case; and Jones goes
free.

Smith then files his petition for habeas corpus.

He makes no claim that he did not have a full and fair
hearing in the state courts, but asserts that his

Stone v. Powell
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Fourth Amendment claim had been erroneously decided
and that he is being held in violation of the
federal Constitution.

He cites this Court's decision

in Jones' case to satisfy any burden placed on him by
§

2254 to demonstrate that the state court was in

error.

Unless the Court's reservation, in its present

opinion, of those situations where the defendant has
not had a full and fair hearing in the state courts is
intended to encompass all those circumstances under
which a state criminal judgment; may be reexamined under
§

2254 -- in which event the opinion is essentially

meaningless and the judgment erroneous -- Smith's
petition would be dismissed, and he would spend his
life in prison while his colleague is a free man.

I

cannot believe that Congress intended this result.
Under the present habeas corpus statute, neither
Rice's nor Powell's applications for habeas corpus
should be dismissed on the grounds now stated by the
Court.

-

I would affirm the judgments of the Courts of

-

Appeals as being acceptable applications of the ex~......--~s:u~,.,..._,pqw ......_~"""'-'"'-•------------'='

clusionacy _!'ll.le applicable in state criminal trials by
•

~

virtue

of~

._............,

,...,

..........

......

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

01=
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- 4 I feel constrained to say, however, that I
would join four or more other Justices in substantially
limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule as presently
administered under the Fourth Amendment in federal and
state courts •

..

W~ther I would have joined the Court's opinion

in~

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), had I then been

a member of the Court, I do not know.

But as time went

on after coming to this bench, I became convinced that
both Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and
~

v. Ohio had overshot their mark insofar as they

aimed to deter lawless action by law enforcement personnel
and that in many of its applications the exclusionary rule
was not advancing that aim in the slightest and in this
respect was a senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth
in many criminal trials.
The rule has been much criticized and suggestions
have been made that it should be wholly abolished, but I
would overrule neither Weeks v. United States nor
Ohio.

----- -

~

v.

I am nevertheless of the view that the rule should
~

~-

~

be substantially modified so as to prevent
its application

in those many circumstances where the evidence at issue

Stone v. Powell
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--

was seized by an officer acting in the good faith
~

,...,

~

~

belief that his conduct comported with existing law
and having reasonable grounds for this belief.

These

are recurring situations; and recurringly evidence is
excluded without any realistic expectation that its
exclusion will contribute in the slightest to the
purposes of the rule, even though the trial will be
affected or the indictment dismissed.
An officer sworn to uphold the law and to
apprehend those who break it inevitably must make
judgments regarding probable cause to arrest:

is there

reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that a particular suspect has committed
it?

Sometimes the historical facts are disputed or are

otherwise in doubt.

In other situations the facts may

be clear so far as they are known, yet the question of
probable cause remain.

In still others there are special

worries about the reliability of secondhand information
such as that coming from informants.

In any of these

situations, which occur repeatedly, when the officer is
convinced that he has probable cause to arrest he will
very likely make it.

Except in emergencies, it is

probable that his colleagues or superiors will participate

Stone v. Powell
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in the decision, and it may be that the officer will
secure a warrant, although warrantless arrests on
probable cause are not forbidden by the Constitution
or by state law.

Making the arrest in such circum-

stances is precisely what the community expects the
police officer to do.

Neither officers nor judges

issuing arrest warrants need delay apprehension of the
suspect until unquestioned proof against him has accumulated.

The officer may be shirking his duty if he

does so.
In most of these situations, hopefully the
officer's judgment will be correct; but experience tells
us that there will be those occasions where the trial or
appellate court will disagree on the issue of probable
cause, no matter how reasonable the grounds for arrest
appeared to the officer and though reasonable men could
easily differ on the question.

It also happens that

after the events at issue have occurred, the law may
change, dramatically or ever so slightly, but in any
event sufficiently to require the trial judge to hold that
there was not probable cause to make the arrest and to
seize the evidence offered by the prosecution.

It may

also be, as in the Powell case now before us, that there

Stone v. Powell
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is probable cause to make an arrest under a particular
criminal statute but when evidence seized incident to
the arrest is offered in support of still another
criminal charge, the statute under which the arrest and
seizure were made is declared unconstitutional and the
evidence ruled inadmissible under the exclusionary rule
as presently administered.
In these situations, and perhaps many others,
excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is
painfully apparent that in each of them the officer is
acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in
similar circumstances.

Excluding the evidence can in no

way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him
less willing to do his duty.

It is true that in such

cases the courts have ultimately determined that in their
view the officer was mistaken; but it is also true that
in making constitutional judgments under the general
language used in some parts of our Constitution, including
the Fourth Amendment, there is much room for disagreement
among judges, each of whom is convinced that both he and hi s
colleagues are reasonable men.

Surely when this Court

Stone v. Powell

- 8 divides five to four on issues of probable cause,
I

it is not tenable to conclude that the officer was
I

at fault or acted unreasonably in making the arrest.
When law enforcement personnel have acted
I

mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable
grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is
later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent
effect.

The officers, if they do their duty, will

act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in
the future; and the only consequence of the rule as
presently administered is that unimpeachable and
probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and
the truth-finding function of proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally aborted.

This

makes the law a fool.
Admitting the evidence in such circumstances
does not render judges participants in Fourth Amendment
violations.

The violation, if there was one, has

already occurred and the evidence is at hand.

Furthermore,

there has been only mistaken, but unintentional and fault less, conduct by enforcement officers.

Exclusion of the

evidence does not cure the invasion of the defendant's
rights which he has already suffered.

Where an arrest has

Stone v. Powell

- 9 been made on probable cause but the defendant is
acquitted, under federal law the defendant has no
right to damages simply because his innocence has
been proved.

"A policeman's lot is not so unhappy

that he must choose between being charged with
dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he
has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if
he does."

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).

The officer is also excused from liability for "acting
under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid
but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face
or as applied."

Id.

There is little doubt that as

far as civil liability is concerned, the rule is the
same under federal law where the officer mistakenly but
reasonably believes he has probable cause for an arrest.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court announced generally that
officers of the Executive Branch of the Government should
be immune from liability where their action is reasonable
"in light of all the circumstances, coupled with goodfaith belief."
went on to say:

416 U.S. 232, 247-248 (1974).

The Court

Stone v. Powell
- 10 "Public officials, whether governors,
I

mayors or police, legislators or
I

judges, who fail to make decisions when
they are needed or who do not act to
implement decisions when they are made
do not fully and faithfully perform
the duties of their offices.

Implicit

in the idea that officials have some
immunity--absolute or qualified--for
their acts, is a recognition that they
may err.

The concept of immunity

assumes this and goes on to assume that
it is better to risk some error and
possible injury from such error than not
to decide or act at all."

Id., at

241-242 (footnote omitted).

The Court has proceeded on this same basis in other
contexts.

O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);

Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
If the defendant in criminal cases may not
recover for a mistaken but good faith invasion of his
privacy, it makes even less sense to exclude the

Stone v. Powell
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evidence solely on his behalf.

He is not at all

recompensed for the invasion by merely getting his
property back.

It is often contraband and stolen

property to which he is not entitled to in any
event.

He has been charged with crime and is seeking

to have probative evidence against him excluded, although often it is the instrumentality of the crime.
There is very little equity in the defendant's side
in these circumstances.

The exclusionary rule, a

judicial construct, seriously shortchanges the public
interest as presently applied.
accordingly.

I would modify it

To: Mr. Justice
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v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 441 (1971), it seems
clear to me that the exclusionary rule has been operative long enough to
demonstrate its futility and that the time has come to modify its reach if
no more.

Over the years, the strains imposed by reality have led the

Court to vacillate as to the rationale for deliberate exclusion of truth from
the fact-finding process.

The rhetoric has varied with the rationale, to the

point where it has now become a doctrinaire result in search of validating
reasons.
The exclusionary rule now rests solely upon its purported tendency to
deter police misconduct.

United States v. Janis, Slip opinion, at 13 (1976);

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).

Other rhetorical

generalizations, including the "imperative of judicial integrity," have not
withstood analysis.

- 2 -

Proof is lacking that the rule, a judge-created device, serves the
purpose of deterrence and, of course, as to inadvertent conduct it is hardly
relevant.

Despite Herculean efforts, no empirical study has been able to

demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does in fact have any deterrent
effect.

United States v. Janis, Slip opinion, at 16 and n. 22.

To vindicate

the continued existence of this judge-made rule, it is incumbent upon those
who seek its retention to demonstrate that it serves its avowed purpose,

See, e.g. ,

outweighing its heavy cost•
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (1962).

The burden rightly rests

upon those who ask society to ignore trustworthy evidence of guilt, at the
expense of setting the guilty free.

It is, in my view, an abdication of our

responsibility to exact such excessive costs from society if we do so on the
basis of totally unsubstantiated assumptions.

Judge Henry Friendly has

observed:
"[T]he same authority that empowered the Court to supplement
the [fourth] amendment by the exclusionary rule a hundred and
twenty-five years after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify
that rule as the 'lessons of experience' may teach." Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif.
L.Rev. 929, 952-953 (1965).
In Bivens, I suggested that, despite its grave shortcomings, perhaps
the rule need not be abandoned until some meaningful alternative could be
developed to protect innocent persons damaged by police action.

With the

passage of time, it now appears that the continued existence of the rule,

- 3 -

as presently implemented, actually inhibits the development of any alternatives.

The reason is quite simple: incentives for developing new procedures

or remedies must remain minimal or nonexistent so long as the exclusionary
rule is retained in its pre sent posture.

It can no longer be assumed that

other branches of government will act while judges cling to this draconian1
discredited device.

Legislatures are unlikely to act at all so long as persons

charged with serious crimes continue to reap the enormous benefits of the
exclusionary rule.

With this extraordinary

11

remedy 11 for Fourth Amend-

ment violations, legislatures might assume that nothing more should be
done, even though a grave defect of the exclusionary rule is that it offers
nothing to victims of overzealous police work who never appear in court.
Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U .L.
Rev. 1, 14 (1969).

And even if legislatures were inclined to experiment

with alternative remedies, they have no assurance that the judicially created
rule will be modified or abolished in response to such legislative remedies.
The unhappy result, as I see it, is that alternatives will inevitably be stymied
by rigid adherence on our part to the exclusionary rule.

I venture to predict

that overruling this judicially invented doctrine -- or limiting its scope to
egregious police conduct -- would inspire a surge of activity toward providing
statutory remedies for innocent victims.

- 4 The Court• s opinion today eloquently recounts the dismal social costs
occasioned by the rule.

Ante, at 21-23.

And Mr. Justice White observes

today that, in many instances, the exclusionary rule constitutes a
obstacle to arriving at the truth in many criminal trials.

11

11

senseless

Post, at _ _ .

He therefore suggests that the rule be substantially modified

11

so as to

prevent its application in those many circumstances where the evidence at
is sue was seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct
comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief. 11
Post, at

His view has much to commend it.

The exclusionary rule had its genesis in the natural desire to
protect private papers.
(dictum).

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886)

From this origin, the rule has now been carried to the point of

excluding from evidence the body of a homicide victim.

See Mitchell v.

New York, __N.Y. 2d __ (1976), petition for cert. pending.
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (1962).
It is time to change .
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 16, 1976
PERSONAL

Re:

(74-1055 - Stone v. Powell
(74-1222 - Wolff v. Rice

Dear Lewis:
In the rush of these days you may not get to
my problems with the "endorsement" of the
exclusionary rule at p. 24. If you find it
possible to adopt something along the Hnes
of my suggestion I can join the opinion.
Meanwhile I am circulating a concurring
opinion calling for the end or modification
of the exclusionary rule-- one of the great
hoaxes on the public in its present form.

Mr. Justice Powell
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER
I concur in the judgment.
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 441 (1971), it seems
clear to me that the exclusionary ru1e has been operative long enough to
demonstrate its futility and that the time has come to modify its reach if
no more.

Over the years, the strains imposed by reality have led the

Court to vacillate as to the rationale for deliberate exclusion of truth from
the fact-finding process.

The rhetoric has varied with the rationale, to the

point where it has now become a doctrinaire resu1t in search of validating
reasons.
The exclusionary rule now rests solely upon its purported tendency to
deter police misconduct.

United States v. Janis, Slip opinion, at 13 (1976);

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).

Other rhetorical

generalizations, including the ''imperative of judicial integrity," have not
withstood analysis.

- 2 Proof is lacking that the rule, a judge-created device, serves the
purpose of deterrence and, of course, as to inadvertent conduct it is hardly
relevant.

Despite Herculean efforts, no empirical study has been able to

demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does in fact have any deterrent
effect.

United States v. Janis, Slip opinion, at 16 and n.22.

To vindicate

the continued existence of this judge-made rule, it is incumbent upon those
who seek its retention to demonstrate that it serves its avowed purpose,
See, e.g.,

outweighing its heavy cost•
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (1962).

The burden rightly rests

upon those who ask society to ignore trustworthy evidence of guilt, at the
expense of setting the guilty free.

It is, in my view, an abdication of our

responsibility to exact such excessive costs from society if we do so on the
basis of totally unsubstantiated assumptions.

Judge Henry Friendly has

observed:
"[T)he same authority that empowered the Court to supplement
the [fourth) amendment by the exclusionary rule a hundred and
twenty-five years after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify
that rule as the 'lessons of experience' may teach." Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif.
L.Rev. 929, 952-953 (1965).
In Bivens, I suggested that, despite its grave shortcomings, perhaps
the rule need not be abandoned until some meaningful alternative could be
developed to protect innocent persons damaged by police action.

With the

passage of time, it now appears that the continued existence of the rule,
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as presently implemented, actually inhibits the development of any alternatives.

The reason is quite simple: incentives for developing new procedures

or remedies must remain minimal or nonexistent so long as the exclusionary
rule is retained in its pre sent posture.

It can no longer be assumed that

other branches of government will act while judges cling to this draconian1
discredited device.

Legislatures are unlikely to act at all so long as persons

charged with serious crimes continue to reap the enormous benefits of the
exclusionary rule.

With this extraordinary

11

remedy" for Fourth Amend-

ment violations, legislatures might assume that nothing more .should be
done, even though a grave defect of the exclusionary rule is that it offers
nothing to victims of overzealous police work who never appear in court.
Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U .L.
Rev. 1, 14 (1969).

And even if legislatures were inclined to experiment

with alternative remedies, they have no assurance that the judicially created
rule will be modified or abolished in response to such legislative remedies.
The unhappy result, as I see it, is that alternatives will inevitably be stymied
by rigid adherence on our part to the exclusionary rule.

I venture to predict

that overruling this judicially invented doctrine -- or limiting its scope to
egregious police conduct -- would inspire a surge of activity toward providing
statutory remedies for innocent victims.

Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell)

6/17/76

Consider adding a footnote along the following lines
(possibly note 32a)

32a.

The Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion,

addresses generally the application of the exclusionary
rule.

Ante at

Mr. Justice White, although dissenting

in this case, states that he would join four or more other
Justices "in substantially limiting the reach of the
Exclusionary Rule".

Ante at

We find no occasion

in this habeas corpus case to question the application
of the rule at trial and on direct appeal, as we think it
unnecessary to reach the broader issues addressed by the
Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice White.

6/17/76

Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell)

Consider adding a footnote along the following lines
(possibly note 32a)

32a.

The Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion,

addresses generally the application of the exclusionary
rule.

Ante at

Mr. Justice White, although dissenting

in this case, states that he would join four or more other
Justices "in substantially limiting the reach of the
Exclusionary Rule".

Ante at

We find no occasion

in this habeas corpus case to question the application
of the rule at trial and on direct appeal , as we think it
unnecessary to reach the broader issues addressed by the
Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice White.

LFP/gg

6-18-76

Rider A, p. 24 (Stone v. Powell)

We assume that the continued vitality of these
assumptions justifies the application of the Exclusionary
Rule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state

. .
32a
court convLctLons,

b ut t h ey d o not support Lts
.

application on collateral review.
if any, of the

The additional contribution,

LFP/gg

6-18-76

32a.
opinio~ and

Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell)

The Chief Justice, in his concurring

Mr. Justice White in his dissent, address

generally the application of the exclusionary rule.
at

and

Ante

But we find no occasion in this habeas

corpus case to question the application of the rule at trial
and on direct appeal, as we think it unnecessary to reach
the broader issues addressed by the Chief Justice and by
Mr. Justice White.

See n. 16, supra.
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Reporter of Decisions.

Syllabus

STONE, WARDEN v. POWELL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-1055. Argued February 24, 1976-Decided June -, 1976*
Respondent in No. 74-1055, was convicted of murder in state court,
in part on the basis of testimony concerning a revolver found on
his person when he was arrested for violating a vagrancy ordinance. The trial court rejected respondent's contention that the
testimony should have been excluded because the ordinance was
unconstitutional and the arrest therefore invalid. The appellate
court affirmed, finding it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because of the court's conclusion that the
error, if any, in admitting the challenged testimony was harmless,
beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent then applied for habeas
corpus relief in the Federal District Court, which concluded that
the arresting officer had probable cause and that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional the deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule did not require that it be applied to bar
admission of the fruits of a search incident to an otherwise valid
~trrest. The court held, alternatively, that any error in admission
of the challenged evidence was harmless. The Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that the ordinance was unconstitutional; that
respondent's arrest was therefore illegal; and that, although exclusion of the evidence would serve no deterrent purpose with regard to officers who were enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion
would deter legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes.
The court also held that admission of the evidence was not harmless error. In No. 74-1222, respondent was also convicted of murder in a state court, in part on the basis of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant which respondent on a suppression
*Together with No . 74-1222, Wolff, Warden v. Rice, on appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
I

li

STONE v. POWELL
Syllabus
motion claimed was invalid. The trial court denied respondent's
motion to suppress, and was upheld on appeal. Respondent then
filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court. The
court concluded that the warrant was invalid, and rejected the
State's contention that in any event probable cause justified the
search. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Where the State,
as in each of these cases, has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may
not be granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained through an unconstitutional search and ·seizure was introduced at his trial. In this context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment
is minimal as compared to the substantial societal costs of applying
the rule. Pp. 7-26.
(a) Until these cases this Court has had no occasion fully to
examine the validity of the assumption made in Kaufmah v. United
States, 394 U. S. 217, that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth, requires
the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were held in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, to require exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review.
P. 13.
(b) The Mapp majority justified application of the exclusionary
rule chiefly upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct, and though preserving the integrity of the
judicial process has been alluded to as also justifying the rule,
that concern is minimal where federal habeas corpus relief is
sought by a prisoner who has already been given the opportunity
for full and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at
trial and on direct review. Pp. 16-18.
(c) Despite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction
of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons;
in various situations the Court has found the policies behind the
rule outweighed by countervailing considerations. Pp. 18-21.
(d) The ultimate question of guilt or innocence should be the
central concern in a criminal proceeding. Application of the exclusionary rule, however, deflects the truthfinding process and often
frees the guilty. Though the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity, in part through nurturing respect for Fourth Amend-

STONE v. POWELL
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Syllabus
ment values, indiscriminate application of the rule may well generate disrespect for the law and the administration of justice.
Pp. 21-23.
(e) Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, the
assumption has been that the exclusionary rule deters law enforcement officers from violating the Fourth Amel).dment by removing
the incentives to disregard it. Though the Court adheres to that
view as applied to the trial and direct-appeal stages, there is no
reason to believe that the effect of applying the rule would be appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be
raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. Even
if some additional deterrent effect existed from application of the
rule in isolated habeas corpus cases, the furtherance of Fourth
Amendment goals would be outweighed by the detriment to the
criminal justice system. Pp. 24-26.
No. 74-1055, 507 F. 2d 93; No. 74-1222, 513 F. 2d 1280, reversed.

74-1055 and 74-1222 Stone and Rice
Dear Chief:
Here is a copy of my opinion (second draft) in the above
cases, with riders attached which incorporate changes which I
hope you will find satisfactory.

As you will recall, we took these cases because they
clearly presented the issue whether the exclusionary rule
should apply on a collateral attack based on the Fourth Amendment. This i was the issue I addressed in my concurring opinion
· in Bustamante, which you joined. At that time, Potter also
was willing to join five other Justices, but was unwilling
then to make the fiftli"Vote. Pr .i.or to granting the above
cases, Bill Rehnquist and I conferred with Potter to see
whether he considered them appropriate vehicles to reconsider
the issue. I think I kept you advised of this.
At our Conference, Byron expressed a willingness to adopt
, a "good faith" modification of the exclusionary rule even as
, applied to trial and appeal, a position which both Bill
Rehnquist and I have expressed sympathy for in the past. But
Potter and John flatly stated their unwillingness to join an
opinion going so far, or expressing any dissatisfaction with
' .the rule at trial and on direct appeal.

MJ distinct understanding at Conference, therefore, was
that there were six firm votes to dispose of these cases solely
on the applicability of the exclusionary rule to Fourth Amendment issues raised on habeas corpus. The or.inion was written
that way. Footnote 16 (p. 14) states that 'we find it unnecessary to consider the. other issues concerning the exclusionary
, rule raised by the parties".

It was against this background that I found your "concurring in result only" opinion so surprising. In any event,
I have gone back to Potter and cleared with him the riders
now attached to pages 24 and 25. They say two things: (i)
that we merely assume the continued vitality of the assumptions
that have been relied upon to support the rule; and (ii) in
the new footnote on page 25, we make crystal clear that we
need not and do not reach the question of the application of
the rule at trial and on direct appeal.
The footnote, and the change in the text, allow you to
join the opinion and also file your concurrence without
substantial change of any kind. You will be perfectly free
in the future, as will all of us, to advance the view you
have advocated for some time.
I have not gone back to John Stevens, as I will be in
a stronger position with him if I have prior approval .by both '
you and Potter. br ·
Sincerely,

The

.fu.p:rtntt <qll'ltrlltf tift~~ .ftaf:tg
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 2 1 , 1 9 7 6
PERSONAL

Re:

( 74-1055 - Stone v. Powell
( 74-1222 -Wolff v. Rice

Dear Lewis:
Confirming our telephone conversation:
1.

I find the previous (print) version on p. 24 more
tolerable than your proposed typed version.

2.

With some slight changes I will let my concurring
opinion stand.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell

~u.pr.tm:t ~ltllrl of tltt J:nitt~ .jtzdtg
'~lhtsftinght~ ~. ~· 20~~~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 21 , 1 9 7 6

Re:

(74-1055 - Stone v. Powell
(74-1222 -Wolff v. Rice

Dear Lewis:
I have concluded to join your opinion in the above
case.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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Mr. Justice White
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Nos. 74-1055 & 74-1222

Reo1rcu1ated:
W.T. Stone, Warden, Petitioner

v.

)
)
)

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court o: Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

)

Lloyd Charles Powell
No. 74-1055

)
)
)

Charles L. Wolff, Jr •• Warden,
Petitioner

)
)

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

)

v.

)
)

David L. Rice
No. 74-1222

)
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
The Court today holds "that where the State has provided
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial."

Ante, at 26.

To

be sure, my brethren are hostile to the continued vitality of the
exclusionary rule as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, as today' s
decision in United States v. Janis, post, at _ _ , confirms.

But

this case, despite the veil of Fourth Amendment terminology employed by the Court, does not involve any question of the right of a
defendant to have evidence excluded from use against him in his
criminal trial when that evidence was seized in contravention of

7
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rights ostensibly secured
ments.

l.l
by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-

Rather, it involves the question of the availability of a

federal forum for vindicating those federally guaranteed rights.
Today' s holding portends substantial evisceration of federal habeas
..

....

....

........

corpus jurisdiction, and I dissent.

______..._.__

The Court's opinion does not specify the particular basis on
which it denies federal habeas jurisdiction over claims of Fourth
Amendment violations brought by state prisoners.

In light of the

?:_I

-

-

explicit language of 2 8 U.S. C. § 22 54,
....

...F1"t ..._.,-..,

significantly not even

mentioned by the Court, I can only presume th:1t the Court intends
to be understood to hold either that respondents are not "in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,

11

or that

"considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration
of justice,

11

-

ante, at n. 11,

II

-

are sufficient to allow this Court to re-

writf! jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress.

....

Neither ground of

decision is tenable; the former is simply illogical, and the latter is
an arrogation of power committed solely to the Congress.

I

Much of the Court's analysis implies that respondents are not
entitled to habeas relief because they are not being unconstitutionally
detained.

Although purportedly adhering to the principle that the

- 3 -

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "require exclusion 11 of evidence
seized in violation of their commands, ante, at 13, we are told that
there has merely been an "assumption" in our cases that "the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment . . • requires the granting of habeas
relief when a prisoner has been convicted in state court on the basis
of evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure
13.

i/

Applying a "balancing test,

11

see,

~·,

••

11

Ante, a t

ante, at 19, 20, 21, 26,

the Court then concludes that the "assumption" is unfounded and that
the policies of the Fou.rth Amendment would not be implemented if
claims to the benefits of the exclusionary rule were cognizable in

~./
collateral attacks on state court convictions.
Understandably the Court must purport to cast its holdin g in
constitutional terms, because that avoids a direct confrontation w l th
the incontrovertible facts that (a) the habeas statutes have heretofore
'
•I
,,
I . . J .J- (
always been construed to grant jurisdiction to entertain Fourth Amend- l..{)"l.t.lt.A ,

II

:;: z:;:

---' ..

---

..._--, ...

_.,.,

~

~

ment claims of both state and federal prisoners, that (b) Fourth
-------~

,... .....,.......,

..........__....... .......~.-......

.....

Amendment principles have been enforced in numerous cases on
collateral review of final convictions, and that (c) Congress has
legislatively accepted our interpretation of congressional intent as
to the necessary scope and function of habeas relief.

Indeed, the

Court reaches its result without explicitly overruling any of our
plethora of precedents inconsistent with that result or even discussing

- 4 -

principles of stare decisis.

Rather, the Court simply asserts, in

essence, that the Justices joining those prior decisions or reaching
the merits of Fourth Amendment claims overlooked the obvious
constitutional dimension to the problem in m.erely "assuming" that
granting collateral relief when state courts erroneously decide Fourth
Amendment issues would effectuate the principles underlying that

I

&_I
Amendment.
to

o ~ cure

But shorn of the rhetoric of "interest balancing" used

l

.\

what is at stake in this case, today' s attempt t:::. rest the

..........................

decision on the Constitution must fail so long as Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), remains undisturbed.
Under Mapp, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a state
court

~exclude

~

unconstitutionally obtained evidence from the trial

of an individual whose Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated by a search or seizure that directly or indirectly resulted in
the acc;uisition of that evidence.
338, 34 7 ( 1974), said,

11

As Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S.

evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim

]_I
of the illegal search and seizure.

11

When a state court admits st:('h

evidence, it has committed a constitutional error, and unless that
error is harmless under federal standards, see,

~·,

Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), it follows ineluctably that the defendant
has been placed "in custody in violation of the Constitution" within the

'(~

-
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comprehension of 28 U.S. C. § 2254.

In short, it escapes me as

to what logic can support the assertion that the defendant's unconstitutional confinement obtains during the process of direct review,

'§_/
no matter how long that process takes, but that the unconstitutionality

I

then suddenly dissipates at the moment the claim is asserted in a
collateral attack on the conviction.
The only conceivable rationale upon which the Court's "constitutional" thesis might rest is the statement that "the [exclusionary]
rule is not a person::1.l constitutional right . • . .

Instead, 'the rule is

a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect. ' 11 Ante, at 18, quoting
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., at 348.

____....._,

Although my dissent in

Calandra rejected, in light of contrary decisions establishing the role
of the exclusionary rule, the premise that an individual has no constitutional right to have unconstitutionally seized evidence excluded

J_/
from all use by the government, I need notdispute that point here.
For today' s holding is not su

ortable in logic even under Calandra.

However the Court reinterprets Mapp, and whatever the rationale now
attributed to Mapp' s holding or the purpose of the exclusionary rule,
the prevailing constitutional rule is that unconstitutionally seized evidence cannot be admitted in the criminal trial of a person whose federal
constitutional rights were violated by the search or seizure.

The
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erroneous admission of such evidence is a violation of the Constitution
(Mapp inexorably means this at least, or there would be no basis for
applying the exclusionary rule in state criminal proceedings), and an

-----------------~--~----~

accused against whom such evidence is admitted has been convicted
in derogation of rights mandated by, and is "in custody in violation of,"
the Constitution of the United States.

Indeed, since state courts vio ·

late the strictures of the federal Constitution by admitting such evidence,
then even if federal habeas review did not directly effectn:tte Fourth
'--..

~

~ ........._

r..

..-_

~

'"r.w

Amendment values, a proposition I deny, that review would nevertheless
~

serve to effectuate what is concededly a constitutional principle con-

.........

..............

---~

~...,.,....,...-

~.....

~

...-,/

cerning admissibility of evidence at trial.
The Court, assuming without deciding that respondents were
convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained evidence erroneously admitted against them by the state trial courts, acknowledges
that n;spondents had the right to obtain a reversal of their convictions
on appeal in the state courts or on certiorari to this Court.

Indeed,

since our rules relating to the time limits for applying for certiorari
in criminal cases are non-jurisdictional, certiorari could be granted
respondents even today and their convictions be reversed, despite
today' s decision.

See also

infra.

And the basis for

reversing that conviction would of course have to be that the State, in
rejecting respondents' Fourth Amendment claims, had deprived them
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of a right in derogation of the Federal Constitution.

It is simply

inconceivable therefore that that constitutional deprivation suddenly

------~---_.~--~------------

~

vanishes after the appellate process has been exhausted.

.

~-

~,..._.,_ ~--

,_,_

._

..................

And as

between this Court on certiorari, and federal district courts on
habeas, it is for Congress to decide what the most efficacious method
is for enforcing federal constitutional rights and asserting the primacy
of federal law.

See

infra.

The Court, however, simply

ignores the settled principle that for purposes of adjudicating constitutional claims Congress, which has the power to do so under Article
~-----

I II of the Constitution, has effectively cast the distri

courts sitting

in habeas in the role of surrogate Supreme Courts

,.

Today' s opinion itself starkly exposes the illogic of the Court's
seeming premise that the rights recognized in Mapp somehow
evaporate after all direct appeals are exhausted.

suddenly ~

For the Court would

not bar assertion of Fourth Amendment claims on habeas if the defendant
was not accorded "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim
in the state courts.

11

Ante, at 1.

See also id., at 12, quoting

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J.,
curring); ante, at 18, 21, 23, 26 & n. 16.

-

,,
~

~;.;on-

But this "exception" is

-

impossible if the Court really means that the "rule" that Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas is constitutionally based.
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For if the Constitution mandates that "rule" because it is a "dubious
assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure that went

_!_!_/
undetected at trial or on appeal, '' ante, at 25,

it is not equally a

''dubious assumption'' that those same police officials would fear that
federal habeas review might reveal that the state courts had denied
the defendant an opportunity to have a full and fair hearing on his
claim that went undetected at trial or on appeal.

And to the extent

the Court is making the unjustifiable assumption that our certiorari
jurisdiction is adequate to correct ''routine'' condonation of Fourth
Amendment violations by state courts, surely it follows

~

forUori

that our jurisdiction is adequate to redress the "egregious" situation
in which the state courts did not even accord a fair hearing on the
Fourth Amendment claim.

·

The "exception" thus may appear to make

the holding more palatable, but it merely highlights the lack of a
~

"constitutional" rationale for today' s constriction of habeas jurisdiction.
Thus, the constitutional "interest balancing" approach to this
case is untenable, and I can only view the constitutional garb in which
the Court dresses its result as a -....
disguise
fQr rejectiQn
ai
,..,.,.
............... -we
standing principle that there are no

--

..

11

th~~ ong-

second class" constitutional rights

~,------~----~------~

for purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction.

f

~

~r,;;:-~
II ~

even more troubling ground of today' s decision
ortent for habeas 'uris diction generally -- may be

read the statute as requiring the District Courts routinely to deny
---

w

,.

--

_____.....,._-

--

- -

prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

.

~

United States" habeas relief as a matter of 'udicial "discretion"

/

a "discretion" created today contrary to the expre

2_

statutory

language -- because such claims are "different in kind" from other
constitutional violations in that they "do not 'impugn the integrity of
the fact-finding process,"

~.

at 12, and because application of

such constitutional strictures "often frees the guilty." Ante, at 22.
Much in the Court's opinion suggests that a construction of the habeas
statutes to deny relief for non-"guilt-related" constitutional violations,
based on vague notions of comity and federalism, see,
n. 11, is the actual premise for today' s decision.

~·,

ante , at

This is a harbinger

of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes that plainly does violence
-------~ ...._ .......
to Congressional power to frame the statutory contours of habeas

-

jurisdiction .
If today' s decision were only that erroneous state
....
court resolutions of Fourth Amendment claims did not render the

-

defendant's resultant confinement "in violation of the Constitution"
its premise of comity and federalism, even though exposed primarily
in footnotes, would have been unnecessary, I am justified therefore
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in apprehending that the groundwork is being laid today for a drastic
.........

.

-

~~

.........

withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds, then
"'=:=:-== ~
- ~
at least for claims -- for example, of claims of unconstitutional

.........

detention, of double jeopardy, self-incrimination, Miranda, invalid

D.. I

identification procedure, or entrapment
decides are not "guilt-related.

11

-- which this Court later

For we are told that "[r]esort to

habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no
innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in
serious instrusions on values important to our system of government,

11

including waste of judicial resources, lack of finality of criminal convictions, friction between the federal and state judiciaries, and
incursions on "federalism.

11

Ante, at n. 30.

We are told that federal

determination of Fourth Amendment claims merely involves

11

an issue

that has no bearing on the basic justice of [the defendant's] incarceration,

11

ibid., and that "the ultimate question [in the criminal process

should invariably be] guilt or innocence.

11

Ante, at 22; see also id., at

n. 29; id. ,'at 22, quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting).

We are told that the "policy arguments"

of respondents to the effect that federal courts must be the ultimate
arbiters of federal constitutional rights, and that our certiorari jurisdiction is inadequate to perform this task, "stem from a basic mistrust
of the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication of
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federal constitutional rights 11 ; the Court, however, finds itself
"unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate
courts of the several States", and asserts that it is

11

unpersuaded 11

by "the argument that federal judges are more e?Cpert in applying
federal constitutional law" because "there is

1

nointrinsic reason

why the fact that a man is a federal judge should ' make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to tha application of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse.
at n. 34.

11

Ante,

Finally, a revisionist history of the genesis and growth

of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is attempted, something wholly
irrelevant, if today 1 s decision were actually constitutionally rather
than statutorily based.

Ante, Part I I.

To the extent the Court is actually premising its holding on

--

an interpretation of 28 U.S. C. § 2243 or § 2254, it is overruling the

,.......

heretofore settled principle that federal habeas relief is available to
~

'-----~~

......,.

~

redress any denial of asserted constitutional rights, whether or not
denial of the right affected the truth or fairness of the fact-finding
process.

As MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognized in proposing that

the Court reevaluate the scope of habeas relief as a statutory matter
in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 251 (1973) (concurring
opinion), "on petition for habeas corpus on collateral review filed in
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a federal district court, whether by state prisoners under 28 U.S. C.

§ 2254 or federal prisoners under § 2255, the present rule is that
Fourth Amendment claims may be asserted and the exclusionary rule
must be applied in precisely the same manner as on direct review."
This Court has on numerous occasions accepted jurisdiction over
collateral attacks by state prisoners premised on Fourth Amendment
violations, often over dissents that as a statutory matter such claims
should not be cognizable.

See,

~·,

Lefkowitz v.

Newsor~1.e,

420 U.S.

283, 292-293 & nn. 3, 9 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973);

Adam~

v. Williams, 407 U.S.

143 (1972); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969);
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. Lavallee, 391
U.S. 234 (1968); Wardenv. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).

Consideration

of the merits in each of these decisions reaffirmed the unrestricted
scope of habeas jurisdiction, but each decision must be deemed over-

.!.!/
ruled by today' s holding.
~

..... ..,..

Federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment claims of
state prisoners was merely one manifestation of the principle that
"conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional
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rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest
opportunity for plenary federal review." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 301,
424 (1963).

This Court's precedents have been "premised in large

part on a recognition that the availability of collateral remedies is
necessary to insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial
where constitutional rights are at stake.

Our decisions leave no do'.Abt

that the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that
unconstitutionally seized evidence was admitted against them." Kaufman
v. United States,

sup~~·

at 225.

Some of those decisions explicitly

considered and rejected the "policies" referren. to by the Court in
footnote 30 ante.

~·,

Brown v. Allen, supra; Fay v. Noia, supra;

Kaufman v. United States, supra.

There were no "assumptions" with

respect to the construction of the habeas statutes, but reasoned decisio::.::;
that those policies were an insufficient justification for shutting the
federal habeas door to litigants with federal constitutional claims in

---

-

light of such couptervailing considerations as "the necessity that federal

.......

courts have the 'last say' with respect to questions of federal law, the

____....----~----------------~--------~--~----------------~

--------~~

~

~awa

inadequacy of state procedures to raise and preserve federal clajms,
the concern that state judges may be unsympathetic to federally created

'

.

.

rights, [and] the institutional constraints on the exercise of this Court's
certiorari jurisdiction to review state convictions," id., at 225-226, as
well as the fundamental belief "that adequate protection of constitutional
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rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing
availability of a mechanism for relief.
~·,

11

Id., at 226.

See generally,

Fay v. Noia, supra; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).

As Mr. Justice Harlan, who had dissented from many of the cases
initially construing the habeas statutes, readily recognized, habeas
jurisdiction as heretofore accepted by this Court was "not only concerned with those rules which substantially affect the fact-finding
apparatus of the original trial.

Under the prevailing notions, Kaufman

v. United States, supra, at 224-226, the threat of habeas serves as a
necessary additional incentive for trial and

app~llate

courts throughout

the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with
established constitutional standards.

11

Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.

244, 263-264 (1969) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis supplied).

The avai!-

ability of collateral review assures "that the lower federal and state
courts toe the constitutional line.

11

Id., at 264.

"[H]abeas lies to in-

quire into every constitutional defect in any criminal trial, where the
petitioner remains 1in custody 1 because of the judgment in that trial,
unless the error committed was knowingly and deliberately waived or
constitutes mere harmless error.

That seems to be the implicit premise

of Brown v. Allen, supra, and the clear purport of Kaufman v. United
States, supra • . . .

The primary justification given by the Court for

extending the scope of habeas to all alleged constitutional errors is that
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it provides a quasi -appellate review function, forcing trial and appellate
courts in both the federal and state system to toe the constitutional
mark." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 685-687 (1971) (opinion
of Harlan, J. ).

See also Brown v. Allen, supra, at 508 ("[N]o binding

weight is to be attached to the State determination.
requirement is greater.

The congressional

The State court cannot have the last say wl:len

it, though on fair consideration of what procedurally may be deemed
fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional
Noia, supra, at 422.

right.'~;

Fay v.

In effect, habeas jurisdiction is a deterrent to

unconstitutional actions by trial and appellate judges, and a safeguard
to ensure that rights secured under the Constitution and federal laws
are not merely honored in the breach.

"[I]ts function has been to pro-

vide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to
be intolerable restraints." Id., at 401-402.

"[T]he historical role

of the writ of habeas corpus [is that of] an effective and imperative
remedy for detentions contrary to fundamental law.

11

Id., at 438.

At least since Brown v. Allen, supra, detention emanating
from judicial proceedings in which constitutional rights were denied
has been deemed "contrary to fundamental law,

11

and all constitutional

claims have thus been cognizable on federal habeas corpus.

There is

no foundation in the language or history of the habeas statutes for discriminating between types of constitutional transgressions, and efforts
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to relegate certain categories of claims to the status of ''second-class

15/
rights" by excluding them from that jurisdiction have been repulsed.
To~nion,

however, marks the triumph of those who have sought

to establish a hierarchy of constitutional rights, and to deny for all
practical purposes a federal forum for review of those rights considered less worthy or important.

Without even the slightest deference

to principles of stare decisis or acknowledging Congress' failure for
\
two decades to alter the habeas statutes in light of our interpretation
of congressional iPtent to render all federal constitutional contentions
cognizable on habeas, the Court today rewrites Congress' jurisdictional

--

statutes as heretofore construed and bars access to federal courts by
state prisoners with constitutional claims distasteful to a majority of
my Brethren.

But even ignoring principles of stare decisis dictating

that Congress is the appropriate branch for embarking on such a fundamental shift in the jurisdiction of the federal courts, I can find no
adequate justification elucidated by the Court for concluding that habeas
relief for all federal constitutional claims is no longer compelled under
the reasoning of Brown, Fay, and Kaufman.
I would address the Court's concerns for effective utilization of
scarce judicial resources, finality principles, federal-state friction,
and notions of "federalism" only long enough to note that such concerns
carry .no more force with respect to non-"guilt-related" constitutional
claims than they do with respect to claims that affect the accuracy of
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the fact-finding process.

Congressional conferral of fe:deral habeas

jurisdiction for the purpose of entertaining petitions from state
prisoners necessarily manifested a conclusion that such concerns
could not be controlling, and any argument for discriminating among
constitutional rights must therefore depend on the nature of the constitutional right involved.
The Court, as it must to justify such discrimination, focusing
on Fourth Amendment rights, argues that habeas relief for non- 11 guiltrelated 11 constitution.al claims is not mandated because such claims do
not affect the

11

basic justice•• of a defendant 1 s detention, see ante, at

n. 30; this is presumably because the "ultimate goal 11 of the criminal

JJ?j
justice system is "truth and justice.

11

~·,

ante, at 22-23 & n. 2 9.

This denigration of constitutional guarantees and constitutionally mandated procedures, relegated by the Court to the status of mere
utilitarian tools, must appall citize__g,s taught to expect judicial respect
>
:==
=-

=

and support for their constitutional rights.
11

Even if punishment of the

guilty•• were society• s highest value -- and procedural safeguards

I

denigrated to this end -- in a constitution that a majority of the memI

hers of this Court would prefer, that is not the ordering of priorities
under the Constitution forged by the Framers, and this Court• s sworn
duty is to uphold that Constitution and not to frame our own.

The pro-

cedural safeguards mandated in the t ramers 1 Constitution are not admonitions
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to be tolerated to the extent they serve functional purposes that ensure
that the "guilty" are punished and the "innocent" freed; rather, every
guarantee enshrined in the Constitution, our basic charter and the
guarantor of our most precious liberties, is by it endowed with an
independent vitality and value, and this Court is not free to curtail
those constitutional guarantees even to punish the most obviously g1'..llty.
Particular constitutional rights that do not affect the fairness of factfinding procedures cannot for that reason be denied at the trial itself.
What possible justification then can there be for denying vindication
of such rights on federal habeas when state courts do deny those rights
at trial?

To sanction dis respect and dis regard for the Constitution in

the name of protecting society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimatf>

1]_1
freedom and liberty depends.

"The history of American freedom

is, in no small measure, the history of procedure,

11

Malinski v. New

York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J. ), and as
Mr. Justice Holmes so succinctly reminded us, it is ••a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an
ignoble part.

11

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1927)

(dissenting opinion).

11

[I]t is an abuse to deal too casually and too lightly

with rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, even though they
involve limitations upon State power and may be invoked by those morally
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unworthy.

Brown v. Allen, supra, at 498.

11

Enforcement of federal

constitutional rights that redress constitutional violations directed
against the

11

guilty 11 is a particular function of federal habeas review,

lest judges trying the

11

morally unworthy 11 be tempted not to execute

the supreme law of the land.

State judges popularly elected may have

difficulty resisting popular pressures not experienced by federal judges
given tenure designed to immunize them from such influences.

The

federal habeas statutes reflect the Congressional judgm.ent that such
detached federal r eview is a salutary safeguard against any detention
of an individual
States.

11

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

11

Federal courts have the duty to carry out the congressionally
assigned responsibility to shoulder the ultimate burden finally to
adjudge whether detentions violate federal law, and today• s decision
substantially denies that duty.

The Court does not, because it cannot,

dispute that institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility
that this Court can adequately oversee whether state determinations

J&l
properly apply to federal law.
state courts

11

However, although I fully

agr~e

that

have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal

liberties and to uphold federal law,

11

and that there is no

11

generallack

of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and
appellate courts of the several states,

11

and further may assume that
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federal judges are not

11

more expert in applying federal constitutional

law;• ante, at n. 34, I cannot agree that it follows that, as the Court
today holds, federal court determination of almost all Fourth Amendment claims of state prisoners should be barred, and state court
resolution be insulated from the federal review Congress intended.
For as Mr. Justice Frankfurter so aptly framed the issue in rejecting
similar contentions in construing the habeas statutes in Brown v. Allen,
supra:
Congres s could have left the enforcement of federal
constitutional rights governing the administration of
criminal justice in the States exclusively to the State
courts. These tribunals are under the same duty as the
federal courts to respect rights under the United States
Constitution. • . . It is not for us to determine whether
this power should have been vested in the federal courts.
[T]he wisdom of such a modification in the law is
for Congress to consider, particularly in view of the effect
of the expanding concept of due process upon enforcement
by the States of their criminal laws. It is for this Court
to give fair effect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction as
enacted by Congress. By giving the federal courts that
jurisdiction, Congress has imbedded into federal legislation the historic function of habeas corpus adapted to
reaching an enlarged area of claims.
11
•
•
•
But the prior State determination of a claim
under the United States Constitution cannot foreclose
consideration of such a claim, else the State court would
have the final say which the Congress, by the A'"t of 186 7,
provided it should not have. 11 Id., at 499-500.
11

State adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the
habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is
precisely these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide. 11 Id., at 506.
11
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••congress has the power to distribute among the
courts of the States and of the United States jurisdiction to determine federal claims. It has seen
fit to give this Court power to review errors of
federal law in State determinations, and in addition
to give to the lower federal courts power to inquire
into federal claims, by way of habeas corpus • . . .
But it would be in disregard of what Congress has
expressly required to deny State prisoners access
to the federal courts.
11
• • • Insofar as this jurisdiction enables federal
district courts to entertain claims that State Supreme
Courts have denied rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, it is not a case of a lower court
sitting in judgment on a higher court. It is merely_
one aspect of respecting the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution '"'hereby federal law is higher than State
law. It is for the Congress to designate the member
in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary to express
the higher law. The fact that Congress has authorized
district courts to be the organ of the higher law rather
than a Court of Appeals, or exclusively this Court,
does not mean that it allows a lower court to overrule
a higher court. It merely expresses the choice of
Congress how the superior authority of federal law
should be asserted. 11 Id. , at 508-510 (emphasis
supplied).
Congress• action following Townsend v. Sain, supra, and Fay
v. Noia, supra, emphasized

11

the choice of Congress how the superior

authority of federal law should be asserted 11 in federal courts.

Townsend

v. Sain outlined the duty of federal habeas courts to conduct fact-finding
hearings with respect to petitions brought by state prisoners, and Fay v.
Noia defined the contours of the ••exhaustion of state remedies•• prerequisite in § 2254 in light of its purpose of according state courts the
first opportunity to correct their own constitutional errors.

Congress
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expressly modified the habeas statutes to incorporate the Towns end
standards so as to accord a limited and carefully circumscribed
~judicata

effect to the factual determinations of state judges.

But

Congress did not alter the principle of Brown, Fay, and Kaufman that
collateral relief is to be available with respect to any constitutional
claim and that federal district judges, subject to review in the Courts
of Appeals and this Court, are to be the spokesmen of the supremacy
of federal law.

Indeed, subsequent congressional efforts to amend

those jurisdictional statutes to effectuate the result that my Brethren
accomplish by judicial fiat have consistently proved unsuccessful.
There remains, as noted before, no basis whatsoever in the language
or legislative history of the habeas statutes for establishing such a
hierarchy of federal rights; certainly there is no constitutional war ran~
in this Court to override a Congressional determination respecting
federal court review of decisions of state judges determining constitutional claims of state prisoners.
In any event, respondents' contention that Fourth Amendment
claims, like all other constitutional claims, must be cognizable on
habeas, does not rest on the ground attributed to them by the Court
that the state courts are rife with animosity to the constitutional mandates of this Court.

It is one thing to assert that state courts, as a
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general matter, accurately decide federal constitutional claims; it
is quite another to generalize from that limited proposition to the
conclusion that, despite congressional intent that federal courts
sitting in habeas must stand ready to rectify any constitutional
errors that are nevertheless committed, federal courts are to be
judicially precluded from ever considering the merits of whole
categories of rights which are to be accorded less procedural protection merely because the Court says they do not affect the accuracy
or fairness of the fact-finding process.

11

Under the guise of fashioning

a procedural rule, we are not justified in wiping out the practical
efficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District Courts.
Rules which in effect treat all these cases indiscriminately as frivolous
do not fall far short of abolishing this head of jurisdiction.
Allen, supra, at 498-499.

11

Brown v.

To the extent state trial appellate judges

faithfully, accurately, and assiduously apply federal law and the constitutional principles enunciated by the federal courts, such determinations will be vindicated on the merits when collaterally attacked.

But

to the extent federal law is erroneously applied by the state courts,
there is no authority in this Court to deny defendants the right to have

11_/
those errors ameliorated by way of federal habeas.

Furthermore,

some might be expected to dispute the academic 1 s dictum seemingly
accepted by the Court that a federal judge is not necessarily more skilled
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than a state judge in applying federal law.

See ante, at n. 34.

For

it may well be argued that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
proceeds on a different premise.
If proof of the necessityof the federal habeas jurisdiction were
required, the disposition by the state courts of the underlying Fourth
Amendment issues presented by these cases supplies it. In No. 74- 1055,
respondent was arrested pursuant to a statute which obviously is unconstitutional under Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
( 1972).

Even apart irom its vagueness and concomitant potential for

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, the statute purports to
criminalize the presence of one unable to account for his presence in
a situation where a reasonable person might believe that public safety
demands identification.
not to have

11

See ante, at n. 1.

It is no crime in this

countr ~;

identification papers 11 on one 1 s person, and the statute is

a palpable effort to enable police to arrest individuals on the basis of
mere suspicion, and to facilitate detention even when there is no probable
cause to believe a crime has been or is likely to be committed.
405 U.S., at 168-170.

See

Without elaborating on the various arguments

buttressing this result, including the self-incrimination aspects of the
ordinance and its attempt to circumvent Fourth Amendment safeguards
in a situation that, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ( 1968), would at
most permit law enforcement officials to conduct a protective search
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for weapons, I would note only that the ordinance, due to the Court's
failure to address its constitutionality today, remains in full force
and effect, thereby affirmatively encouraging further Fourth Amendment violations.

Moreover, the fact that only a single state judge

ever addressed the validity of the ordinance, and the lack of record
evidence as to why or how he rejected respondent's claim, gives me
pause as to whether there is any real content to the Court's "exception"
for bringing Fourth Amendment claims on habeas in situations in which
state prisoners were not accorded an opportunity for a full and fair
state court resolution of those claims; that fact also makes irrelevant
the Court's presumption that deterrence is not furthered when there is
federal habeas review of a search-and-seizure claim that was erroneously rejected by "two or more tiers of state courts." Ante, at 23.
Even more violative of constitutional safeguards is the manner
in which the Nebraska courts dealt with the merits in respondent Rice's
case.

Indeed, the method in which Fourth Amendment principles were

applied in the Nebraska Supreme Court is paradigmatic of Congress'
concern respecting attempts by state courts to structure Fourth Amendment jurisprudence so as not to upset convictions of the "guilty" or the
"unworthy. " As Judge Urbom fully detailed in two thorough and thoughtful
opinions in the District Court on Rice's petition for habeas, the affidavit
upon which the Omaha police obtained a warrant and thereby searched
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Rice's apartment was clearly deficient under prevailing constitutional
standards, and no extant exception to the warrant requirement justified
the search absent a valid warrant.

Yet the Nebraska Supreme Court

upheld the search on t·he alternative ai!td .obviously untenable ground
that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if a defective warrant is
supplemented at a suppression hearing by facts that theoretically co'.J.ld
have been, but were not, presented to the issuing magistrate.

Such a

construction of the Fourth Amendment would obviously abrogate the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and the principle that
its "protection consists in requiring that those inferences [as to whether
the data available justify an intrusion into a person 1 s privacy] be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).

Yet the

Court today even casts doubt on that heretofore unquestioned precept of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by reserving the question whether
such supplementation can retrieve official action from the realm of
unconstitutionality.

See ante, at n. 3.

Particularly in an area such as

the Fourth Amendment, where principles guiding police behavior should
be as simple and unambiguous as possible, . this novel suggestion is totally
unacceptable.

Indeed, it would even permit police officials to escape

liability in such situations when damage actions are brought by innocent
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victims of a search, since the officers could claim they believed in
reasonable good faith that all evidence need no longer be presented
to a neutral magistrate.

It is disturbing that the Court simply ignores

the statement of Mr. Justice Har!an, speaking for the Court in rejecting
a similar contention in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n. 8:
"Under the cases of this Court, an otherwise insufficient affidavit
cannot be rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed
by the affiant when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing
magistrate.

See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1.

A contrary

rule wbuld, of course, render the warrant requirements of the Fourth
~I
Amendment meaningless.

III
Other aspects of today• s decision are deserving of comment but
one particularly merits special attention.

-------

Respondents, relying on the

explicit holding of Fay v. Noia, supra, that a petition for a writ of
certiorari is not a necessary predicate for federal habeas relief, and
accepting at face value the clear import of our prior habeas cases that
all unconstitutional confinement may be challenged on federal habeas,
contend that any new restriction on state prisoners 1 ability to obtain
•

,e,,..,

~~-

......

'-'

,_

ever, dismisses respondents 1 effective inability to have a single federal
court pass on their federal constitutional claims with the remark that
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11

respondents were, of course, free to file a timely petition for

certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas relief.'' Ante, at 36.
Of course, federal review in this Court is a matter of grace and
is grace seldom bestowed?

The failure to limit today' s ruling to

prospective application stands in sharp contrast to recent cases that
have so limited decisions expanding or affirming constitutional
rights.

To be sure, the fact that the time limits to seeking relie£

under our certiorari jurisdiction with respect to criminal cases emanating
from state courts are EEE.- jurisdictional would dictate that respondents
are at least free to file out-of-time certiorari petitions; under the
Court's "direct review 11 distinction delineated today, we would still
have authority to address the substance of respondents 1 eminently
meritorious Fourth Amendment claims.

But I have little confidence

that four Justices would agree which only underscores Congress' wisdom
in mandating a broad federal habeas jurisdiction for the District Courts.
These respondents are owed at least review in this Court since it shuts
the doors of the District Courts in decisions which mark such a stark
break with our precedents on the scope of habeas relief.

IV
In summary, while unlike the Court, I consider that the exclusion~~

ar x: rule...is a constitutional ingredient of the Fourth Amendment, any
i¢L

._......~~

......,..,......, ......

~~

modification of it requires a justification not provided today.

The Court
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does not disturb the holding of Mapp v. Ohio that, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, illegally obtained evidence must be exeluded from the trial of a criminal defendant whose rights were
transgressed during the search that resulted in acquisition of the
evidence.

In light of that constitutional rule it is a matter for

Congress, not this Court, to prescribe what federal courts are to
review claims of state prisoners of error by state courts.

Until

this decision, our cases have never departed from the construction
of the habeas statutes as embodying a congressional intent that,
however substantive constitutional rights are delineated or expanded,
those rights may be asserted as a procedural matter under federal
habeas jurisdiction.

---

Employing the transparent tactic that today' s is
~
a decision construing the Constitution, the Court usurps an authority

.......___

vested by the Constitution in the Congress to reassign federal judicial
~

-

resRonaibility to review state prisoners' claims of failure of state courts
to redress violations of their Fourth Amendment rights.

Our jurisdic-

tion is eminently unsuited for that task, and as a practical matter the
only result of today' s holding will be that denials by state courts of
claims by state prisoners of violations of their Fourth Amendment rights
will go unreviewed by a federal tribunal.

I fear that the same treatment

ultimately will be accorded state prisoners 1 claims of violations of other
constitutional rights; thus the potential ramifications of this case for

- 30 -

federal habeas jurisdiction generally are ominous.

The Court no

longer is content just to restrict the constitutional rights of the
citizenry, it now is embarked on a campaign to water down all such
rights by the device of foreclosing resort to the federal habeas remedy
for their redress.

------------

1 would affirm the judgments of the Courts of Appeals.

FOOTNOTES

I/
I say "ostensibly" secured both because it is clear that
the Court has yet to make its final frontal assault on the exclusionary

holding that the Fourth Amendment has no substantive content whatso-

--

ever, See,

~'

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,

U.S.

( 1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and cases cited therein.

2/
28 U.S. C. § 2254 provides:

§ 2254.

State custody; remedies in State courts.

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a
circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an
applicat~ for a writ of habeas corpu.s in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the g_ro~ that he is in S:!,Stody
in violation
the consti~tion or la;-; or treaties
of the nit
tates.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
At
judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
~~~
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, within the meaning of this section, if he
has the right under the law of the State to raise,
by any available procedure, the question presented.

or

--

r

•

FN- 2

(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal
court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court, a determination after a hearing on
the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which
the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer
or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable
and adequate w:r:itten indicia, shall be presumed to
be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or
it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall
admit -( 1) that the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the State court hearing;
( 2) that the factfinding procedure employed
by the State court was not adequate to afford
a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately
developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of
the subject matter or over the person of the
applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the
State court, in deprivation of his constitutional
right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him
in the State court proceeding;
( 6) that the applicant did not receive a full,
fair, and adequate hearing in the State court
proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied
due process of law in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the
State court proceeding in which the determination
of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support such factual determination, is produced
as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court
on a consideration of such part of the record as a
whole concludes that such factual determination is
not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the
Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more

FN- 3

of the circumstances respectively set forth in
paragraphs numbered (I) to (7), inclusive, is
shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or
is admitted by the respondent, or unless the
court concludes pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the
State court proceeding, considered as a whole,
does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant
to establish by convincing evidence that the
factual determination by the State court was
erroneous.
(e) 1f the applicant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence adduced in such State court
proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual issue made therein, the applicant,
if able, shall produce that part of the record
pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support such determination. If the
applicant, because of indigency or other reason is
unable to produce such part of the record, then
the State shall produce such part of the record and
the Federal court shall direct the State to do so
by order directed to an appropriate State official.
If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of
the record, then the court shall determine under
the existing facts and circumstances what weight
shall be given to the State court's factual determination.
(f) A copy of the official records of the State
court, duly certified by the clerk of such court to
be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial
opinion, or other reliable written indicia showing
such a factual determination by the State court
shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding.

3/
§ 2243. Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision.
A court, justice or judge entertaining an application
for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the
writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show
cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it

FN- 4

appea:rs from the application that the applicant
or person detained is not entitled thereto.
The writ, or order to show cause shall be
directed to the person having custody of the
person detained. It shall be returned within
three days unless for good cause additional time,
not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.
The person to wh0m the writ or order is
directed shall made a return certifying the true
cause of the detention.
When the writ or order is returned a day shall
be set for hearing, not more than five days after
the return unless for good cause additional time
is allowed.
Unless the application for the writ and the
return present only issues of law the person to
whom the writ is directed shall be required to
produce at the hearing the body of the person
detained.
The applicant or the person detained may,
under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the
return or allege any other material facts.
The return and all suggestions made against
it may be amended, by leave of court, before
or after being filed.
The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as
law and justice require.

4/
See also, ~·, ante, at 18 ("the Court [in Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969)] assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration of search-andseizure claims upon collateral review of state convictions 11 ); id. , at
21 (11 [t ]he answer [to the question whether Fourth Amendment claims
may be raised by state prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceedings]
is to be found by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against

FN - 5

the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment
claims"); id., at 25 ([the additional contribution, if any, of the
consideration of search-and - seizure claims of state prisoners on
review is small in relation to the costs . . . .

The view that the

deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests
on the dubious assumption that law enf9rcement authorities would
fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or
seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal. "); id., at 26 ("in
this context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the
effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the substantial
societal costs of application of the rule per sis with special force").

5/
To the extent the Court is rendering a constitutional

-

holding, there is obviously no distinction between claims brought by
s:ate pris ~ers under 28 U.S. C. § 2254 ~d tho ~ brought ~y fede :-1 '2 '2. f!:"

-

prisoners under 28 U.S. C. § 2255.

Thus, the Court overrules not

---............~

only a long line of cases concerning availability of habeas relief to
state prisoners, but also a similarly long line of cases concerning
availability of counterpart § 2255 relief for federal prisoners.

6/
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Kaufman v. United States,

394 U.S. 217 ( 1969), argued that in light of his view of the purposes

c:J

'j-

FN- 6

?

of the exclusionary rule Fourth Amendment claims should not, as a
matter of statutory construction, be cognizable on federal habeas.
~

.

However, he never made the suggestion, apparently embraced by the

?

Court today, that such claims cannot as a constitutional matter be
entertained on habeas jurisdiction, even though Congress fashioned
that jurisdiction at least in part to compensate for the inadequacies
inherent in our certiorari jurisdiction on direct review.
at 22 & n. 15.

C£. ante,

Indeed, Kaufman did not ignore the dissenting Justices•

arguments; rather, it noted that habeas jurisdiction, apart from any
effect on police behavior, serves the independent function of "insur[ing]
the integrity of proceedings at and before trial where constitutional
rights are at stake.

11

394 U.S., at 225.

See also

infra.

As to the argument that our prior cases do not resolve the issue decided
today because "only in the most exceptional cases will we consider
issues not raised in the petition,

11

see ante, at n. 15, that claim is

only valid to the extent the issue is one of construing congressional
intent as to when with respect to cases properly withing the district
court• s power to grant relief, habeas relief should nevertheless be
denied as a matter of discretion.

But the extent a person against whom

unconstitutionally seized evidence was admitted at trial after a full and
.;

fair hearing is not "in custody in violation of the Constitution,

11

there

would be no jurisdiction even to entertain a habeas petition, see note 2,
supra, and such subject matter questions are always open -- and must

FN- 7

be resolved -- at any stage of federal litigation. See,
& Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.

12(h).

~·,

Louisville

149 (1908); Fed. R. Civ. P.

$

It borders on the incredible to suggest that so many Justice for

so long merely "assumed" to answer to such a basic jurisdictional
question.

7/
See also id., at 351, noting"inadmissibility of the illegally
seized evidence in a subsequent prosecution of the search victim. "

8/
Only once does the Court advert to any temporal distinction
between direct review and collateral review as a possible reason for
precluding the raising of Fourth Amendment claims during the former
and not during the latter proceedings.

See ante, at 25 (arguing that

deterrence would not be "enhanced" by the risk "that a conviction
obtained in state court and affirmed on direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings years after the incarceration of the
defendant").

Of course, it is difficult to see how the Court could

constitutionalize any such asserted temporal distinctions, particularly
in light of the differential speed with which criminal cases proceed
even on direct appeal.

9/

It is unnecessary here to expand upon my reasons for

FN- 8

my disagreement which are stated fully in my dissents in United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) and United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544 (1975).

10 I

The failure to forthrightly to

-

obviously a core defect in the Court's analysis.
.......

----------

_,_,

Congress has accorded the federal district courts a role in our
constitutional scheme functionally equivalent to that of the Supreme
Court with respect to review of state court resolutions of federal
constitutional claims, it is evident that the Court's direct/ collateral
review distinction for constitutional purposes simply collapses.
Indeed, logically extended, the Court's analysis, which basically
turns on the fact that law enforcement officials cannot anticipat e a
second court finding constitutional errors after one court has fully
and fairly adjudicated the claim and found it to be meritless, would
preclude any Supreme Court review on direct appeal or even state
appellate review if the trial court fairly addressed the Fourth Amend ment claim on the merits.

The proposition is certainly frivolous

if Mapp is constitutionally grounded.

Yet such is the essential thrust

of the Court's view that the unconstitutional admission of evidence is
tolerable merely because police officials cannot be deterred from
unconstitutional conduct by the possibility that a favorable "admission"

FN- 9

decision would be followed by a later unfavorable

11

exclusion 11 decision.

The Court's arguments respecting the cost/benefit analysis
of applying the exclusionary rule on collateral attack also have no
merit.

For all of the

11

costs 11 of applying the exclusionary rule on

habeas should already have been incurred at the trial or on direct
review if the state court had not misapplied federal constitutional
principles.

As such, these

11

costs 11 were deemed to be outweighed

when the exclusionat•y rule was fashioned.

The only proper question

on habeas is whether federal courts, acting under congressional
directive to have the last say as to enforcement of federal constitutional
principles, are to permit the states free enjoyment of the fruits of a
conviction which by definition were only obtained through violations
of the constitution as interpreted in Mapp.

Whether any

11

educative 11

function is served by such habeas review, see ante, at 25, is a lesson
that, tragically for an individual's constitutional rights, will not be
lost on state courts after today' s decision.

See

infra.

Another line of analysis exposes the fallacy of treating today' s
holding as a constitutional decision.

Constitutionally, no barrier bars

a state defendant from immediately seeking a federal court's injunction
against any state use of unconstitutionally seized evidence against him
at trial.

However, equitable principles have operated to foreclose

cutting short the normal initial adjudication of such constitutional
defenses in the course of a criminal prosecution, Dombrowski v.

FN- 10

Pfister, 380

u. 's.

479, 485 n. 3 (1965), subject to ultimate federal

review either on direct review or collaterally through habeas.
also, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 ( 1971).

See,

Moreover, considera-

tions of comity, now statutorily codified as the exhaustion requirement
of § 2254, and not lack of power, dictate that federal review by delayed
pending the initial state court determination.

But delay only was the price,

"else a rule of timing would become a rule circumscribing the power of
the federal courts on habeas, in defiance of unmistakable congressional
intent." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963); see id., at 417-426.
The Court today, however, converts this doctrine dictating the timing
of federal review in a doctrine precluding federal review; such action
is in keeping with the regrettable recent trend of barring the federal
courthouse door to individuals with meritorious claims.
Warth Rizzo, E. Ky., Francis.

See,

~·,

Although the federal courts could

have been the forum for the initial "opportunity for a full and fair
hearing" of Fourth Amendment claims of state prisoners that the Court
finds sufficient, non- constitutional concerns dictated temporary abstention; but have so abstained, federal courts are, as a constitutional
matter, now ousted from ever determining the claims, since the
courts to which they initially deferred are all that this Court deems
necessary for protecting rights essential to preservation of the Fourth
Amendment.

Such hostility to federal jurisdiction to redress violations

of rights secured by the federal Constitution is profoundly disturbing.

FN- 11

11/
In arguing in the Court's "deterrence" idiom, I

emphasize that I am accepting the Court's assumptions concerning
the purposes of the exclusionary rule, only to demonstrate that on
its own premises, today' s decision is insupportable.

12/
Today' s decision is only another that overrides decisions
construing the habeas statutes in order to cabin the scope of habeas
relief for criminal defendants.

See,

U.S • . __ , Estelle v. Williams,

~~

'

Francis v. Henderson,

U.S.

13/
Others might be claims of official surveillance of
attorney- client communications, government acquisition of evidence
through unconscionable means, see,

~·,

Rochin v. California, 342

U.S. 165 (1952), denial of the right to a speedy trial, government
administration of a "truth serum, see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
( 1963), or the obtaining of convictions under statutes that contravene
First Amendment rights when a properly drawn statute could have been
applied to the particular defendant's conduct.

14/
The overruling of Lefkowitz v. Newsome, decided only
last Term, is particularly ironic.

That case held that a state defendant

FN- 12

could file a federal habeas corpus petition asserting Fourth Amendment claims, despite a subsequent guilty plea, when the state provided
for appellate review of those claims.

Three Justices dissented and

would have held, as a statutory matter, that Fourth Amendment claims
are not cognizable on federal habeas, but none suggested the "constitutional'' thesis suggested by the Court as the ostensible ration decided
for today' s cases.
Although not expressly overruling Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217 (1969) and its progeny involving collateral review of
Fourth Amendment claims of federal prisoners (indeed, the Court
accomplishes today' s results without expressly overruling or distinguishing any of our diametrically opposed precedents),
does not survive.

This tactic has become familiar in earlier decisions

-------~~----~----~--~

this Term.

Cf. also, Hudgens v. NLRB,

Henderson,

Kaufman obviously

u.s.

--· Greer v.

Spock,

u.s.

--·

Francis v.

u.s.

15 I
My Brother White's hypothetical of two confederates in
crime, see post at

, fully demonstrates the type of discrimination

that Congress clearly sought to avoid if, out of the full universe of
constitutional rights, certain rights could be vindicated only by resort
to this Court• s certiorari jurisdiction; indeed the anomaly of today' s
holding would be even more clear if, in that hypothetical situation,

FN- 13

the first defendant had sought, and we had denied, certiorari.

16/
The Court also notes that ''attention .

is diverted''

when trial courts addtess exclusionary rule issues, ante, at 22, and
with the result that application of the rule ''often frees the guilty.''
Ibid.

Of course, those ''arguments'' are true with respect to every

constitutional guarantee governing administration of the criminal
justice system.

17/
''Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's
purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty
by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 11
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479
(1928). Seealsoid., at483, 485.
"We are mindful of the reliance that society must
place for achieving law and order upon the enforcing
agencies of the criminal law. But insistence on
observance by law officers of traditional fair
procedural requirements is, from the long point of
view, best calculated to contribute to that end.
However much in a particular case insistence upon
such rules may appear as a technicality that inures
to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the
criminal law proves that tolerance of short- cut
methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring
effectiveness. 11 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 313 ( 1958). See also Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Weeks v. United States,
232 u.s. 383, 392-394 (1914).

FN- 14

18/
These considerations were powerfully articulated in
Brown v. Allen, supra, at 491-494.

Cf. also Fay v. Noia, supra,

at 432-433; England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-417
(1964).

19/
See Brown v. Allen, supra, at 497-499.

11

The meri-

torious claims are few, but our procedures must ensure that those
few claims are not stifled by undiscriminating generalities.

11

Id.,

at 498.

20/
And, the Nebraska Supreme Court fell into patent error
in citing Whiteley for the proposition that ''the affidavit may be
supplemented by testimony of additional evidence known to the police.
199 N. W. 2d 480, 488.

11
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 23, 1976

Re:

74-1055 .,.. Stone v. Powell
74-1222 - Wolff v. Rice ,

Dear Lewis:
Please join me,
Since:cely,

Jll
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

I
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CHAMB E RS OF"

June 22, 1976

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

R.e: No. 74-1055
No. 74-1222

Stone v. Powell
Wolff v. R.ice

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

;#(·
T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Holds for Stone v. Powell, No. 74-1055 and
Wolff v. Ric, No. 74-1222
Two cases are being held for Powell & Rice.
1.

United States v. Karathanos, No. 75-1402.

The issue in this case is whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied in circumstances where the federal officers
executed a search warrant bot in compliance with Aguilar&pinelli.

Federal agents obtained a warrant to search a

restaurant basement for illegal aliens.

The warrant was based

on an affidavit of a •ederal investigator indicating:
(i)
past;

many aliens had been arrested at the restaurant in the ·
(ii) a named informant, himself an illegal alien who

had been employed by and resided in the restaurant basement
for the previous year and a half, had informed the investigator
that there were a number of illegal aliens living in the
basement.

The search revealed 7 aliena and respondents were

indicted for harboring and concealing them.
The DC granted respondent's motion to suppress
the evidence derived from the search on the ground the affidavit

2.

failed to specify adequately the source of the informant's
conclusion that the aliens were illegally in the country.
CA 2 affirmed, rejecting the government's contention that
the exclusionary rule should not be invoked where federal
agents in good-faith attempt to comply with the Fourth
Amendment.
The S.G. raises the good faith issue here, expressly
declining to seek review of CA 2's conclusions regarding the
sufficiency of the warrant.

There was no finding below that

government agents acted in good faith since in the DC the
government litigated only the question of whether the
affidavit established probable cause.

I will vote to grant,

however, as the good faith issue is otherwise squarely
presented.
2.

LaVallee v. Mungo, No. 75-696.

In this case CA 2 ordered the granting of a writ
of haeeas corpus upon the petition of a state prisoner who
cla~ed

that his arrest was without probable cause.

I will

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Greg Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

June 24, 1976

Stone and Powell

•

<

"

made a preliminary review of Justice Brennan's '
dissent, I record some random thoughts and questions that
we may, or may not, think important or relevant enough to ·
justify changes in or additions to our opinion.
1.

Kaufman.

As we anticipated, the dissent states that

the effect of our decision is tooverrule Kaufman, and criticizes
us for lacking the candor to concede this.

In footnote 5, the

dissent states that if our decision is a constitutional holding
"there is obviously no distinction between claims brought by
state prisoners until § 2254 and those brought by federal
prisoners under § 2255.
has been undercut.

There is much to the view that Kaufman

Subject to conferring with you, we might

simply state in a note that although the holding in Kaufman
under 2255 is not directly implicated in this case, our
decision today necessarily undercuts the rationale of Kaufman.
2.

Perbaps the most telling point in the dissent is

the argument that, by enunciating a constitutional rule, we
hold in effect that federal courts do not have jurisdiction
on habeas corpus to review the action of state courts with
respect to Fourth Amendment claims.

't

I'm inclined to think

~--~--------------------------~----------~----------------~~~~ ~.

we should answer this argument.
as jurisdiction.

I do not view our decision

It is clear, of c'o urse, that a federal court

on habeas may decide whether there was a full and fair opportunity
to present the claim in a state court.
brings to mind Justice Stewart's inquiry whether
there was room, under our rationale, for habeas review of some
egregious blunder by a state court.

I would like to try writing

a note, as a reply to the dissent's assertion that we are
denying habeas jurisdiction (denying the superior right of
federal courts to review state judgments).

We can say that

the dissent apparently misconceives both the rationale and
the scope of today's decision; that it is clear from the opinion
that the fairness of the state courts'review of the Fourth

~·

Amendment claim is subject to federal scrutiny on habeas
corpus.
The difficulty would be in attempting to articulate
or elaborate on what we mean by a "full and fair" opportunity.
',,·

This sounds''procedural", and I would so interpret it in most
situations.

But procedural and substantive matters frequently

are blurred and indistinguishable in fact.

If a trial court

declined, on a motion to suppress, to hear evidence as to

',,

the Fourth Amendment violation, we would have a clear denial
of a full and fair opportunity.

Assume, however,
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Having made a preliminary review of Justice Brennan's
dissent, I record some random thoughts and questions that
we may, or may not, think important or relevant enough to
justify changes in or additions to our opinion.
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us for lacking the candor to concede this.

In footnote 5, the
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prisoners under § 2255o
has been undercut.
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Perhaps the most telling point in the dissent is

the argument that, by enunciating a constitutional rule, we
hold in effect that federal courts do not have jurisdiction
on habeas corpus to review the action of state courts with
respect to Fourth Amendment claims.
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as jurisdiction.

I do not view our decision
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It is clear, of course, that a federal court

on habeas may decide whether there was a full and fair opportunity
to present the claim in a state court.
This brings to mind Justice Stewart's inquiry whether
there was room, under our rationale, for habeas review of some
egregious blunder by a state court.

I would like to try writing

a note, as a reply to the dissent's assertion that we are
denying habeas jurisdiction (denying the superior right of
federal courts to review state judgments).

We can say that

the dissent apparently misconceives both the rationale and
the scope of today 1 s decision; that it is clear from the opinion
that the fairness of the state courts'review of the Fourth
Amendment claim is subject to federal scrutiny on habeas
corpus.
The difficulty would be in attempt i ng to articulate
or elaborate on what we mean by a"full and fair" opportunity.
This sounds'procedural", and I would so interpret it in most
situations.

But procedural and substantive matters frequently

are blurred and indistinguishable in fact.

If a trial court

declined, on a motion to suppress, to hear evidence as to
the Fourth Amendment violation, we would have a clear denial
of a full and fair opportunity.
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.

)

I concur in the Court's opinion.

~

'i/f.~

By way of dictum, and

what hesitantly, the Court notes that the holding in this case

;orr:/z( '

le~

undisturbed the exclusionary rule as applied to criminal trials.

For

reasons stated in my dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 441 (1971), it seems clear to me that the
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exclusionary rule has been operative lon,g enough to demonstrate its
futility.

The time has come to modify its reach, even if it is retained

for a small and limited category of cases.
Over the years, the strains imposed by reality, in terms of
the costs to society and the bizarre miscarriages of justice that have
been experienced because of the exclusion of reliable evidence when
the "constable blunders", have led the Court to vacillate as to the
rationale for deliberate exclusion of truth from the fact-finding process.
The rhetoric has varied with the rationale to the point where the rule
has become a

doctrinaire result in search of validating reasons.

In evaluating the exclusionary rule, it is important to bear in
mind exactly what the rule accomplishes.

Its function is simple --the

exclusion of truth from the fact-finding process.

Cf. Frankel, The

Search for Truth-- An Umpireal View, 31st Annual Benjamin N.
Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, Dec. 16,
1974.

The operation of the rule is therefore unlike that of the Fifth

Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination.

A con-

fession produced after intimidating or coercive interrogation is inherently dubious.

If a suspect's will has been overborne, a cloud

hangs over his custodial admissions; the exclusion of such statements
is based at least in part on their lack of reliability.

This is not the

case as to reliable evidence -- a pistol, a packet of heroin, counterfeit

money, or the body of a murder victim-- which may be judicially
declared to be the result of an "unreasonable" search.

The

reliability of such evidence is beyond question; its probative value
is certain.
This remarkable result, virtually unknown to the commonlaw tradition, had its genesis in a case calling for the protection of
private papers against governmental intrusions.
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
U.S. 383 ( 1914).

Boyd v. United

See also Weeks v. United States, 232

In Boyd, the Court held that private papers were

inadmissible because of the Government's violation of t,he Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.

In Weeks, the Court excluded private letters

seized from the accused's home by a federal official acting without a
warrant.

In both cases, the Court had a clear vision of what it was

seeking to protect.

What the Court said in Boyd shows how far we

have strayed from the original path:
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited
goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to
avoid the payment thereof, are totally different
things from a search for and seizure of a man's
private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them
as evidence against him. The two things differ
toto coelo." 116 U.S., at 623. (Emphasis added).
In Weeks, the Court emphasized that the Government, under settled
principles of common law, had no right to keep a person's private
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papers.

d~d

The Court noted that the case

tools or other proofs of guilt . . . •

11

not involve "burglar's

232 U.S., at 392 (Emphasis

added).
From this origin, the exclusionary rule has been changed in
focus entirely.

It is now used almost exclusively to exclude from

evidence articles which are unlawful to be possessed or tools and
instruments of crime.

Unless it can be rationally thought that the

Framers considered it essential to protect the liberties of the people
to hold that which is unlawful to possess, then our constitutional
course has taken a most bizarre tack.
The drastically changed nature of judicial concern -- from
the protection of personal papers or effects in one's private quarters
to the exclusion of that which the accused had no right to possess -is only one of the more recent anamolies of the rule.

The original

incongruity was the rule 1 s inconsistency with the general proposition
that "our legal system does not attempt to do justice incidentally and
to enforce penalties by indirect means.
at 6 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961).

11

8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2181,

The rule is based on the hope that

events in the courtroom or appellate chambers, long after the crucial
acts took place, will somehow modify the way in which policemen
conduct themselves.

A more clumsy, less direct means of imposing

sanctions is difficult to imagine, particularly since the is sue whether

~~----------------~--~5

-

the policeman did indeed run afoul of the Fourth Amendment is often
not resolved until years after the event.

The "sanction" is par-

ticularly indirect when, as in No. 74-1222, the police go before a
magistrate, who issues a warrant.

Once the warrant issues, there

is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply
with the law.

Imposing an admittedly indirect ••sanction" on the

police officer in that instance is nothing less than sophisticated nonsense,
Despite this anamoly, the exclusionary rule now rests solely
upon its purported tendency to deter police misconduct, 1 United States
v. Janis, _ _ U.S. _ _ (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347 (1974), although, as we know, the rule has long been applied
to wholly good-faith mistakes and to purely technical deficiencies in
warrants.

Other rhetorical generalizations, including the

11

imperative

of judicial integrity••, have not withstood analysis as more and more
critical appraisals of the rule 1 s operation have appeared.

See Oaks,

Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 665 ( 1970).

Indeed, settled rules demonstrate that the

integrity 11 rationalization is fatally flawed,

11

judicial

First, the Court has refused

to entertain claims that evidence was unlawfully seized

unless the

claimant could demonstrate that he had standing to press the contention.
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Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 16? ( 1969).

If he could not, the

evidence, albeit secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is
admissible.

Second, as one scholar has correctly observed:

"[I]t is difficult to accept the proposition that
the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence
is necessary for 'judicial integrity' when no
such rule is observed in other common law
jurisdictions such as England and Canada, whose
courts are otherwise regarded as models of
judicial decorum and fairness. " Oaks, supra,
at 66 9.
Despite its avowed deterrent objective, proof is lacking that the exclusionary rule, a purely judge-created device based on "hard cases",
serves the purpose of deterrence.

Notwithstanding Herculean efforts,

no empirical study has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in
fact have any deterrent effect.

In the face of dwindling support for

the rule some would go so far as to extend it to civil cases.

United

States v. Janis, supra.
To vindicate the continued existence of this judge-made rule,
it is incumbent upon those who seek its retention -- and surely its
extension, to demonstrate that it serves its declared deterrent purpose
and to show that the results outweigh the rule's heavy costs to rational
enforcement of the criminal law.
315 F. 2d 241 (1962).

See,

~·,

Killough v. United States,

The burden rightly rests upon those who ask

society to ignore trustworthy evidence of guilt, at the expense of setting
obviously guilty criminals free to ply their trade.

--------------------~~--- 7~
- ------------~

In my view, it is an abdication of judicial responsibility to
exact such exorbitant costs from society purely on the basis of
speculative and unsubstantiated assumptions.

Judge Henry Friendly

has observed:
"[T]he same authority that empowered the Court
to supplement the [fourth] amendment by the exclusionary rule a hundred and twenty-five years
after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify
that rule as the 'lessons of experience' may
teach. " Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code
of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929,
952-953 (1965).
In Bivens, I suggested that, despite its grave shortcomings,
the rule perhaps need not be abandoned until some meaningful alternative could be developed to protect innocent persons aggrieved by
police misconduct.

With the passage of time, it now appears that the

continued existence of the rule, as presently implemented, actually
inhibits the development of any alternatives.

The reason is quite

simple: incentives for developing new procedures or remedies must
remain minimal or nonexistent so long as the exclusionary rule is
retained in its present form.
It can no longer be assumed that other branches of government
will act while judges cling to this draconian, discredited device in its
present absolutist form.

Legislatures are unlikely to create statutory

alternatives or impose direct sanctions on errant police officers or on
the public treasury by way of tort actions, so long as persons who commit
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serious crimes continue to reap the enqrmous and undeserved
benefits of the exclusionary rule.

And of course, by definition

the direct beneficiaries of this rule can be none but persons guilty
of crimes.

With this extraordinary "remedy" for Fourth Amend-

ment violations, however slight, inadvertent or technical, legislatures might assume that nothing more should be done, even though
a grave defect of the exclusionary rule is that it offers no relief
whatever to victims of overzealous police work who never appear in
court.

Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the

Person, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. l, 14 ( 196 9).

And even if legislatures

wer.e inclined to experiment with alternative remedies, they have no
assurance that the judicially created rule will be abolished or even
modified in response to such legislative innovations.

The unhappy

result, as I see it, is that alternatives will inevitably be stymied by
rigid adherence on our part to the exclusionary rule.

I venture to

predict that overruling this judicially contrived doctrine -- or limiting its scope to egregious, bad faith conduct -- would inspire a surge
of activity toward providing some kind of statutory remedy for persons
injured by police mistakes or misconduct.
The Court's opinion today eloquently reflects something of the
dismal social costs occasioned by the rule.

Ante, at 21-23.

As

Mr. Justice White correctly observes today in his dissent, the
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exclusionary rule constitutes a "senseless obstacle to arriving at the
truth in many criminal trials.

11

Post, at _ _.

He also suggests that

the rule be substantially modified "so as to prevent its application in
those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by
an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct comported
with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief.

11

Post,

at
From its genesis in the desire to protect private papers, the
exclusionary rule has now been carried to the point of potentially
excluding from evidence the traditional corpus delicti in a murder or
kidnapping case.

See Mitchell v. New York, _ _ N.Y. 2d _ _ (1976),

petition for cert. pending.

Cf. Killough v. United States, supra.

Expansion of the reach of the exclusionary rule has brought Cardozo 1 s
grim prophecy in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 12, 150 N. E. 585,
( 1926), nearer and nearer to fulfillment:
"A room is searched against the law, and the
body of a murdered man is found. If the place
of discovery may not be proved, the other
circumstances may be insufficient to connect
the defendant with the crime. The privacy of
the home has been infringed, and the murderer
goes free. • . . We may not subject society
to these dangers until the Legislature has spoken
with a clearer voice. 11

~88

Cassandra
In view of the

~RKRRHxa-l~ke

some comment is indicated.

The dissent

Court's opinion as laying the groundwork for a "drastic

~

withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all
grounds, then at least [for many]

II
•

0

•

Infra, at

It refers variously to our opinion as a "novel reinterpretation of the habeas statute", infra a t _ ; as a "harbinger
of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes", infra at

__,.

as "rewrit l ing] Congress' jurisdictional statutes

• . . and [barring] access to federal courts by state
prisoners with constitutional claims distasteful to a
majority" of the Court, infra at

_ ,

10 or more prior decisions, infra at

as overruling some

_,.

and as a

"denigration of constitutional guarantees [that] must
appall citizens taught to expect judicial respect" of
constitutional rights.

Infra at

- ·

Despite these modest assessments of the Court's
opinion the Republic still stands. We have said only
that the judicially created exclusionary rule is not a
personal constitutional right; that there is a difference,

we think a critical one recognized for centures, between
the function of courts at trial and on habeas corpus review;
that this difference has peculiar force, as Mr. Justice
Black noted, with respect to Fourth Amendment claims where
"ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way have been
untrustworthy . . • and indeed often . . . alone establishes
beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant
is guilty", infra at 22; and that § 2254 does not require
a federal court to apply the exclusionary rule on habeas
corpus review absent a showing that the state prisoner was
denied an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the
Fourth Amendment claim.

We do not say that the federal

court lacks jurisdiction; we do hold that its acknowledged
jurisdiction should be exercised only upon this showing.
The dissent's perception of the violence we are
asserted to have done to history and precedent applies
a remarkably truncated view of both.

If one looks to

history and precedent, it would be difficult ·to find any
support for the various charges made in the dissenting
opinion.

As scholars have observed (Bator, supra at _,.

3.
corpus - upon which the dissent relies as if it were
written in the Magna Carta

dates primarily from Mr.

Justice Brennan's decision in Fay v. Noia, supra, decided
only 13 years ago.

These scholars also noted that the

operative language of § 2254, that the dissent asserts we
ignore, dates back to the 1867 Act when it was transparently
clear that Congress intended only "to incorporate the
common law uses and functions" of habeas corpus.
Oaks, supra at

See

The dissent now criticizes the

"revision" of Fay without the slightest acknowledgment of
that ease l 's sweeping revision of the relevant history.
As to precedents, we have overruled none.

It is fair

to say that Kaufman, a decision under § 2255 that - only
seven years ago - did overrule a number of decisions by
Courts of Appeals, is now of limited

~~il~~y.

At

least the dictum therein with respect to the applicability
of the exclusionary rule in § 2254 cases is indeed
disapproved.

To be sure, the language in some of our

relevant cases over the past two decades has not always
been consistent, but this is the first occasion on which
the Court - after requested briefing and argument on the

4.
issue - has specifically and

c~refully

addressed the

appropriate scope of federal habeas corpus review of
Fourth Amendment claims.
Our system of criminal justice, even prior to Fay and
Kaufman, afforded a broader spectrum of carefully

k;J
articulated and applied rights

~

persons accused of crime

than any other country in the world.

This is conceded to

be true even with respect to Great Britain, the country
from whence we derived the common law, the writ of habeas
corpus and most of the fundamental provisions of the Bill
of Rights.
The facts of the two cases we here decide illustrate

H..,..,_J.~~~..aJ

that no one fairly can BR say that

~

their "day in court" with the full

JUIRapa.i~

rights accorded under due process.

were deprived of
panoply of

Powell's claim of

Fourth Amendment violation was reviewed before it reached
us by no less five courts:

the California trial court,

the California Supreme Court (denying state habeas corpus),
the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals.
Rice's claim was considered by the trial and Supreme
Courts of Nebraska, and - on habeas corpus - by the federal

5.

District Court and Courts of Appeals.

The evidence that

each defendant was guilty of murder is overwhelming.

No

assertion is seriously made that the Fourth Amendment
claims were not fully and fairly considered by the state
courts .

There must be some limit, even under our most

generous system, to repetitive review of the issue presented
by these cases.

In view of the Gasandra-like

some comment is indicated.

tone of the dissent,

The dissent characterizes the

Court's opinion as laying the groundwork for a "drastic
withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all
grounds, then at least [for many] • • • "

Infra, a t _ .

It refers to a "novel reinterpretation of the habeas
statute", infra at

-·

As a "harbinger of future

eviscerations of the habeas statutes", infra a t _ ; "the
Court today rewrites Congress' jurisdictional statutes
•

•

0

and bars access to federal courts by state prisoners

with constitutional claims distasteful to a majority" of
the Court, infra at ___ ; lists some 10 or more prior
decisions which "must be deemed overruled by today's
holding", infra a t _ ; and concludes that this "denigration
of constitutional guarantees [are] . • • relegated by the
Court to the status of mere utilitarian tools [and] must
appall citizens t .a ught to expect judicial respect'' of
constitutional rights.

Infra at

-·

Despite these modest assessments of the Court's
opinion the Republic still stands.

We have said only

2.

that the judicially created

ex~lusionary

rule is not a

personal constitutional right that there is a difference,
we think a critical one recognized for centuries, between
the function of courts at trial and on collateral review;
that that difference has peculiar force, as Mr. Justice
Black noted (infra at 22), with respect to Fourth Amendment
claims where

11

ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way

have been untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and
indeed often this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually
any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilt"; and
that

§

2254 does not require a federal court to

ap~ly

the

exclusionary rule on habeas corpus review absent a showing
that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim.
We do not say that the federal court lacks jurisdiction;
we do hold that its acknowledged jurisdiction should be
exercised only upon this showing.
The dissent's perception of the violence we are
asserted to have done to history and precedent applies
a "foreshortened" view of both.

If one looks both to

3.
history and precedent, it would be difficult to find any
support for the various charges made in the dissenting
opinion.

As scholars have noted (Bator, supra at

_,.

Oaks, supra at ___ ) the expansion of the scope of habeas
corpus - upon which the dissent relies as if it were
written in the Bill of Rights - dates primarily from Mr.
Justice Brennan's decision in Fay v.
only 13 years ago.
language of

§

~.

supra, decided

These scholars noted that the operative

2254, that the dissent asserts we ignore,

dates back to the 1867 Act when it was transparently clear
that Congress intended only "to incorporate the connnon law
uses and functions" of habeas corpus.

See Oaks, supra at

Despite this history, the dissent now criticizes
the "revision" of Fay's sweeping revision of the relevant
history.

As to precedents, we have overruled none.

It is

fair to say that Kaufman, a decision under 2255 that only seven years ago - did overrule

a number of decisions

by Courts of Appeals, is not of limited applicability.

At

least the dictum therein with respect to the applicability
of the exclusionary rule in

§

2254 cases, is indeed

4.
disapproved.

To be sure, the language in some of our

relevant cases over the past two decades has not always
been consistent, but this is the first occasion on which
the Court - after requested briefing and argument on the
issue - has specifically and carefully addressed the
appropriate scope of federal habeas corpus review of Fourth
Amendment claims.
Our system of criminal justice, even prior to Fay and
Kaufman, afforded a broader spectrum of carefully
. articulated and applied rights of persons accused of crime
than any other country in the world.

This is conceded to

be true even with respect to Great Britain, the country
from whence we derived the common law, the writ of habeas
corpus and most of the fundamental provisions of the Bill
of Rights.

The decision today - indeed
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than any other country in the world.
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corpus and most of the fundamental provisions of the Bill
of Rights.
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MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting.
For many of the reasons stated by MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, I cannot agree that the writ of habeas corpus should
be any less available to those convicted of state crimes
where they allege Fourth Amendment violations than
where other constitutional issues are presented to the
federal court. Under the amendments to the habeas
corpus statute, which were adopted after Fay v. N oia,
372 U. S. 391 ( 1963), and represented an effort by Congress to lend a modicum of finality to state criminal
judgments, I cannot distinguish between Fourth Amendment and other constitutional issues.
Suppose, for example, that two confederates in crime,
Smith and Jones, are tried separately for a state crime
and convicted on the very same evidence, including evidence seized incident to their arrest allegedly made without probable cause. Their constitutional claims are fully
aired, rejected and preserved on appeal. Their convictions are affirmed by the State's highest court. Smith,
the first to be tried, does not petition for certiorari, or
does so but his petition is denied. Jones, whose convio-

~ r?- ~
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tion was considerably later, is more successful. His petition for certiorari is granted and his conviction reversed
because this Court, Without making any new rule of law,
simply concludes that on the undisputed facts the arrests
were made without probable cause and the challenged
evidence was the~efore seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The State must either retry Jones or release him, necessarily because he is deemed in custody
in violation of the Constitution. It turns out that without the evidence illegally seized, the State has no case;
and Jones goes fr~e. Smith then files his petition for
habeas corpus. He makes no claim that he did not have
a full and fair hearjng in the state courts, but asserts that
his Fourth Amendment claim had been erroneously decided and that he is being held in violation of the Federal
Constitution. He cites this Court's decision in Jones'
case to satisfy any burden placed on him by § 2254 to
demonstrate that the state court was in error. Unless
the Court's reservation, in its present opinion, of those
situations where the defendant has not had a full and
fair hearing in the state courts is intended to encompass
all those circumstances under which a state criminal
judgment may be re-examined under § 2254-in which
event the opinion is essentially meaningless and the judgment erroneous-Smith's petition would be dismissed,
and he would spend his life in prison while his colleague
is a free man. I cannot believe that Congress intended
this result.
Under the present habeas corpus statute, neither Rice's
nor Powell's applications for habeas corpus should be
dismissed on the grounds now stated by the Court. I
would affirm the judgments of the Courts of Appeals as
being acceptable applications of the exclusionary rule
applicable in state criminal trials by virtue of M app v..
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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I feel constrained to say, however, that I would join
four or more other· Justices in substantially limiting the
reach of the exclusionary rule as presently administered
under the Fourth Amendment in federal and state criminal trials.
Whether I would have joined the Court's opinion in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), had I then been·
a Member of the Court, I do not know. But as time
went on after coming to this bench, I became convinced
that both Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
and Mapp v. Ohio had overshot their mark insofar as
they aimed to deter lawless action by law enforcement
personnel and that in many of its applications the exclusionary rule was not advancing that aim in the slightest and that in this respect it was a senseless obstacle to
arriving at the truth in many criminal trials.
The rufe has been much criticized and suggestions
have been made that it should be wholly abolished, but
I would overrule neither Weeks v. United States nor
Mapp v. Ohio. I am nevertheless of the view that the
rule should be substantially modified so as to prevent
its application in those many circumstances where the
evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the
good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief.
These are recurring situations; and recurringly evidence
is excluded without any realistic expectation that its exclusion will contribute in the slightest to the purposes of
the rule, even though the trial will be seriously affected
or the indictment dismissed.
An officer sworn to uphold the law and to apprehend
those who break it inevitably must make judgments
regarding probable cause to arrest: is there reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that a particular suspect has committed it? Sometimes
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the historical facts are disputed or are otherwise in
doubt. In other situations the facts may be clear so
far as they are known, yet the question of probable
cause remain. In still others there are special worries
about the reliability of secondhand information such as
that coming from informants. In any of these situations, which occur repeatedly, when the officer is convinced that he has probable cause to arrest he will very
likely make the arrest. Except in emergencies, it is
probable that his colleagues or superiors will participate
in the decision, and it may be that the officer will secure
a warrant, although warrantless arrests on probable cause
are not forbidden by the Constitution or by state law.
Making the arrest in such circumstances is precisely
what the community expects the police officer to do.
Neither officers nor judges issuing arrest warrants need
delay apprehension of the suspect until unquestioned
proof against him has accumulated. The officer may be
shirking his duty if he does so.
In most of these situations, it is hoped that the officer's judgment will be correct; but experience tells us
that there will be those occasions where the trial or
appellate court will disagree on the issue of probable
cause, no matter how reasonable the grounds for arrest
appeared to the officer and though reasonable men could
easily differ on the question. It also happens that after
the events at issue have occurred, the law may change,
dramatically or ever so slightly, but in any event sufficiently to require the trial judge to hold that there was
not probable cause to make the arrest and to seize the
evidence offered by the prosecution. It may also be,
as in the Powell case now before us, that there is probable cause to make an arrest under a particular criminal
statute but when evidence seized incident to the arrest
is offered in support of still another criminal charge, the
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statute under which the arrest and seizure were made
is declared unconstitutional and the evidence ruled inadmissible under the exclusionary rule as presently
administered.
In these situations, and perhaps many others, excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully
apparent that in each of them the officer is acting as a
reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way
affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less
willing to do his duty. It is true that in such cases the
courts have ultimately determined that in their view the
·officer was mistaken; but it is also true that in making
constitutional judgments under the general language
used in some parts of our Constitution, including the
Fourth Amendment, there is much room for disagreement among j;udges, each of whom is convinced that
both he and his colleagues are reasonable men. Surely
when this Court divides five to four on issues of probable cause, it is not tenable to conclude that the officer
was at fault or acted unreasonably in making the arrest.
When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable grounds,
and yet the evidence they have seized is later excluded,
the exclusion can have no deterrent effect. The officers,
if they do their duty, will act in similar fashion in
similar circumstances in the future ; and the only consequence of the rule as presently administered is that
unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the
trier of fact and the truth-finding function of proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally aborted.
Admitting the evidence in such circumstances does not
render judges participants in Fourth Amendment violations. The violation, if there was one, has alrea.dy

I
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occurred and the evidence is at hand. Furthermore,
there has been only mistaken, but unintentional and
faultless, conduct by enforcement officers. Exclusion of
the evidence does not cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered. Where an
arrest has been made on probable cause but the defendant is acquitted, under federal law the defendant has no
right to damages simply because his innocence has been
proved. "A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he
must choose between being charged with dereliction of
duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause,
and being mulcted in damages if he does." Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 555 (1967). The officer is also
excused from liability for "acting under a statute that
he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later
held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied." Ibid.
There is little doubt that as far as civil liability is concerned, the rule is the same under federal law where the
officer mistakenly but reasonably believes he has probable cause for an arrest. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the
Court announced generally that officers of the Executive
Branch of the Government should be immune from
liability where their action is reasonable "in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief." 416
U. S. 232, 247-248 (1974). The Court went on to say :
"Public officials, whether governors, mayors or
police, legislators or judges, who fail to make decisions when they are needed or who do not act to
implement decisions when they are made do not
fully and faithfully perform the duties of their
offices. Implicit in the idea that officials have some
immunity-absolute or qualified-for their acts, is
a recognition that they may err. The concept of
immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that
it is better to risk some error and possible injury
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from such error than not to decide or act at all."
!d., at 241- 242 (footnote omitted) .
The Court has proceeded on this same basis in other
contexts. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975) .
If the defendant in criminal cases may not recover for
a mistaken but good-faith invasion of his privacy, it
makes even less sense to exclude the evidence solely on
his behalf. He is not at all recomponsed for the invasion
by merely getting his property back. It is often contraband and stolen property to which he is not entitled to
in any event. He has been charged with crime and is
seeking to have probative evidence against him excluded,
although often it is the instrumentality of the crime.
There is very little equity in the defendant's side in these
Circumstances. The exclusionary rule, a judicial construct, seriously shortchanges the public interest as;
presently applied, I would modify it accordingly_
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Holds for Stone v. Powell, No. 74-1055 and Wolff
v. Rice, No. 74-1222
Three cases are being held for Powell and Rice.
1. United States v. Karathanos, No. 75-1402. The issue
in this case is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied
in circumstances where the federal officers executed a search
warrant not in compliance with Aguilar-Spinelli. Federal
agents obtained a warrant to search a restaurant basement
for illegal aliens. The warrant was based on an affidavit of
a federal investigator indicating: (i) 11 aliens had been
arrested at the restaurcnt in the past five years; and (ii)
a named informant, himself an illegal alien who had been
employed by and resided in the restaurant basement for the
previous year and a half, had informed the investigator that
there were a number of illegal aliens residing in the
restaurant basement. The search revealed seven aliens.
Respondents were indicted for harboring and concealing them.
The DC granted respondent's motion to suppress the
evidence derived from the search on the ground the affidavit
failed to specify adequately the source of the informant's
conclusion that the aliens were illegally in the country.
CA2 affirmed (2-1), rejecting, inter alia the government's
contention that the exclusionary rule should not be invoked
where federal agents in good-faith attempt to comply with the
Fourth Amendment.
The S.G. raises the good faith issue here, expressly
declining to seek review of CA2 1 s conclusions regarding the
sufficiency of the affidavit as establishing probable cause
for the search. Although there was no finding below with
respect to whether government agents acted in good faith,
that issue is otherwise squarely presented. I could join
three to Grant.

2.

2. Lavallee v. Mungo, No. 75-696.,
In this case
CA 2 ordered the granting of a writ of habeas corpus upon
the petition of a state prisoner who claimed that his arrest
was without probable cause. Since the prisoner was afforded
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of this claim
at trial and direct review, I will vote to grant, vacate
and remand in light of Rice and Powell.
3. Meeks v. Havener, No. 75-5416.
Petitioner,
an escapee, was convicted in state court of bank robbery
after a warrantless search of his apartment turned up
evidence that was not introduced at trial but which led to
his indictment.
The DC denied habeas corpus relief and CA 6
affirmed.
Under Rice and Powell, since petitioner was afforded
an opportunity ~full and fair consideration of his Fourth
Amendment claim in the state courts, I would vote to deny
on this issue.
The case, however, is also currently being held
for Do~le and Wood. Petitioner contends there was constitutional
error 1n a line-0! questioning during the state's case.
The officer who interrogated petitioner testified that he
had given Miranda warnings, and that petitioner had refused
to sign a wa1ver and refused initially to speak about the
case. At this point the court sustained defense counsel's
objection. The state proffered evidence that petitioner
later (how much later is unknown) had made voluntary
incriminating statements. The DJ held that the voluntary
statements would have been admissible, and that as a
"predicate" to their admission the prosecutor could elicit
a description of the Miranda warnings and petitioner's
immediate reaction.
As indicated in the hold memorandum
for Doyle and~' Nos. 75-5014 and 75-5015, the situation
presented by the officer's testimony is a bit unusual and
is not governed by Do~le.
If the officer had been permitted
to continue and petit1oner's later statements had proved
voluntary and been admitted, there would seem to be no
constitutional error in the officer's "lead-in" concerning

3.

petitioner's initial silence. As things stand, however,
we have nothing except the testimony about petitioner's
silence, and that testimony was given in the state's caseinl chief. I will vote to grant, vacate and remand in light
of Doyle, although I recognize this disposition may be
a little confusing.
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MR. CHIEF JuSTICE BuRGER, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion. By way of dictum,
and somewhat hesitantly, the Court notes that the holding in this case leaves undisturbed the exclusionary rule
as applied to criminal trials. For reasons stated in my
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents,
403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971), it seems clear to me that the
exclusionary rule has been operative long enough to
demonstrate its fwtilit~·. The time has come to modify
its reach, even if it is retained for a small and limited
category of cases.
Over the years, the strains imposed by reality, in terms
of the costs to society and the bizarre miscarriages of
justice that have been experienced because of the exclusion of reliable evidence when the "constable blunders,"
have led the Court to vacillate as to the rationale for
deliberate exclusion of truth from the factfinding process.
The rhetoric has varied with the rationale to the point
where the rule has become a doctrinaire result in search
of validating reasons.

.f'lct.\AJS.

74-1055 & 74-1222-CONCUR

2

STONE v. POWELL

In evaluating the exclusionary rule, it is import&nt
to bear in mind exactly what the rule accomplishes. Its
function is simple-the exclusion of truth fr:om the fact~
finding process. Cf. Frankel, The Search for Truth-An
Umpireal View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lee~
ture, Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, Dec. 16,
1974. The operation of the rule is therefore unlike that
of the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled
self-incrimination. A confession produced after intimi~
dating or coercive interrogation is inherently dubious.
If a suspect's will has been overborne, a cloud hangs
over his custodial admissions; the exclusion of such statements is based ~ leasb in pttt ~ on their lack of reliability.
This is not the case as to reliablt; evidence-a pistol,- a
packet of heroin, counterfeit money, or the body of a
murder victim-which may be judicially declared to be
the result of an "unreasonable" search. · The reliability
of such evidence is beyond question; its probative value
is certain.
This remarkable rQiilwU,.-, ir~ftaU, unknown to the common-law traditionc;h~td its genesis in a case calling for
the protection of private papers against governmental
intrusions. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 ( 1914).
In Boyd, the Court held that private papers were inadmissible because of the Government's violation of theFourth and Fifth Amendments. In Weeks, the Court
excluded private letters seized from the accused's home·
by a federal official acting without a warrant. In both
cases, the Court had a clear vision of what it was seekingto protect. What the Court said in Boyd shows how
far we have strayed from the original path:
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited
goods, or goods liable to duties and conce~:~.led t()
avoid the payment thereof, are totally different
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things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining
information therein contained, or of using them M
evidence against him. The two things differ toto
coelo." 116 U. S., at 623. (Emphasis added.)
In Weeks, the Court emphasized that the Government,
under settled principles of common law, qad no right to
keep a person's private papers. The Court noted that
the case did not inv()lve "burglar's tools or other proof8
of guilt .... " 232 U.S., at 392 ,(~phasis added).
From this origin, the eJ.;clusion~ry rule has been
changed in focus entirely. It is now used almost exclusively to exclude from evidence articles which are
unlawful to be possessed or tools and instruments of
crime. Unless it can be rationally thought that the
Framers considered it essential to protect the liberties of
the people to hold that which,is unlawful to possess,
then our constitutional course has taken a most bizarre ;~
tack~
The drastically changed nature of judicial concernfrom the protection of personal pj:tpers or effects in one's
private quarters to the exclusion of that which the ac1
cused had no right to possess-is only one of the more
recent anamolies of the rule. The original incongruity
was the rule's inconsistency with the general proposition
that "our legal system does not ~ttempt to do justice
incidentally and to enforce pen~Jties by indirect means."
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2181, at 6 (McNaughten rev. ed.
1961). The rule is based on the hope that events in the
courtroom or appellate chambers, long a.fter the crucial
acts took place, will somehow modify the way in which
policemen conduct themselves. A more clumsy, less direct means o,f imposing sanctlons is difficult to imagine,
particularly since the issue whether the policeman did
indeed rim afoul of the Fourth Amendment is often not
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resolved until years after the event. The "sanction"· is·
particularly indirect when , as in No. 74-1222, the police
go before a magistrate, who issues a warrant. Once the
warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law. Impos"
ing an admittedly indirect "sanction" on the police officel"
in that instance is nothing less than sophisticated
nonsense.
Despite this anamoly, the exclusionary rule now rests·
upon its purported tendency to deter police misconduct,
United States v. Janis, U. S. (1976); United·
States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974) , although ,
as we know, the rule has long been applied to wholly
good-faith mistakes and to purely technical deficiencies
in warrants. Other rhetorical generalizations, including
the "imperative of judicial integrity," have not withstood analysis as more and more critical appraisals of the
rule's operation have appeared. See Oaks, Studying·
the Exclusionary Rule in Selch and Seizure, 37 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 665 (1970). Indeed, settled rules demonstrate·
that the "judicial integrity" rationalization is fatally
flawed. First, the Court has refused to entertain claims
that evidence was unlawfully seized unless the claimant
could demonstrate that he had standing to press the
contention. Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165.
(1969). If he could not, the evidence, albeit secured in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, is admissible. Sec- .
ond, as one scholar has correctly observed:
"[I] t is difficult to accept the proposition that the·
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is necessary for 'judicial integrity' when no such rule is observed in other common law · jurisdictions such as·
England and Canada, whose courts are otherwise·
regarded as models of · judicial decorum and fair:..
ne.ss~" Oaks, supra, at 66.9...
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Despite its avowed deterrent objective, proof is lacking
that the exclusionary rule, a purely judge-created device
based on "hard cases," serves the purpose of deterrence.
Not)lwithstanding Herculean efforts, no empirical study
has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in fact
have any deterrent effect. In the face of dwindling support for the rule some would go so far as to extend it to
civil cases. United States v. Janis, supra.
To vindicate the continued existence of this judgemade rule, it is incumbent upon those who seek its retention-and surely its extension, to demonstrate that
it serves its declared deterrent purpose and to show that
the results outweigh the rule's heavy costs to rational
enforcement of the criminal law. See, e. g., Killough v.
United States, 315 F. 2d 241 (1962). 'The burden rightly
rests upon those who ask society to ignore trustworthy
evidence of guilt, at the expense of setting obviously
guilty criminals free to ply their trade.
In my view, it is an abdication of judicial responsibility to exact such exorbitant costs from society purely
on the basis of speculative and unsubstantiated assumptions. Judge Henry Friendly has observed:
11
[T] he same authority that empowered the Court
to supplement the [fourth] amendment by the exclusionary rule a hundred and twenty-five years afterits adoption, likewise allows it to modify that rule·
as the 'lessons of experience' may teach." Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,.
53 Cal. L. Rev. 929, 952-953 (1965).
In Bivens, I suggested that, despite its grave short-.
comings, the rule ~s need not be"'abandoned until
some meaningful alterpative could be developed to protect innocent persons aggrieved by police misconduct.
With the passage of time, it now appears that the con:tinued existenee of the rule, as presently implemented,.
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actually inhibits the development of ~ alternatives.
The reason is quite simple: incentives for developing
new procedures or remedies ~remain minimal or
nonexistent so long as the exclusionary rule is retained
in its present form.
It can no longer be assumed that other branches of
government will act while judges cling to this Draconian,
discredited device in its present absolutist form. Legislatures are unlikely to creatstatutory alternatives pr impose direct sanctions on errant police officers or on the
public treasury by way of tort actions, so long as persons
who commit serious crimes continue to reap the enormous and undeserved benefits of the exclusiona.t y rule.
And of course, by definition the direct beneficiaries of
this rule can be none but persons guilty of crimes. With
this extraordinary "remedy" for Fourth Amendment violations, however slight, inadverteht or technical, legislatures might assume that nothing more should be done,
even though a grave defect of the exclusionary rule is
that it offers no relief whatever to victims of overzealous
police work who never appear in court. Schaefer; The
Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64
N w. U. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1969). And even if legislatures
were inclined to experiment with alternative remedies,
they have no assurance that the judicially created rule
will be abolished or even modified in response to such
legislative innovations. The unhappy result, as I see it,
is that alternatives will inevitably be stymied by rigid
adherence on our part to the exclusionary rule.. I venture to predict that overruling this judicially contrived
doctrine--or limiting its scope to egregious, bad-faith.
conduct-would inspire a surge of activity toward providing some kind of statutory remedy for persons injured by police mistakes or misconduct.
'The Court's opinion today eloquently reflects some-
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thing of the dismal social costs occasioned by the rule.
Ante, at 21-23. As MR. JusTICE WHITE correctly observes today in his dissent, the exclusionary rule constitutes a "senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in
many criminal trials." Post, at - . He also suggests
that the rule be substantially modified "so as to prevent
its a.pplication in those many circumstances where the
evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the
good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief."
Post, at-.
From its genesis in the desire to protect private papers,
the exclusionary rule has now been carried to the point
of potentially excluding from evidence the traditional
corpus delicti in a murder or kidnapping case. See
Mitchell v. New York, N. Y. 2d - , cert. denied,
U. S. (1976). Cf. Killough v. United States,
supra. Expansion of the reach of the exclusionary rule
has brought Cardozo's grim prophecy in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 12, 150 N. E. 585, 588 (1926), nearer
&MJ: iiCMOit to fulfillment:
"A room is searched against the law, and the body
of a murdered man is found. If the place of discovery may not be proved, the other circumstances
may be insufficient to connect the defendant with
the crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the murderer goes free. . . . We may
not subject society to these dangers until the Legisl~;~.tur~ has SJ?oken witb. a cl_E)Q.re:c voice,"

To: Justice Powell

March 11, 1976

From: Greg Palm
Re: No. 74-1055
No. 74-1222

Stone v. Powell
Wolff v. Rice

This memorandum summarizes my thoughts as to how we
should proceed in these cases.
basic options: (1)

~interpret

In my view we have .......,_., two
the habeas statute to not

include 4th Am. claims, or (2) re-cast the scope of the
exclusionary rule not to be cognizable in habeas proceedings
since the "right of exclusion" is limited to areas where the
general deterance value exceeds the costs.
I. Option I:

There are two sub-options within this option.

The first

is to simply re-cast your Bustamante opinion into a majority
opinion.

The advantages of this approach are two:

(1) consistary

with your expressed views and (2) "innocense" is a sound
touchstone upon which to differentiate 4th Am. claims(there
obviously is some runover to Miranda).

The disadvantages

of this approach are: (1) unless one wanted to cont inue to
allow habeas claims by federal prisoners(a silly result) we
will have to overrule a statutory
old,

cons~ruction

only 6 years

(2) Stevens and Stewart refuse to accept an approach

focusing on "innocen.e", (3) the roots of the Kaufman holding
run directly back to Brown v. Allen , a

1953 Frankfurter

opinion, and make it very difficult to argue that CongEess
has not accepted this Court's expansive view of the habeas
statute(the § 2255 argument in Bustamante that a majority of
the CAs did not permit habeas claims by federal prisoners at
the time of the last revisions is not very helpful since in
fact a majority of those·same courts allowed state prisoners to
bring such claims.
A second approach would basically follow .the first except
that innocence would not be emphasized,

Instead, we would

have to rely on the notions of comity, federalism, and equity
that recently surfaced in Stewart's

opinion in Francis

v.

Henderson.

The problem with

applY-i~g Fran~is

here is that

ft dealt with a procedural matter, while we are here dealing
with a constitutional right(unless Option II is adopted).
Moreover, Francis in fact creates the equity-comity notion
almost out of thin air.

That is, although there is language

in Fay and some prior opinions to the effect that the writ
is equitable, until Francis

all that has meant is that re-

quirements such as exhaustion could be created.

Of course,

if Francis issues first, once the great leap has been made
there is no reason for us not to rely on it.
In any event, under either of these options the opinion
would proceed in the following way:
1. Issue
2. Facts of Each Case:

useful in showing:a. review of 2

state court decisions by a federal district court;

b. relia-

bility of evidence seized.
3. History

of Writ:

you in Bustamante,
(respectively in Fay

A combination of the views expressed by
Harlan and Black in their dissents
and Kaufman), Bator,Oaks, and a couple

other sources I have discovered.

All this would lead to thw

conclusion that the Court arguably has expanded the writ
greatly.

There is, however, no strong historical support for

any differentiation out of 4th Am. Claims.
4. The Francis Equitable

Notion:

At this point the notion of

permitting the courts to flexibly awly the

writ comes in.

There

isn't much direct support for the notion, but it• could be
done.

((But if we can't rely much on the innocense notion

it is still hard to say why 4th Am. claims are different from
others)).
5.

Balance All the Reasons for not Permitting Such claims:

Federalism, finality, etc .. The arguments are in Bustamante,
Batmr's and Friendly's articles, and elsewhere.

II. Option II:
Option II
That is, as our recent cases
have demonstrated the exclusionary rule is based on the

principle of deterrance.

The questiOn to be asked is thus

whether the incremental value of permitting 4th Am. claims
in habeas outweighs the cost.

This balancing would be very

similar to the approach you adopted in Calandra.

The

argument would be that the contributtion to deterrance from the
application of the rule in

~

habeas is minimal in comparison

with its costs((the costs cited would be the same as those
discussed in 85. of Option I)).
approach are obvious:

The advantages of this

(1) we avoid re-interpreting a statute

(2) the analytic approach applied--deterrance v. cost-- is
one which the Court has recently opted for in several cases
and one which the Court will certainly argue from in a later
case adopting the "good faith" exception((This analysis will
set the statge for tm t opinion)).

The only problems in

this approach are the tension between this view and the
view of the 4th Am. advanced in . . . certain

~

past cases--

This is not really aXE significant problem,however, since
I think

it is quite clear after Calandra and other
general deterrance is the moving force

behind! the rule.
In choosing between these options some other factors
should be considered:

(1) Option I clearly gives Congress the

option to amend the statute and EE overrule the Court if it•
is unhappy (2) Under Option II, it is not clear that there
would be any way Congress could force an exclusionary rule in
habeas for xxx State prisoners (3) Under HE either approach
there are implications for other types of Constitutional claims.
Option II,
Under ~~MXKKXXX¥ for example,
the rationale might be
extended to Miranda warnings.
As to the mechanics of Option II the prime difference iE
that it would contain a brief history of the exclusionary
rule to demonstrate that deterrance is the basis.

Also, the

history of habeas would be very brief since our conclusion
would be even accepting the Fay - Kaufman

view of history,

4th am. exclsuionary rule claims are not cognizable.

As

I indicated above, I lean xxxx strongly in favor of Option II
since I think its the most defensible of the two((the dissent
lt.)Q ~ ~ .J..\e ~
will have far less to complain about)) ( { ~\)G)~~~ ~k·~ ~ -

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FR:

Russell R. Wheeler

RE:

Your Request for Research on Habeas Corpus Petitions

DT:

March 18, 1976

{Jr

This responds to your March 18 letter asking if I would be
able to undertake some research for you on federal habeas corpus
review of state decisions. I would be pleased to do what I can for you
but would appreciate clarification on two points:
I.

J

Is there a deadline and if so, what?

I am rather heavily involved in work for the forthcoming
"Pound Conference" (April 7-9), but the demands are somewhat
episodic and I could perhaps complete your project, if not by April
7, then closely thereafter. If I could not, I would be quite happy to
take the assignment with me when I begin working at the National
Center for State Courts on Apri116. I know that there--as here-the work is such that I could find time to complete your project
relatively soon. I am relatively sure that I could complete it by
May, if you want these data for your address to the Fifth Circuit.
If, on the other hand, the information must be in by April 1,
or April 15, I perhaps should decline the invitation.

II. I know that you are suggesting reference to published
data rather than original research.
However, at least some of this
information may well be readily available albeit in unpublished form
either at the Administrative Office or at the Federal Judicial Center.

- 2 If you want me to undertake the inquiry, may I have your
permission, when asking if such unpublished data exist, to say that
"I am making this inquiry for Justice Powell"( or, alternatively,
for a "member of the Court, 11 or for 11 a judge")?
Such an inquiry sometimes tends naturally and I think understandably to provoke a faster response than a simple request for
information--but you may wish that!. not refer to you directly, or
indirectly.

Again, I would be pleased to find out what I can for you on
these matters, and I hope that your deadline is not so immediate as
to preclude my doing so.

RRW/bb
cc: Mark W. Cannon

<!fo-tni of flrt 2ltnitt~ .:§taftg
'~htiT!rtttgfott. ~. <!f. 206t'-t~

.:§uvutttt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

March 18, 1976

Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State
Decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Dear Russell:
I wonder if you would be willing to help me with some
statistics if they are available.
In my concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamante,
412 U.S. 218, at 260, note 14, I included some figures obtained from the 1972 report of the Administrative Office on petitions for federal habeas corpus filed by state
prisoners. I am now interested in some refinements of
similar statistics if the data is available.
It is believedby some that the two cases that did most
to stimulate petitions under § 2254 were Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 426, decided March 18, 1963, and~ v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, decided June 19, 1961. Fay (at least as I view it)
took a more expansive view of habeas corpus than the history
of the writ warranted. ~ extended the exclusionary rule
to the states as a means of effectuating the Fourth Amendment.
As my note in Bustamante indicates, federal habeas
petitions increased from 1,020 in 1961 to 7,949 in 1972,
tapering down from 9,063 in 1970. I would like to have these
figures brought down to the latest year available. They are
readily obtainable, I believe, from the Administrative Office
in the tables it publishes annually.
The refinements which interest me include the following:
(i) Is there statistical support for the view expressed
above as to the effect of Fay and ~? Or, putting it
differently, is there a probable correlation between these
cases, or either of them, and the sharp rise in habeas corpus
petitions.

- 2 (ii) Does the available data identify the federal habeas
corpus petitions according to the ground asserted for relief?
My impression is that a large majority of these cases that
ultimately reach us assert Fourth Amendment claims, invoking
the exclusionary rule.
(iii) As indicated in my Bustamante note, all filings
in United States District Courts have been increasing
substantially, although at a far less rapid rate than the
habeas corpus increase. Again, if the data is available I
would be interested in comparative percentage rates of
increase in (a) civil filings (which in gross would include
habeas corpus), (b) habeas corpus filings under § 2254, and
(c) criminal filings. You would have to select a base year.
I suppose it would be desirable to go back earlier than 1961
for a comparison reflecting the possible effect of the cases
mentioned.
(iv) If the habeas corpus cases can be identified as
such, does the available information indicate (by gross
numbers or percentages) the success of state prisoners who
have invoked federal habeas successfully. In Fay, the Court
opinion stated (372 U.S., at 440) that: "Our decision today
swings open no prison gates."'" In note 45, on the same page,
it is stated that a study in 1958 covering a nine-year period
indicated that a total of only 24 federal habeas petitioners
had won release from state penitentiaries. If there are any
similar subsequent studies, I would be most interested in
seeing the result.
There also has been an upsurge in the filing of § 1983
civil actions in the federal courts. If the tables available
afford a convenient comparison with the increase in habeas
corpus petitions, over the past two decades, this also would
be interesting.
You may well be overcommitted already in the process
of moving to the Administrative Office. Accordingly, I will
quite understand if you are not in a position to undertake
this inquiry. In any event, I emphasize that I am not
suggesting original research as distinguished from using
what is available and relevant to the above inquiries.

*I cannot resist commenting that Fay, at least, swung open
the "gates" to the federal courts.

- 3 -

If the foregoing is not clear, I will be happy to discuss
it with you.
Sincerely,

Russell R. Wheeler, Esquire
lfp/ss
cc:

Dr. Mark W. Cannon

lfp/ss
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Greg Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
No. 74-1055
No. 74-1222

DATE:

April 2, 1976

Stone v.
Wolff v.

~····

You may find it of interest to look at the SG's brief
in MacCollom No. 74-1487, and particularly the discussion
emphasizing the extraordinary nature of collateral review
contrasted with review on direct appeal. •
I may have mentioned this to you before.

·~

of the Solicitor General.

\

.....

(

I was impressed

the SG's MacCollom brief which was written by Frank
Easterbrook, one of ablest lawyers of any age

:!j,

i.f

LFP/ss

4/12/.,6
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MEMORANDUM

'
t

.'I,

'J.

'\)_i

TO:

Greg Palm

DATE:

F.ROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

:,!;

~
tl\

·'

April 12,1976

No. 74-1222 Wolff v. Rice
. ': No. 74-1055 Stone v. Powell

il"'

'

As

r:''c,

a result of spending most of Saturday reviewing the

latest draft, I have come to the conclusion that we are trying
.~·:·

,,

•.:t

to "overwrite" this case.
I think we have a strong, lawyer-like opinion through
':

Parts I, II and III.
·:,Iii

~'
);

~·'

Part I is fairly routine, although the statement of the
facts and issues always is important.

I do think we have

stated the facts in too much detail, and suggest that you
summarize them in more conclusory fashion.

You can see how

this was done in the California Court of Appeals and also in
the federal courts.

As we do not come back to the facts, in

any significant way, I see no useful puurpose in detailing
" ;_ facts that may be relevant to such issues as probable cause,
and who did what and when.

r
:tf.;

Parts '· II and III of the draft are excellent in every
respect.

I have done some editing, and have a couple of riders,

but I believe we have these just about right.
In Part II the draft reviews, constructively and

,,
~.

accurately (I believe) the development of federal habeas corpus •
.•

\j,'

2.
·' L

Part III deals with the Fourth Amendment, and the
exclusionary rule.

The discussion of the purpose and justifica-

tions of the exclusionary rule is quite good.

We show that ,

the rule · is not a personal constitutional right, and that its
primary purpose is deterrence of future police misconduct.
You effectively dispose of the "judicial integrity" argument.
Perhaps we should say, in_a note, that the rule also has some
educational value that we do not minimize.

,~

There is· a key sentence at the bottom of page 22B reading
as follows:

.•.. ·r

"'

'' \,'

"•

"But despite the broad deterrent purpose of the
rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe
the introduction of illegally seized evidence in
all proceedings or against all persons."
Calandra is a key decision, as Professor Monaghan has
pointed out. , You use Calandra effectively on page 23, and
thenmove on to say that its pragmatic approach notoonly is not
new (Walder) but also points the way for a proper analysis
of the issue whether the rule should apply to Fourth Amendment
habeas corpus cases. • ·
This brings us to Part IV.

The first page and a half

(26, 27) summarizes briefly the negative consequences of the

rule as applied at trial and on direct review.

This is a

proper introduction to the "balancing process" that Part III
has shown to be the proper basis of analysis.

We get into

trouble on page 27 by moving into a consideration of general

3.
societal interests, namely, those that I relied upon rather
heavily in Bustamante.

.,.

In that case, however, I was addressing

the use of habeas corpus jurisdiction itself, rather than , .: , '
whether -the exclusionarp rule properly may be extended to
a Fourth Amendment habeas claim.

In practical consequences,

the difference may not be too important. In terms of analysis, ·
however, .
/it seems to me that there is a considerable difference. ·: : ~·; ,,
""· ·~

Rather than devote a half a dozen or more pages of our
opinion to the interest identified on page 27, I suggest that
we rewrite the opinion from this point on with the focus on
· the exclusionary rule itself.

That is, applying the type of

analysis indicated by Calandra

and explicated in the balancing

approach mentioned in Part · III- we should emphasize the reasons
~

why the deterrent effect of the rule is minimal on collateral
review of Fourth Amendment claims.
This , approach would require a discarding of page 27
(beginning with "in addition to these costs"), and of virtually
all of pages 28, 29, 29a, 30, 31 and 33 (I don't find any page
32).

-if

\ ·~·

~·

'm ~;;"''

You return to consider specifically the efficaciousness 1'

,',:t111:

' of the exclusionary rule, commencing at the bottom of page 33
and continuing the end on page 36. ;·, ·

'"~'

My suggestion is that you redraft Part IV, condensing it
or weighing of the merits and demerits

< '

-

4.

of the exclusionary rule when applied to collateral review
;.,..i

of a Fourth Amendment claim.

Such a reduction, to perhaps

three or four pages, would mean the elimination of the
interesting and generally supportive material from the middle
of page 27 through most of page 33.

There are two possible

ways in which we might utilize some of the points made in these
pages

(~·&••

use of resources of the legal system, merit of

finality, minimization of friction).

It may be possible, in

a single paragraph, to summarize in highly conclusory fashion
these important societal interests.

Such a paragraph could

be included in the text, at some appropriate place in Part IV,
as policy considerations supportive of our basic position
on the exclusionary rule.

We must bear in mind, however, that

these same policy considerations apply rather generally to
all habeas corpus review.

This is a rather compelling reason

why we should not overemphasize them in this opinion.
An

alternative to · including such a paragraph in the text,

would be to place it in a footnote.

A general reference

could be made to my opinion;l in Bustamonte.
A point of some delicacy is how we conclude that the
.4',

'(\

J

exclusionary rule does not apply on collateral review of a
Fourth Amendment claim without the same reasoning being
applicable, say, to Fifth Amendment claims. ·As you know,
Judge Friendly would apply the same analysis to both.

I

5.
do not want to foreclose this possibility, and yet I do have

a

rather strong feeling - for the reasons stated by Justice

Black in Kaufman - that Fourth Amendment claims are different.

As we have pointed

ou~and

may need to reiterate, there is far

, less likelihood of uncertainty as to the facts, or of an
innocent person being denied the benefit of

habea~

corpus

relief, where the issue is simply whether the rule should be
applied to exclude specific, incriminatory fruits of a search.
· ~yhope that you and Chris will do some careful thinking about ·
this, and also some artful drafting.
"! .. ,

***
Still lurking in my mind is the desire to accommodate

·~

Justice Stewart• s wish that we leave the way open for applica:-_
tion of the rule in what he might characterize as an outrageous
violation by police resulting, at least arguably, in the
conviction of an innocent

defendant. ~

I was going to try a · ·

footnote on this point, but my time has run out this (Saturday)
afternoon. ·'-;.) 1 would think we might say that, in ;. S: case such

,i~\

as Stewart would ~·describe, that considerations of fundamental ,', .
li

fairness implicit in due process would always justify

habeas _.·~
·~'"
..-:f

review and the application of an exclusionary rule where
justice requires.

There is a good deal of language in some of

the cases (alluded to at one point in your draft} to the effect

6.
·~·

that habeas itself is appropriate only to remedy serious
errors."~-'

'

~.·

;~_,

$;

,~r:i

Also, there is the theory that habeas relief has

some of the flexibility of equity.

If we include such a note,

we must make clear that application of the rule, in light of
the conclusion of the Court in this case, would rarely be

..,:

"t·

:J,'

I~

appropriate, and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Somewhere in the opinion, perhaps as a concluding
paragraph, we should pay our respects generally to the values .;.:
of the Fourth Amendment, the utility of habeas review to
correct grievous error (see some of my good language in ·
,, Bustamante), and emphasize that the effect of our decision
I?'J

should have affirmative effects - rather than negative ones -

-...;t_~

on the fair and effective administration of the criminal
justice system.

It will be somewhat easier to write such

concluding paragraph if we have left room for a ·:· "fundamental
',~

fairness ,~.'

exception.

the concurring and

circulated

In this connection, take a look at

diss~nting

opinion that Carl
·; and I have~·
\~j~.··:

l:'

«:
~

t~~::.

lfp/ss

!;.
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-
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TO:

Greg Palm

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

April 15, 1976

Rice and Powell
l

~i

Ji'

Justice Stewart called and suggested that we take a look
at two cases:

Sunal v. Large and Chestman v. California.

Justice Stewart did not have the citations.

He thinks

both of the cases were decided in the late 1950's, that Douglas
wrote for the Court in Sunal and wrote a ,dissent in Chestman.
"t

Justice 1 Stewart' s recollection, ·twithout having verified
it, is that in both cases Douglas emphasized that habeas corpus
is not a substitute for appeal and that the writ should not be
abused.
Justice Stewart recognizes that neither of these cases
is "on point", but he thinks there may be some opportunity if his recollection is correct for supportive use of the
cases.

!i

iii-

'.
'

I

lfp/ss
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Greg Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

April 19, 1976

Powell and Rice
When you reach the point of "going to the press" for a
Chambers Draft, I suggest that you make a xerox copy of the
opinion and notes.

We would be here :until August if, by some

back luck, the printers lost or destroyed our only copy of
thbs opinnon with its multitude of changes.
,,
'

* *

**

We should discuss, perhaps on Thursday, whether our
opinion need recognize specifically that Kaufman is overruled.

In a technical sense, of course, it is not overruled

as that involved collateral review of federal court action.
But, as we have agreed, there is even less reason for such
review.

My preference is to state, with candor, that our

holding rejects the

~~a~tn&

of Kaufman.

Perhaps we could

say this in a note which also reemphasized that Kaufman,
as Justice Black noted, did not consider whether the purpose
of the exclusionary rule would be served by its holding.
merely assumed that the rule applied on collateral review,
a conclusion supported neither by reason nor authority.

L.F .P., Jr.
ss

It

5-7-76

LFP/gg

.

,..

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

No. 74-1055 Stone v. Powell
No. 74-1222 Wolff v. Rice

We know, from the "clerk grapevine" that
Justice Brennan plans to file an "explosive" dissent.
We will probably have to make some response.
Among other things, we might keep in mind the following:
(i)

somewhat greater emphasis that t here c omes

a point when the cost to society of applying
a prophylactic rule, that does not create a
personal constitutional right, simply is too
great.
(ii)

other civilized systems do not release

guilty defendants merely because the constable
blundered
(iii)

the view of the dissent (if it materializes

in the form expected) is that the Court's decision
in these cases represents a major regressive
reversal of prior precedents.

answer not
1
mentioned in my present draft opinion, is that
until

~

One

- only 14 years ago - the exclusionary

rule was not applied to the states in Fourth
Amendment cases, and not until the dictum in
Kaufman did this r.ourt indicate that it applied

2•

.&t.L:

on collateral review of Fourth Amendment
1\

cases.

Thus, for the first century and

3/4ths

(175 years) of the life of our

country, persons demonstrably guilty as
charged were not "turned loose" on society
merely because critical evidence had been
seized unlawfully.
(iv)

We might add something along the lines

of my Bustamonte opinion to the effect that
habeas corpus, at least until Fay v. Noia,
had been considered a remedy to afford relief
against unjust incarceration.

Normally this

would not include defendants clearly guilty
whose trials were flawed by a Fourth Amendment
infringement.

In this general connection,

the following statement in Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 at 312 may possibly be relevant:
"State prisoners are entitled to
relief on federal habeas corpus only
upon proving that their detention
violates the fundamental liberties of
the person, safeguarded against State
action by the Federal Constitution."

3.

*****
Mr. Justice Stewart thinks we should be prepared
to make a strong response to Mr. Justice Brennan's full
scale assault.

~P.,

Jr.

LFP/gg

5-7-76

MEMORANDUM TO FILE
No. 74-1055 Stone v.
No. 74-1222 Wolff v. Rice
We know, from the "clerk grap·e vine" that
Justice Brennan plans to file an "explosive" dissent.
We will probably have to make some response.
Among other things, we might keep in mind the following:
(i)

somewhat greater emphasis that there comes

a point when the cost to society of applying
a prophylactic rule, that does not create a
personal constitutional right, simply is too
great.
(ii)

other civilized systems do not release

guilty defendants merely because the constable
blundered
(iii)

the view of the dissent (if it materializes

in the form expected) is that the Court's decision
in these cases represents a major regressive
reversal of prior precedents.

One ~

answer not

mentioned in my present draft opinion, is that
until Mapp - only 14 years ago - the exclusionary
rule was not applied to the states in Fourth
Amendment cases, and not until the dictum in
Kaufman did this £ ourt indicate that it applied

. !-

-.

2.
~··

~-

>f, ..-:

,,

'l

·r'~

on collateral review of Fourth Amendment
cases.

Thus, for the first century and

3/4ths, (175 years) of the life of our
country, persons demonstrably guilty as
charged were not "turned loose" on society
because critical evidence had been
seized unlawfully.
(iv)

v

•1

l

We might add something along the lines

of my Bustamante opinion to the effect that

-

habeas corpus, at least until Fay v. Noia, ·: "'.
'., .....

had been considered a remedy to afford relief
against unjust incarceration.

......
1'

,,

~~·

Normally this

would not include defendants clearly guilty

·tlti

;

whose trials were flawed by a Fourth Amendment
In this general connection,
the following statement in Townsend v. Sain,
293 B;t 312 may possibly be relevant:
"State prisoners are entitled to
relief on federal habeas corpus only
upon proving that their detention

' '

··' violates the fundamental liberties of
J!'

' the person, safegaarded against State ';· ·~
the Federal Constitution."

,

*
Mr. Justice Stewart thinks we should be prepared
~,"

~,,··~, to

make a strong response to Mr. Justice Brennan's full

I
l

' · scale assault.

:
L.F.P., Jr.
'

.

lfp/ss

f1/ll/76

Rider A, p

23 (Stone v. Powell)

Add the following to note 30:

We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief,
recognizing the need in a free society for an additional
safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer
an unconstitutional loss of liberty.
~.

The Court in Fay v.

described habeas corpus as a remedy for "what

society deems to be intolerable restraints", and recognized
that those to whom the writ should be granted "are persons
whom society has grievously wronged".
441.

372

u.s.,

at 401,

In the typical Fourth Amendment claim asserted on

collateral attacK, however, a convicted defendant is
usually asking society to redeterming an issue that has
no bearing at all on the basic justice of his incarceration.

5/11/76
In sum, we conclude that where the State has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
a Fourth Amendment claim,

35

a state prisoner may not be

granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
such claim was erroneously rejected by the state courts.
In this context

1

the contribution of the exclusionary

rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment
is minimal and the recognized costs of application of the
rule persist with special force.

36

lfp/ss

5/11/76

Rider A, p

21 (Stone v. Powell)

The answer is to be found by weighing the utility of the
exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to
collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims.

f

I

I

lfp/ss

5/ll/76

Rider A, p. 24 (Stone v. Powell)
...,.....

But there is no reason to believe that the overall
educative effect of reexamining state convictions on
Fourth Amendment grounds would be significant.

)

,ju:pumt Q}cmt ltf t4t ~lt ,jhdtg

'llhtllftittghttt.lO. <!}.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM.J. BRENNAN , JR.

May 15, 1976

RE: Nos. 74-1055 and 74-1222 Stone v. Powell &
Wolff v. Rice
Dear Lewis:
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the
above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

j)nprtmt Qf4tttrt 4tf tfrt 'JI!ttittb j)tatts
~asfriughttt.!B.

<!f.

2ll~'l-~

CHAMBERS OF

JU ST ICE POTTER STEWA R T

May 17, 1976

Re: Nos. 74-1055 and 74-1222, Stone v. Powell
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in
this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
P. S. to Mr. Justice Powell only
It is quite possible that I may have some further
suggestions after we see the dissenting opinion.

ju.vrtmt <!Jom:t .o-f t!rt ~tb ,jt~s
jlras!rittghm. ~. <!J. 2llgt~~
CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

)

May 17, 1976

Re: No. 74-1055, Stone v. Powell; No. 74-1222, Wolff
v. Rice

Dear Lewis,
Please join me in your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~U}tfttttt

<!f01tri qf tlrt ~tb ,j~ztt.tg

-ufring~ ~.<!f. 2U&i~$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 17, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1055 and 74-1222 - Stone v. Powell, et al.

Dear Lewis:
I think that I have some language which will satisfy
you and me, though it might not satisfy Potter, on page 24
in your opinion in this case.
The last two lines of text on that page presently
read:
"We adhere to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the
exclusionary rule at trial • • • "
I think the desired neutrality would be fully achieved
if something like this could be substituted for those two
lines:
"We adhere to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the
rule under which illegally seized evidence
may be excluded at trial • • • "
If the language appeals to you, use it as you will.
If it doesn't, forget it.
Sincerely, ~

Mr. Justice Powell

~tutt

<Q:ltltrl llf tltt )lnitth ~httt
Jl'ulti:ttgbm. ~. <Q:. 2llbi~~ '

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 24, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1055 No. 74-1222 -

Stone v. Powell
Wolff v. Rice

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

.Supr~mt

<lJ:!lUrlllf tlr~~ttb' .sw~1Ja,g.lfittghnt. ~. a):. 2lJ.gi'l'

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 27, 1976

Re:

74-1055 - Stone v. Powell
74-1222 - Wolff v. Rice

Dear Lewis:
Confirming my oral statement to you, I do
intend to join your opinion for the Court but
am considering writing a short additional concurring opinion because of the exceptional
importance of the case.
Sinc~rely,

JL
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 74-1055

AND

74-1222

W. T. Stone, Warden,!
.
.
.
Petitioner
On Wnt of Certwran to the
74-1055
'
United States Court of Appeals
Lloyd Ch;ies Powell.
for the Ninth Circuit.
.
.
.
Charles L. Wolff, Jr.,)
Warden, Petitioner, On Wnt of Cert1oran to the
?'4-1222 v
United States Court of Appeale
'd L. R'
for the Eighth Circuit.
D av1 . 1ce.
[May -, 1976]
Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were affirmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for·
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of considerable importance to the administration of criminal
justice.
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I
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist·
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected'
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the·
The ordinance provides :
"Every person is a vagrant who :
" [1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police·
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as ·
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such:
1

iP,~ntiiicatJon."
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error,
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson officer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the
alternative, that court agreed with the California District
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence concerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The $fourt concluded.
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where
we invalidated a city ordinance in part defining vagrants as ... "per~

~
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve r,t~
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would servf;l
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98.. After an independent review of the evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
accomplices. Id., at 99.
B
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone call that a woman had been heard screaming at
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant
was issued for Peak)s arrest. The investigation also
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill
Peak before he could incriminate them. in their search
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m.
that night and found iights and a teievision on, but there
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object. . . . " Id., at 156--157, n. 1. Noting the
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see
n, 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti•
'tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition of the case we need not consider this issue.
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obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials use•
ful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing
at that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclos-ing dynamite particles.
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-.
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced itetns seized during the
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
I
(1972).
'
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration was unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410 ( 1969) , and {iguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190--194 (1974). 8 · The court
8

The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent
· killing of an officer had occurred and it a.ppeared tha.t the NCCF

..
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak
and search for bombs and explosives believed in possession of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry as the police lacked
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and
further concluded that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. !d., at 194-202. 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions
I
'•I

I'

was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in the
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an
issue we need not reach.
4 The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as
the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne;
[;umber Co ., Inc . v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) .
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eencerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
cf the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases

lnvolving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their
:petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975). 5 We
new reverse.
II
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The original statutory authorization did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ..."
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance with 'the common law and limited it to an inquiry as
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that
counsel in PoweU v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions:
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254~"
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C.
§ 2254."
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte BoUman, 8 U. S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) ,
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar.'
·
dhall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. U~der the 1867
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States .... " . But the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g.,
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded, 7 this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court.
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The·
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973);
¥rankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32,
19-80 & n. 107 (1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion
cnf the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable·
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100'
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and '
Federal Habeas Corpus For State PrisonerS, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441,473
& n. 75 (19763).
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convictions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e, g., Ex parte ·
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal'
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 WalL) · 163 (1973),..
'Se:e ]iator, s~v.ra, n. 7, at. 40.5:-47.4..
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-.
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because
Frank's federal claims had been considereq by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized,
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process"
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. !d.,
at 333-336.
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487,
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
9 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105
(1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. 8. 391, 421
& :n, 30; id., at 451-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct· r~
view had refused to consider ·the appeal because the
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that
since the state court judgment rested on a re~onable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court, the . District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458, 486.
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963).'0 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murd~r. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confession. N oia's codefendants,
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to estab1ish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipulated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but
the District Court followed Daniels in ho1ding that Noia's
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183
:~.o Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal ·counterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.'''
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceeclings. !d., at
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could riot have
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in~
nerently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' " id., at 346,,
quoting Htll v United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962).
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and
that he be released from custody or a new trial be
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims. 11
During the period in which the substantive scope of
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.'2 The
11 In constming broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require:'
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis
v. Henderson, U. S. (1976), holding that a state prisoner
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a postconviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual
prejudice, we emphasized:
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425--426;"
12
Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965);
De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388
U. S . .919 (1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 {CA-9
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." I d., at 224. See
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368
F . 2d 822 (1966).
· Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that searchand-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings.
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. (J., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that there was no basis for restricting "access by
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226.
Although in recent years the view has been expressed
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope·
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportumty to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250'
1962); Arm-stead v. United States, 318 F . 2d 725 (CA5 1963), withr
e. g., Untted States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 317 F . 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v.
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966}
(search-and-seizure claims not cogmz.able under § 2255 absent special:
~b:cumstances). .
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) / 8 the Court, without
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). 14
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant~
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con~
victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic~
tion upon direct review.15 Until this case we have not
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assump~
tion. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 ( 1970) .
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal.
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See
420 U. S., at 287 n. 4.
15 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufmrm majority made
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DePorte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as
well as in Warden, the issue considered here was not presented to
the Court in the petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized by
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con,
sider issues not .raised in the petition. 394 U. S., at 239 & n. 7.
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that the a.ssumption is unjustified.16

III
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unrea.sonablf:l searches and seizures." The
Amendment wa.s primarily a reaction to the evils ~ci
ated with the use of the general warrant in England ~nd
· the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Te:Das,
. 379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (l959), and was intended to protect
the "sanctity of a man's hqme and the privacies of life,"
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
searches under unchecked general authority. 17
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourtp Amendment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 ( 1921), there existed no barrier to the
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New York,
16 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence
·should have been excluded because it was obtainoo by an illegal
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full and
fair consideration of that claim in the btate courts, may not invoke
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it
unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police action.
l7 See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court (1966); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937) .

I
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192 U. S. 585 (1904).18 In Weeks the Court held that
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of
property secured through an illegal search or seizure conducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a
federa.l prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause.'' !d., at 27-28.
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as
"an essential ingredient of that right.'' hi., at 29. The
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions,
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea·
v~ United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
u. s. 643 (1961).
The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd'
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v·.
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered
to the common-law rule tl\at a trial court must not inquire, . on
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise•
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. ..
D'ana;, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (.1841} .
18

·'V~
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Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. The
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that
exclusion of illega1ly seized evidence prevents contami- ~ . ;(J,..,/
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222. 19 Bu~
~ ::::'. f
a more pragmatic ground was emphasized:
(!~
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter-to co.mpel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail..
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." I d., at 217.
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds, 2{) but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.
1
Althoug~decisions
1 · I H :P1' often have ·al- ~
luded to the "imperative of · judicial integrity/' e. g.,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975),
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1008); Weeks v. Uniteil
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); id., at 484
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
:20 See 367 U . .S., at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidenoo
where introduction is "tantimiount" to a coerced confession) ; id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial integrity) .
Only four Justices adopted the· view that the Fourth Amendment
itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
state criminal trials. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, .
was not sufficient, _see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949)
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a· constitutional basis emerges;
!or: :teq_uiring exclusion. 361 U. S., at 661. See n. 18, supra ..
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they demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a
particular context. 21 Logically extended this justification would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may object to
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S.
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judiciai
process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence. 22
The importance of this justification becomes minimal
21 See Monaghan, Foreword : Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975).
22
As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the
Constitution." United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538 (emphasis
omitted) .
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where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisonev
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full
p.nd fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at
trial and on direct review.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions havE)
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to th~:t
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy· designed tQ
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect ...." United States v,
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539;
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S., at 63~637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S.
406, 416 (1966).
Mapp involved the enforcement of the exclusionary
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment aiso requires the consideration
of search-and-seizure claims upon coilaterai review of
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in•
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in
the case of any remedial device, "the application of the·
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."'
United States v. Calandra, supra at 348. 28 Thus, our
28
1

As Professor Amsterdam has observed :

'Th~t rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen~
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refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
by such extension against the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through deterrence of police misconduct :
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro"'
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation ....
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." !d., at 351 (footnote omitted).
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . . .
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from bltmdering,
pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity·
inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest ... .'' Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev ..
378, 388-389 (1964) (footnotes omitted) .
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in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi~
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion·
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to llSSUre the integrity of the trial
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of
competing policies. In thfl.t case, the public interest in
determination of truth at trial :w was deemed to out..
weigh the incremental contribution that might have been
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by
application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist
only when the Government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See JoneS'
v. United States, 362 U:S. 257, ·261 (1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view that the "additional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed'
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence·
·u See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal
View, 31st Annual Benjamm N. Cardozo Lecture, As$11. of th~ Bar
of the C1ty of New York, Dec. 16, U174.
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which exposes the truth."
supra, at 174-175,25

ZI

Alderman v. United States,

IV
We turn now to the specific question presented by these
eases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question is whether state prisonerswho have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial
and on direct review-may invoke their claim again on
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found·
through the balancing process identified above in Part

III.
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at
trial and on direct review are well known: 26 the focus
25 Cases addressing the question whether search-and-seizure holdings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the·
<;l"eterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context, See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254
& n. 21 (1969) ; Linkletter v. W;uker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965).
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 8l (1968) . The "attenuationof-the-taint" doctrine also~~· consistent with the balancing approach.
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at
389-390.
26 See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971)
(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On Evidence§ 2184a, at
51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391;
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule.
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and
sources cited therem, Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961) ;:
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?:,.
SD. Texas L: Rev. 'Z36 (1972) .
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein,
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. 27 Moreover, the physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty."
394 U. S., at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty. ·The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. 28 Thus,
27

See address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
delivered at the N ahonal Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With thr Admuustration of .Justice, at 8-9, April 8,
1976 ; cf Frankel, n. ~supra .
28 Many of the proposals for mod1ficat10n of the scope of the
exclusionary rule recognize at least 1mphmtly the role of proportionality m the cnminal justice system and the potential value of
-establislung a direct relationship between the nature of the violation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at
181-183 ("substantial viOlations"); H. Fnendly, Benchmarks 260-262'
1 (1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of
· activity mtentionally or flagrantly 11legal.") Wigmore, suprcv, n 25,
~t 52-53
See n. 16, supra.

..
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 29
These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a,
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state
courts. 80
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite
the absence of supportive empirical evidence,S 1 we have
In a different context, Da11in Oaks has observed:
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals."
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975.
30 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state·
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.'~
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., concurring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 13.
81 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject
of sharp debate. Until ·recently, scholarly empirical research
29
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be

to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system. 32
We adhere to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered
may add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. But there is no
reason to believe that the overall educative effect of overturning convictions based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment would be appreciably
diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be
raised in federal habeas corpu~;~ review of state convicwas unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 218 (1960) .
And, the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still
inconclusive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 26; Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its·
Alternatives, 2 Journ. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon,
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974).
See United States v. Janis,-- U . S . - - , - n. 22 (1976; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 475 n, 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiott<J.
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev . 74.0 (1974)'32 See Oaks, supra, n. 26, at 756.
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tions. 88 Nor is there reason to assume that any specific
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of
evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct
review would be enhanced if there were the further risk
that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings years after the incarceration of the defendant. The
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure
that went undetected at trial and on appeal. 84 Even if
83 "As the exclusionary rule "is applied ~ime after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns, and beyond that po"int its continued application is a
public nuisance:" Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389.
84
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the state courts as fair and competent (arums for the adjudication
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges
operate. Despite difference:; in institutiomil environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights
in the trial and appellate courts of the several State>. State courts,
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argument
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutionai
law is especially unr}ersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more

I'

u
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one rationally could assume that some additional incremental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases,
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational
system of criminal justice.
In sum, in view of the substantial societal costs .associated with the exclusionary rule, we conclude that where
the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of Fourth Amendment claims,a~ a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial. In this
context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any,
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal
and the recognized oosts of application of the rule
persist. 86
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of AppealiS

are
Reversed,.
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the appliC3-tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state1 courthouse."
ator, supra, n. 7, at 50.
af.Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court
through an application for It writ of certiorari, and l!ince the time
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimilljition in their
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ~round evidence obtained'
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introducEJCl at their trials
should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana Sfate Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422'-423 (1964) . 'fe reject these
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior·
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S., 391, respondents '\'ere, of course,
free to ~le a timely petition for certiorari prior to ~king feder.M:
habe
us elief.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were affirmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of considerable importance to the administration of criminal
justice.
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I
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.
A
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the
The ordina.nce provides:
"Every person is a vagrant who :
" [1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to arcount for his presenre when asked by any police
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such
identification."
1
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error,
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson officer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the
alternative, that court agreed with the California District
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence concerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and
2 In support. of the vagueness holding the court relied principally
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where
we mvalidated a city ordinance in part defining vagrants as . .."pc~
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. !d., at 98.. After an independent review of the evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
accomplices. !d., at 99.
B
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in
April 1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone call that a woman had been heard screaming at
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant
was issued for Peak's arrest. The investigation also
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m.
that night and found lights and a television on, but there
was no respo11se to their repeated knocking. While some
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was
sons wandering or strollmg around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object.. , ." !d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the
similarity betwern the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see
n. 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Petitioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition of the case we need not consider this issue
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obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials useful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing
at that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite particles.
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted planting the suitcase and making the telephone call, and
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced items seized during the
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration was unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974). 3 The court
3
The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak
and search for bombs and explosives believed in possession of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry as the police lacked
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and
further concluded that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. !d., at 194-202. 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 ( 1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should
be used aga.inst. the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In
concluding that there exi::;ted probable cause for issuance of the
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit
alone sttfficient, it also referred to information contained in testimony adduced at the suppre::;::;ion hearing but not included in the
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969);
Aguilm· v. Texas. :378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cau~:>c was lacking. Petitionrr Wolff contends that police should
be permittrd to supplement the information containrd in an affidavit
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an
issue we nred not reach.
4 The Distnct Court further held that the evidence of dynamite
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as
the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne
Lv.mber Co., lnr: . v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920}.
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concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975). 5 We
now reverse.
II
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The original statutory authorization did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall
have power to issue writs of .. . habeas corpus . ..."
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions :
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a search mcident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is
one cognizabl€1 under 28 U. S. C. § 2254."
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254.''
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corp·us ad subjiciendum, known as the "Great Writ.'' Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4
Cra.nch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.).
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States .... " But the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g.,
ln re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of diVlsion of opinion in the circuit court was remote
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court.
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973);
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32,
79-80 & n. 107 (1928). Pressure naturally developed for expansion
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Frderal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441,473
& n. 75 {19763) .
8 The expansion occurrrd pnmanly with regard to (i) convictions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973) .
See Bator, supra, n 7, at 465-474.
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized,
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process"
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d.,
at 333-336.
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487,
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
9 There bas been disagreement among scholars as to whether the
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 ( 1923) . Compare Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105
(1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev . 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 421
& n .. 30; id., at 451-46.0 (Harlan, J., dissr..nting).
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct review had refused to consider the appeal because the
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court. the District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458. 486.
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963).1 '0 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants,
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to establish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipulated that N oia's confession also had been coerced, but
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183
1.o Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutiohal
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. Id., at
178-179 ; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete m1scarriage of justice,' " id., at 346,
quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962}.
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and
that he be released from custody or a new trial be
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims. 11
During the period in which the substantive scope of
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The
In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the
writ, noting that " [ d] iscretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as la.w and justice require.'
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis
v. Henderson, U. S. (1976), holding that a sta.te prisont:or
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a postconviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual
prejudice, we emphasized :
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426.''
12
Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2cl
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965);
De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388
U. S. 919 (196.7); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA9
11
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." !d., at 224. See
Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D. C. 114, 368
F. 2d 822 ( 1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that searchand-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings.
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234
( 1!)68), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that there was no basis for restricting "access by
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226.
Although in recent years the view has been expressed
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250
1962) ; Arrnstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CA5 1963), with,
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAIO 1963). See also Thornton v.
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966)
(search-and-seizure claim~> not cognizable under § 2255 absent special
eircumstan oos).
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) / 3 the Court, without
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). 14
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted in sta.te court on the basis of evidence obtained in
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review.l 5 Until this case we have not
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assumption. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of
See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal.
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See
420 U. S., a.t 287 n. 4.
15 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U. S. 217, 231,239 (1969), the Kaufman ma.jority made
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Mancusi v. De.Forte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as
well as in Warden, the issue considered here was not presented to
the Court in the petition for writ, of certiorari. As emphasized by
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not mised in the petition. 394 U. S., at 239 & n. 7.
13
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified.16

III
The Fourth Amendment assures the 11right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England and
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363- 365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
searches under unchecked general authority. 17
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 ( 1921), there existed no barrier to the
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New York,
As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full and
fair consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it
unnecessa ry to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in
view of t he purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se
basis without regard to t he nature of the constitutional claim or
the rircumstances of the police action.
1 7 See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court (1966) ; La.:;son, T he History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution ( 1937) .
16

.jliI
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192 U. S. 585 (1904) .1 8 In Weeks the Court held that
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of
property secured through an illegal search or seizure conducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." I d., at 27-28.
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as
"an essential ingredient of that right." Id., at 29. The
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions,
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
u. s. 643 (1961).
18 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that
the compulsory production of a person's private books and parwrs
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v.
New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that
the "law held tmconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealt-h v.
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (I84ll)
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Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. The
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contamination of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222. 10 But
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was
emphasized:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." I d., at 217.
The Mapp majority .iustified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds/ 0 but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.
Although our decisions often have alluded to the
"imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States
10 See 'Terry v. Ohw, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); id., at 484

(Brandeis, J., disSt>ntmg).
20 See 367 U. S., at 656 (preventwn of introduction of evidence
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced conf~ion); id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial mtrgnty) .
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment
itself requirel:l the exclusion of unconstitutionally l:leizE>d evidence in
state criminal tnals. SE'<' 367 U.S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949)
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
for requiring E>xcluswn 367 U S., at 661. See n. 18, supra.

.•
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v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 ( 1975), they demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a particular
context. 21 Logically extended this justification would
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant,
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965) . It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may object to
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119
(1975); Prisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S.
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to
result in convictious in some cases. Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial
process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence. 22
21 See Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutiOnal Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975).
22
As we recognized la::;t Term, judicial integrity is "not offended
if law enforcement officials rea~onably believPd in good faith that
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decision::; subsequent to the search and sPizure have held that conduct of the type
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the
Constitution " United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538 (emphasis
omitted}.

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION
18

STONE v. POWELL

The importance of this justification becomes minimal
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at
trial and on direct review.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect ...." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539;
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S.
406, 416 (1966) .
Mapp involved the enforcement of the exclusionary
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence m all proceedings or against all persons. As in
the case of any remedial device, "the application of the
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
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United States v. Calandra, supra at 348. 23 Thus, our
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
by such extension a.gainst the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through deterrence of police misconduct:
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation ....

"We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." Id., at 351 (footnote omitted).
23

As· Professor Amsterdam has observed:
"The rule is unsupportable a.':l reparation or compensatory dispen-·
sation to the injured rriminal; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert [ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ...
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be
swa.Ifowed than IS needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering,
pursuance of thi;; policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity
inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest ... .'' Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 1!2' U. Pa. L. Rev_
l7.8'; 38$-389\ (19'64) ((footnotes omi'tted) .
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The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court
permitted the Gove~;nment to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in
determination of truth at trial 24 was deemed to outweigh the incremental contribution that might have been
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by
application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist
only when the Government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones
v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 261 (1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view that the "additional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
24

See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal
View, 31st Annual Benjamm N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar
·Of the City of Nrw York, Dec. 16, 1974.
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acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174-175.25

IV
We turn now to the specific question presented by these
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question is whether state prisonerswho have been afforded the opportunity for fuJI and fair
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial
and on direct review-may invoke their claim again on
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found
by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims.
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at
trial and on direct review are well known : 26 the focus
25 Case:; addressing the question whether search-and-seizure holdings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the
deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context, See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254
& n. 21 (1969); Linlclette1· v. Walke?', 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965).
Cf. Pulle?' v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968). The "attenuationo-f-the-taint" doctrine also 1s consistent with the balancing approach.
See Browro v. Illmots, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United
States, 37! U. S. 471, 491--492 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at
389-39'0.
20 See, e.g·., Irvine v. California, :347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971)
(BlmGER', C. J., dissf'nting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150
N. E. 585 (1926) (Ca.rdozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On Evidence§ 2184a, at
51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391;
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and'
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 JJ. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 2:56 (100!);
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein,
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. 27 Moreover, the physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendanto As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman :
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guiltyo"
394 Uo S., at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guiltyo The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justiceo 28 Thus,
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?,
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 ( 1972).
27 Set> address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
delivered at the Nationnl Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8,
1976 ; cf. Frank!'!, n . 24, suprao
28 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of proportionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of
establishing a direct relationship lx>tween the nature of the violation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-a.rraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at
181-183 (!'substantial violations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 20
These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state
courts. 30
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal."}; Wigmore, supra, n. 25,
at 52-53. See n. 16, supra.
2
" In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed:
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccuvation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals"
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975.
30 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to
assure that no innocrnt person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results m seriou::; intrusions on values important to our system
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of
limited judicial resource~, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal
trials, (Iii) the mmimization of friction between our federal and state
systems of JUShce, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., concurring) . See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 13.
We nevertlwles!:i afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against
compelling an mnocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of
liberty. The Court m F'ay v. Noia, supra, described habeaH corpus
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Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite
the absence of supportive empirical evidence/' we have
assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system." 2
We adhere to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial
''

"'

a~

a remrdy for "whatever society drems to be intolc•rablc reand recognized that tho;;e to whom the writ should be
granted ··arc pcr::;o!l~ whom ~ociety has grievously wronged." 372
U. S., at ·!01, 4.JJ. But in the case of a typiral Fourth Amendment
cia im, assertrd on rollateral attark, a convicted defendant is usually
a::;king society to rC'determinc an issue that ha;; no bearing on the
basic just ice of his incarceration.
31 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject
of sharp debate. Until recently, scholarly empirical research
was unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
And, the evidence derived from recent · empirical resea.rch is still
Inconclusive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, sup1'a, n. 26; Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 Joum. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon,
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974).
See United States v. Janis,-- U.S.--,-- n. 22 (1976; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 475 n, 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical
Evaluations of the Rxclu::;ionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiott,o
Research and United State;; v. Calandra, 69 Nw, L. Rev. 740 (1974),
·~ 2 See Oaks, supra, n. 20, at 75tl.
straint~."

-
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and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered
may add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of
the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished
if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions."a Nor
is there reason to assume that any specific disincentive
already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence
at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct review
would be enhanced if there were the further risk that
a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings years after the incarceration of the defendant. The
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure
that went undetected at trial and on appeaJ.B-1 Even if
~ 3 ''At; thr exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimini~;hing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a
public nui~ancc." .'\ msterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389.
3 " The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support
of thr view that fedrral habeas corpus review is necessary to
cffectuatr the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the stair rourts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication
of frdera.l constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts
cannot he trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on rcrtiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective
institutional setting within whjch federal Judges and :;tate judges
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one rationally could assume that some additional incremental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases,
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational
system of criminal justice.
In sum, we conclude that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim/'" a state prisoner may not
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial. In this context the
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist
with special force. 86
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts,
like federal courts, have a coru;titutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816) . Moreover, the argument
that federal j1.1dges are more expert in applying federal constitutional
law is especially 1mpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the ~~pplica
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse."
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.
S 5 Cf. Townsend, .. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
86 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review ·by this Court
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in their
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained
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Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals
t\l'e
Rever.~d..

in an trnconstitutional sea:rch or sei'zure was i'ntrod'trced' at their· trials·
should be prospective. Cf. England' v. Louisiana State Board' of'
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (19'64). We reject these
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course,.
free to file a timely petition for certiorari pri01: to seeking federal
ba he.as corpus relief.
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Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af~
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of considerable importance to the administration of criminal
justice.
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I
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.
A
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a .38' caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist.
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional In October 1969, the
1

The ordinance provides·
"Every person IS a vagrant who :
" [1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or busmess and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to account for h1s presence when asked by any policeofficer to do so [3] If surrounding Circumstances are such as~
to indicate to a reasonable man that thr public safety demands such
identification "
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error,
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi~
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 ( 1967). The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Northern Dig..
trict of California, contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held
tha.t even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the
alternative, that court agreed with the California District
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence concerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), wherew.e- i.J)._valid,ateQ. a cit¥ w-Qjnal)ce in vart. definin~ vagrants as . ."per-.
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98.. After an independent review of the ev:idence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
accomplices. Id., at 99,
B
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in
April1971 after trial i,n a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone call that a woman had been heard screaming at
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant
was issued for Peak's arrest. 'The investigation also
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m.
that night and found lights and a television on, but there
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object.. , ." Id., at 158-157, n. 1. Noting the
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see
n, 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, It concluded that the second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure Its overall vagueness. 507 F 2d, at 95-97. Petitioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition of the rase we need not, consider this issue.
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obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain
v1ew, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials use~
ful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing
at' that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclos~
ing dynamite particles.
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plantmg the suitcase and making the telephone call, and
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced items seized during the
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration was unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393'
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974). 8 The court
8

The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home
because (1) Rice was an offiCial of the NCCF, (2) a violent
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the
warrant was invalid the search was- justified because of
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak
and search fot ·bombs and e~plosives believed in possession of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry as the police- lacked
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and
further concluded that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. Id., at 194-202/ The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
petitioned for review of these decisions; raising questionS"
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said shoutcr
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in · the
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. w: 2d 480, 487-488. See
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to ·the face of the
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n.. 3 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded ptob-·
able cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an·
issue we need not reach.
4 The District. Court further held 'that the evidence of dynamite
particles found on Riee's clothing should have been suppressed as
the tainted fn1it of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued
'but for the · unlawful search of his· home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207 .
. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) ; Silverthorne:
· {.umber Go ., Inc . v. United States~ 251 TJ., S . 385 (1920) .
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concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975) .5 We
now reverse.
II
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-·
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall
have power· to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . . .."
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions :
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is
one cogmzable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254."
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C.
§ 2254 "
6
It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4,
<)anch.) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C J .).
5
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. .Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty ,o r
law of the United States .. . ." But the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g.,
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Franlc, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court.
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973);
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32,
79-80 & n. 107 (1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law an<f
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv, L. Rev.441, 473·
& n. 75 (19763) .
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convictions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parteSiebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based -upon an allegedly illegal
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S.. 1(18 Wall.) 163 (1973).
SeA Bator, supra, n. 7, at 465-474 .
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized,
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process"
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. /d.,.
at 333-336.
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S.
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487,
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 0 In
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the appareAt adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional clai)lls, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
There has been disagreement among scho!a.rs as to whether theresult in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105·
(1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State,
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,.
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 421'.
cy;: 1}.. Q,O; if$,;,, at. 457-46.0 (Hadan, J., qjssc.nting) .
9
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re..
view had refused to consider the appeal because the
'papers were filed out of time. This Court held that
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked
authority to grant habe~s corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458,486.
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro~
ceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963). 10 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de~
fendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants,
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. AI~
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to establish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there~
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub~
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu~
lated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183
10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.''
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. I d., at
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15
(1974) . Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which inberently results m a complete miscarriage of JUstice,' " id., at 346,
' quotmg-Hill v. United States, 368 U. S 424, 428 (1962) .

•'
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re·
versed, ordering that N oia's conviction be set aside and
that he be released from custody or a new trial be
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims.11
During the period in which the substantive scope of
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The
In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habea.s
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffinned the equitable nature of the
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.'
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis
v. Henderson, U. S. (1976), holding that a state prisoner
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a postconviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual
prejudice, we emphasized:
"This Court .has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426."
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965) ;
.De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388
U, R 919 (1967); Williams v, United States, 307 F . 2d 366 (CA9
11
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decision~
was that Fourth Amendment vit>lations are different in
kind from denials .of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights i.n
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge
·evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio1atiOns by law enforcement officers." -ld., at 224. See
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368
F . 2d 822 (1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that searchand-seizure claims are cognizable in §· 2255 proceedings.
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,'r
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafq,s v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 23{
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that there was no basis for restricting "access · by
federal prisoners with illegal search-arid-seizure claims
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similaf"
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226.
Although in recent years the view has been expressed
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope'
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit .collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the ·question of
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 250
1962); Armstead v, United States, 318 F. 2d -725 (CA5 1963), with,.
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963) . See also Thornton v.
United States, 125 U. S. App. D C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966'
(search-and-seizure claix;os not cogniaable under § 2~55 ;tbsent special'
,;(li!CUJ:ThStances ), ..
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) / 3 the Court, without
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975) .14
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant...
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con~
victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 0961), to require
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review.u Until this case we have not
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assumption. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, ~t
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
14 In Newsome the Court focu::;ed on the iss11e whether a state
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal.
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See
420 U. 8., at 287 n. 4.
1. 6 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitea
States, 394 U.S. ~17, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 381'
U. S. 294 ( 1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as
well as m Warden, the Issue considered here was not presented to'
the Court m the petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized ·b y
'.Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con....
.sidfx; lSSQCS not. ~a1s@. in tJhe };?6titiOJil, a94. U. S., at 239 & n. 7.
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exc}u...
sionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified.16

III
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Amendment was primarily a re~ction to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England and
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privfWies of life/~
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
searches under unchecked general authorityY
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. Uniter!
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 (1921), there existed no barrier to the
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New Y ark,
As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal
search or smzure, who has been afforded the opp<:>rtunity for full and
fair consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it
unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the excluswnary
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in "
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied .on a per se
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police action.
11
See gem'rally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Suprem~
,f 'ourt (1966), Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
AmendmPnt to the Umted States Constitutwn (1937) .
·
16
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192 U. S. 585 (1904)? 8 In Weeks the Court held that
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of
property secured through an illegal search or seizure conducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., at 27-28.
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as
"an essential ingredient of that right." !d., at 29. The
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions,
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea
· v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
643 (1961) .

u. s.

a

18 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boy
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphru>izing that
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwisecompetent ev1dence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v~
])ana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841) .
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Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. The
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contami~
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222. 10 But
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was
emphasized:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
1t." l d., at 217.
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds, 20 but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion wouid deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.
Although our decisions often have alluded to the
·."imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States,
• 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting}; id., at 484
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) .
20 See 367 U. S., at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidence
where mtroduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession) ; id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial integrity) .
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment
itself reqmres the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
state criminal tnals. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949)
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban
.against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
{or requmng exclusiOn. 367 U S , at. 661 See n. 18, supra.
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v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), they demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the de·
termination whether to apply the rule in a particular
context. 21 Logically extended this justification would
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant,
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may object to
the mtroduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand
jury proceedings. United States v. Cala,;,dra, 414 U. S.
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial
process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.u
See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89'
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975) .
22
As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended'
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the
Constitution " Uni_tea Sjqtes v .. feltjer:~ suP,ra, at '538 (emphasi$
<!_r_n_ittE!(\,''
21

18

STONE v. POWELL

The importance of this justification becomes minimal
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisonel'
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at
trial and on direct review.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
··
"the rule is a judicially created remedy desigl}ed tosafeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect , . .." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539;
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. I, 28--:29 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S.
406, 416 (1966) .
M app involved the enforcement of the exclusionary
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of
state convictions. But despite the broad· deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in...
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. · As in
the case of any remedial device, "the appl~qation of the·
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial obiectives are thought most efficaciously served J 'f'
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United States v. Calandra, supra at 348.23 Thus, our
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
by such extension against the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de'terrence of police misconduct :
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
·achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation . . ..
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly min-imal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." !d., at 351 (footnote omitted).
As Professor Amsterdam has observed :
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispensation to the injured criminal ; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . . .
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted tha.t so many
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering,
pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity
inflicts gratmtm.ts harm on the public mterest ...._,, Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev.
3.78, 3&&--389 (1964) (fQQtuotQs omitted) .
23
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The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial
process. 'The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in
determination of truth at trial 24 was deemed to outweigh the incremental contribution that might have been
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by
application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist
Gnly when the Government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v.
Unit ed States, 371 U.S. 471 , 491-492 (1963) . See Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view that the "addit ional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth- An Umpireal
View, 31st Annual Benjamlfl N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar
,of t he City of New York, Dec. 16, 1974.
2'
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acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174-175 . ~
2

IV
We turn now to the specific question presented by these
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question is whether state pri89nerswho have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial
and on direct review-may invoke their claim aga,in on
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found
by weighing the utility of the exclusionllfY rule against
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims.
The costs of applying the exclusfonary rule even at
trial and on direct review are well known: 26 the focus
2 D Cases addressing the question whether sear!Jh-and-seizure holdings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the
deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with
the balancing analysis appjied generally in the exclusionary rule context. See :()esist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. 8. 618, 636-637 (1965).
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968) . The "attenuationof-the-taint" doctrine also is consistent with the balancing ~tpproach.
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1!}75); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963); Amsterdall\, supra, n. 23, at
389-390.
26 See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, +41 (1971)
(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150·
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On ~vidence§ 2184a, at
51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391;
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; O&ks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 0970), and'
sources cited tberein ; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule arid Mis-.
QQtJ.d\lcf by tll.e Poiice1 52 J. Crim. L, ·c. & P. s. 255, 256 (1961) ~
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein,
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.27 Moreover, the physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
~'A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered Untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of a doubt that the · defendant is guilty/'
394 U. S., at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfi.nding
process and often frees the guilty. · ·The disparity in par.ticular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty· defendant by
application of the rule is contrary ·to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept ofjustice. 28 · Thus,
, Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders.?,
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972).
21
See address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois,.
delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8_,
· 1976; cf. Frankel, n. 24, supra.
28
Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the·
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor-. tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of
establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the violation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at
181-183 ("substantial violations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262:
. ~1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit .of
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 29
'These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on colla.t·eral review on tbe ground that a search-and-seizure claim
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state
courts. 30
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegaL") ; Wigmore, supra, n. 25,
at 52-53. See n. 16, supra.
29 In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed :
''I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals."
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975.
30 Resort to habeas corpus, especi~~>lly for purposes other than to
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values i!nportant to our system
of government. They include "(i) the most effective '!ltilization ·of
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state·
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded:"
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. 8., at 259 (PowELL, J., concurring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231
(Black, J ., dissenting) ; Friendly, supra, n. 13.
We nevertheless afford broad h~:~-beas corpus relief, recognizing·
the need in & free society for an additional safeguard against
compelling an innocent man to suffer an upconstitutional loss of
l~berty. The Com:t 'in fay v Noia, supra, described habeas corpus:
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Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of theFourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the 'frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite·
the absence of supportive empirical evidence, 31 we have
assumed that the immediate effect ' of exclusion will be·
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. ' More importantly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought.·
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into t~eir value
s :stellJ..! 2
We ada@~:@ \.8 Uli vie"' th~ hese considerationsA supthe imp~entation of the exclusionary rule at trial

----

as a remedy for "whatever so~iety deems to be intolerable restraints," and recognized that those to whom the writ should be
granted "are persons whom society has grievously wronged." 372
JJ Q ot dOl ddl
But in thP. case oi a. tvoical Fourth Amendment

LFP/gg

6-18-76

Rider A, p. 24 (Stone v. Powell)

/
We assume that the continued vitality of these
assumptions justifies the application of the Exclusionary
Rule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state

. .
32a
court conv1ct1ons,

b ut t h ey d o not support its

application on collateral review.
if a ny, of the

The additional contribution,

LFP/gg

6-18-76

32a.

Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell)

The Chief Justice, in his concurring

opinioq,and Mr. Justice White in his dissent, address
generally the application of the exclusionary rule.
at

and

Ante

But we find no occasion in this habeas

corpus case to question the application of the rule at trial
and on direct appeal, as we think it unnecessary to reach
the broader issues addressed by the Chief Justice and by
Mr. Justice White.

See n. 16, supra.
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a:ncT 1ts enforcement on direct appeal of state court cont
victions. But the additional contribution if any of th~
con era 1on o sear
-smzure ··claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs·.
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered
may add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of
the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished
1f search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in fed-·
eral habeas corpus review of state convictions. 33 Nor
1s there reason to assume that any specific disincentive
already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence
at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct review
would be enhanced if there were the further risk that·
a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings years after the incarceration of the defendant. The
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure
that went undetected at trial and on appeal. 34 Even if

____"":.i., :'

"As lhe exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems-·
that Its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimintshing retmns, and beyond that point its continued application is a
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389.
3 ·1 The pohcy arguments that respondents marshal in support
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudicationof federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts:·
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fmr applicatiOn of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an madequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective
t.tJ.St.J1.tltion:~.l settJ-n~ witinn which federaL judges and state judges:
3
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one mtionally could assume that ·some additional incremental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases,
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rationiW.
system of criminal .i ustice.
In sum, we conclude that where the State has pro..
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim,"" a state prisoner may not
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search Ol"
seizure was introduced at his trial. ln th~s context the
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist
with special force. 36
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the
un.sympa.thetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts,
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Les~ee,.
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argtjment
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizt)Ie
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "~~ intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the appli6v.
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse."
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.
85 Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963) .
8 6 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking d1rect review by this Court
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time·
to apply for certiorari has now passed, , any dimunition in tpeir
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained
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According]y, the j,udgments of the Courts of AppealS!
aJre
Reversed.

in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials
should be prospective. Cf'. Engiand v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (1964). We reject these
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior
decisions, see1Fay v. Noia, 372' U. S. 391, respondents were, of course,,
free to file a timely petittQn fot c~tt;iorari prior to seeking federall
lw.bey1s cor{>~ te~ ..
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Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af·
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial, when he
been afforded an opportumty for full
fair litigation
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of considerable importance to the admmistration of criminal
just1ce.
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We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases,
A

Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the
theft of a bottle of wine. . In the scuffling that followed
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a .38' caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the revolver sho~Id have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the
1 The ordinance provides :
"Every person is a vagrant who :
" [1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identifyhimself and to account for his presence when asked by any policeofficer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such ag,
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands suclb
· id.entificatiouo"
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest ~tnd search because it concluded that the error,
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi~
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded
that the arresting officer h!Ld probable cause and held
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the
alternative, that court agreed with the California District
Court of Appeal that the admission of t~e evidence oon{!erning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded'
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and'
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court rehed principally
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), wherewe- ii).valid;tted. a city Qrdjna.\Jce in :t_>art. defining vagrants as ..."per-.
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
the public interest by deterring legisla-tors from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98.. After an independent review of the evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
accomplices. Id., at 99,
B
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in
April1971 after trial i.n a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone call that a woman had been heard screaming at
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a
15-yea.r-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant
was issued for Peak's arrest. ·The investigation also
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m.
that night and found lights and a television on, but there
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object.. . ." /d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see
n. 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, It concluded that the second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure Its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti·tJoner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our dispositton of the ease we need not ronsider this tssue.
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obtained to search for explosiv·es and illegal weapons
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials useful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing
at' that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite particles.
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted planting the suitcase and making the telephone call, and
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced items seized during the
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration was unlawful because the 'evidence', underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974). 3 The court
3

The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's hornEt
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the
warrant was invalid the search was· justified because of
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak
and search fot bombs and explosives believed in possession of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry as the police· lacked
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi~
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. Id., at 194-202/ The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questionS'
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said shou1U
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit
alone sufficient, it also referred to information conta.ined in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in · the
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W: 2d 480, 487-488. See
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. lJJO, 413 n. 3 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause. was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an
issue we need not reach.
4 The District, Court further held 'that the evidence of ·dynamite
partwles found on Riee's clothing should have· been suppressed as
the tainted fmit of a.n arrest warrant that would not have been issued
'but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne:
; J;.umber Go., Inc . v. United. Stat-es~ 251 li... S., 385 (.1920) .
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concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975). 5 We·
now reverse.
II
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-·
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall
have power· to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ..."
Ibid. The courts d~fined the scope of the writ in accordance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions :
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254."
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and sea.rch of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C.
§ 2254 ,"
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used'
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4,
'Qranch.) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.). .

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION

STONE v. POWELL

Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. .Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States.. . ." But the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g.,
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded, 7 this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court.
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973);
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32,
79-80 & n. 107 ( 1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879) ; Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and'
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv, L. Rev. 441, 473'
& n. 75 (19763) .
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convictions based on assertcdly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex part~
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentiOns based ·upon an allegedly illegal
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S l{l8 Wall.) 163 (1973).
See Bator, supra, n 7. :tt 465-474.
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized,
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process"
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d.,
at 333-336.
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S.
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487,
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether theresult in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105'
{1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State'
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,.
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 421'.
cy;: lf_. ~0; it$,,, at. 457-46.0 (Hat:lan, J., dissenting) .
9
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re-o
view had refused to consider the appeal because the
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458,486.
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963). 1() Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants,
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to establish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipulated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183
J.o Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in coll~~oteral proceedings. I d., at
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15
(1974) . Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which inberently results in a Complete miscarriage of JUStice,' " id., at 346,
' quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962).
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re·
versed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and
that he be released from custody or a new trial be
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con•
stitutional claims. 11
During the period in which the substantive scope of
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U. S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The
In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habea.s
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffifllled the equitable nature of the
writ, noting that " [ d] iscretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.'
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis
v. Henderson, U. S. (1976), holding that a state prisoner
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a cha.!lenge in a postconviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual
prejudice, we emphasized:
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances conSiderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426."
~ 2 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins , 281 F. 2d
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965) ;
.De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388
U, S. 919 (1967); Will{Qms v [jnited States, 307 F . 2d 366 (CA9
11
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights i.n
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge
·evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." !d., at 224. See
Thornton v. United Stqtes, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368
F . 2d 822 (1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that searchand-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings.
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,'~
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U. S. 364 ( 1968) ; Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 23-!
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construe-·
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access· by
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similal"'
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226.
Although in recent years the view has been expressed'
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope'
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the 'QUestion of
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity to raise an'd have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d .725 (CA5 1963), with,.
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963) . See also Thornton v.
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966~
{search-and-seizure claims not cogni.able under § ~255 ;tbsent speciaf
.
•l((i]::cuJ.Jl.lltances )...
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( 1973) (POWELL, J., concurring) / 8 the Court, without
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975) .u
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectua-.
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant..
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con~
victed in sta.te court on the basis of evidence obtained in
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 0961), to require
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review.n Until this case we have not
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assumption. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of
uSee, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
H In Newsome the Court focused on the iss11e whether a state
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal.
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See
420 U. S., at 287 n. 4.
n As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitea
States, 394 U.S. ~17, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) . But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as
well as m Warden, the Issue considered here was not presented to'
tlie Court m the petition for writ of certioran. As emphasized by
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con~.
si<Wr; l SSQCS not. :r.aiserl.. in tlhe J;?etitioJil. 3..94 U. S., at 239 & n. 7,

·.
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclu-sionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified.'16

III
The Fourth Amendment assures the 11right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Amendment was primarily a re~tetion to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England and
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the 11sanctity of a man's home and the privfWies of life/'
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
searches under unchecked general authority. 17
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. Uniteil
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 ( 1921), there existed no barrier to the
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New York,
16

As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full and
fair consideration of that claim in the &'tate courts, may not invoke
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it
unnecessa,ry to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary
rule raiSed by the parties. These include, principally, whether in .
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se
basis Without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police actio!\
17
See g('nerally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Suprem~
Court (1966), Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth .
Amendment to the Umted States ConstitutiOn (1937)
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192 U. S. 585 (1904).~ In Weeks the Court held that
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of
property secured through an illegal search or seizure conducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 ( 1920) (fruits of illegally
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." I d., at 27-28.
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as
"an essential ingredient of that right." I d., at 29. The
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions,
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
u. s. 643 (1961) .
8

18 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boy a
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that
the 1'law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwisecompetent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v~
])ana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841} .
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Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. The
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contam1~
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222. 19 But
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was
emphasized:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
1t." I d., at 217.
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds/ 0 but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion wouid deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.
Although our decisions often have alluded to the
·."imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States,
• 277 U. 8. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); id., at 484
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) .
20 See 367 U. S., at 656 {prevention of mtroduction of evidence
where introductiOn is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (preservatiOn of judicial integnty) .
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment
itself reqmres the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
state criminal tnals. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666 Mr. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949)
(concurring opmion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunctiOn w1th the Fifth Amendment ban
.against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
for rE'qumng exclusiOn 367 u s , aJ 661 sf'(' n, 18, supra.
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v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), they demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a particular
context. 21 Logically extended this justification would
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant,
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may object to
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pv,gh, 420 U. S. 103, 119
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand
jury proceedings. United States v. Cala,;,dra, 414 U. S.
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial
process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.u
21 See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89'
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975) .
22
As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended·
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the
Constitution. " Uni_te_a Sjqtes v.. feltjer:~ B"UP.rct,, at , 538 (emphasi$

~rp._itt~, ,
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The importance of this justification becomes minim~
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by- a prisoner
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim a-t
t.rial and on direct review,
The primary justification for the exclusionary ru~e
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment -rights. Post-Mapp decisions hav,e ·
established that the rule is not a personal constitutio~al
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
11
[r]epa.ration comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy desigl').ed ~
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, . ; ," ., United States .vr
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539;
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28....:29 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 416 (1966).
Mapp involved the enforcement of the exclusionary
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment also reqHires the consideratiQ.n
of search-and-seizure claims upon colla.teral review . of
state convictions. But despite the broad· deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in..terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in' all proceedings -or against ·all persons. · As in
· the case of any remedial device, "the appliqation of the·
rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme, 'dial obiectives are · thought most efficaciou~ly served.""
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United States v. Calandra, supra at 348.23 Thus, our
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function 9f the grand jury
·by such extension against the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de'terrence of police misconduct :
11
Any incremental deterre.nt effect which might be
·achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain fit best. Whatever deterrence
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solel:y for use in a grand
jury investigation . . ..
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." !d., at 351 (footnote omitted).
As Professor Amsterdam has observed :
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispensation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility jn 'exert[ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, ~edicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering,
:pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity
inflicts gratu.itm.ls harm on the public interest . .. .0, Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, arid Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PaoLo Rev.
378,_~389 (19,64) (fqqtuotes omitte~) .
23

0

0

0
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The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion~
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assu~e the integrity of the trial
process. 'The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in
determination of truth at trial 24 was deemed to ou~
weigh the incremental contribution that might have been
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by
application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist
only when the Government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view that the "additional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
24 See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar
,of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 1974..
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acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174-175.2<'1

IV
We turn now to the specific question presented by these
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question is whether state pri89nerswho have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial
and on direct review-may invoke their claim again on
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found
by weighing the utility of the exclusion~ry rule against
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims.
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at
trial and on direct review are well known: 26 the focus
23 Cases addressing the question whether searph-and-seizure holdings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the·
deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context. See :()esist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636-637 (1965).
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 8p, 81 (1968). The "attenuationof-the-taint" doctrine also is consistent with the balancing approach.
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1~75) ; Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at
389-390.
26 See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 0954); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971)
(BuRGER, C. J., dissenting) ; People v. Defore , 242 N. Y. 13, 150·
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ; 8 Wigmore On ~vidence§ 2184-a, at
51- 52 (McNaughton ed. 1961) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391;
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Ot\ks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 0970), and.
sources cited tberein ; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-.
QQnd\lct· by the Po1i~~ 52 J. Crim. L , ·c . & P. S. ' 255, 256 (1961) ;.
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of the tri~l, and the attention of the participants therein,
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. 27 Moreover, the physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emph~ized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
~tA claim of illegal search and seizure under· the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized c~n in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of -. a doubt that the -defendant is guilty;"
394 U. S., at 237.
Application, of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty. · 'The disparity in par.ticular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty· defendant by
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept ofjustice. 28 • Thust
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders_?,
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972).
27
See address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois,.
delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8,
1976; cf. Frankel, n. 24, supra.
28
Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the·
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor·
· tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of
· establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the violation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at
tSl-183 ("substantial violations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262:
. ~1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit .pf

e'
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of j;iice. 29
'These long-recognized costs of the rule persist
en a
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collat·eral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state
courts.3 0
act1vity intentionally or flagrantly illegaL") , Wigmore, supra, n. 25,
at 52-53. See n. 16, supra.
29 In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed :
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccup,ation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals."
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975.
80 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values i!nportant to our system
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization ·of
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criniina1
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state·
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded:"·
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., concurring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231
(Black, J ., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 13.
We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing
the need in a free soc1ety for an additional safeguard against
compelling an inrrocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of
liberty. The Cowt in fay v Noia, supra, described habeas corpus:

~..-:-;;;
,-
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Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite
the absence of supportive empirical evidence,S 1 we have
assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be·
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, · this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought·
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
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We assume that the continued vitality of these
assumptions justifies the application of

the ~clusionary

}tule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state
32
court convictions,
a but they do not support its
application on collateral review.

The additional contribution,
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See United States v. Janis,- U . S . - , - n . .22 (1976; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 475 n, 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empiricaf
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule : A Critique of the Spiotto•
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974) ~
82 8.ee Oaks, supra,.n. 26, at 756.
·
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ancf its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. But the additional contribution, if any of the
consid-eration of searc -and-seizure c aims of state pnsoners
on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.
'
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered
may add marginally to an awareness of t~e values protected by the Fourth Amendment. There IS no reason to
believe however that the overall educative effect of
the ex~lusionary 'rule would be appreciably diminished
If search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in fed-
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The Chief Justice, in his concurring

opinio~and Mr. Justice White in his dissent, address
generally the application of the exclusionary rule. Ante
at
and
But we find no occasion in this habeas
corpus case to question the application of the rule at trial
and on direct appeal, as we think it unnecessary to reach
the broader issues addre ssed by the Chief Justice and by
Mr. Justice White.

See n. 16, supra.

t.;ourt on cen10ran Il:l au wautlJUI:l<o ""''"'"u'"'"· --.-- •
. .
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences m the resP_Cct1ve,
l,I)Stltutiomtl sett1~ withm wh1ch federal_ judges and state JUdges:
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one r-ationally could assume that -some additional incre~
mental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases,
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a ration8J.
Rystem of criminal justice.
In sum, we conclude that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair htigation of a
Fourth Ame11dment claim,'j" a state prisoner may not
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his triaL In th~s context the
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist
with special force. 36
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts,
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's LesBee,.
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argt!Illent
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutionaJ
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and~seizqre
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily . basis by trial
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "~o intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the appli~
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse."
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.
85 Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963) .
8 6 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review· by this Court
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time·
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in their
·ability to obtain habeas corpus relief 011 the g,round evidence obtained
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Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals
are

Reversed..

in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials
should be prospective. Cf'. England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 422-423 (1964). We reject these
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior
demsions, see1Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course,
free to file a timely peti_ttQn {ot cettiorari prior to seeking federal!
:Mb~s COt'\)V.S 1;el'¥i..
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were affirmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of considerable importance to the administration of criminal
justice.
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I
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.
A

Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist
testified that the revolver found on Powell \vas the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the
The ordinance provides:
"Every person is a vagrant who:
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any poli ce
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public sa.fety demands such
identification."
1
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error,
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson officer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell fil ed an amended petition for a
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held .
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the
alternative, that court agreed with the California District
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence concerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In December 1974, the Court of Appea1s for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, 2 that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), wherewe invalidated a city ordinance in l?art dc finin~ vagrants as ..."pet-
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. I d., at 98.. After an independent review of the evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
accomplices. /d., at 99.
B
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone call that a woman had been heard screaming at
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that '
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi- ,
gation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a :
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant
was issued for Peak's arrest. The investigation also
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill ·
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m.
that night and found lights and a television on, but there
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpo ~e or object . . . . " /d. , at 156-157, n . 1. Noting the
similarity between the first element of the Hender8on ordinance, see
n.l, supra, and the J acksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second
and third elements of the HcndPrson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure its owmll vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Petitioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition of the case we need not consider this issue.
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obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons :
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials useful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing ·
at that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite particles.
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted planting the suitcase and making the telephone call, and
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced items seized during the
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration was unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974). 3 The court
The sole evidence presented to the
in support of the warrant application.
believed explosives and illegal weapons
bec.ause (1) Rice was an official of
killing of an officer had occurred and
3

magistrate was the affidavit
It indicated that the police
were present in Rice's home
the NCCF, (2) a violent
it appeared that the NCCF
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the·
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak
and search for bombs and explosives believed in possession of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry as the police lacked
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and
further concluded that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. !d., at 194-202. 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should.
be used again~t the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Ccurt found the affidaYit
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testimony adduced at the suppresoion hearing but not in cluded in the
affidaYit. 188 Ncb. 728, 738--739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-1-88. See
also 183 Ncb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The
District Court limited it s probable cau5c inquiry to th e face of the
affidavit, sec Spin elli v. Unit rd States, 393 U.S . 410, 413 n. 3 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109 n. 1 ( 1964), and concluded probable cause was la rking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidaYit
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, a
contention th:1t we ha,·e se,·eral times rejected, sec, e. g., TT'hit ely v.
Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n. 8 (1971); Aguilar v. T ex a ~, supra, at
109 n . 1, and need not re:1c h again here.
• The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite
particles found on Rice's clothing should ha\'e been suppre;::sed as
the tainted fruit of an arr('st warrant thnt \\·ould not hnYe been i s~ued
but for the unlawful sea rch of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne
Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) .

..
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petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975). 5 We
now reverse.
II
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The original statutory authorization did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ..."
Ibid. 'rhe courts defined the scope of the writ in accord- .
ance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as !
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions:
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254."
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
·respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C.
§ 2254."
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
·
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-·
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.).
5
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States .... " But the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g.,
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur- ·
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote
because of the pra cti ce of single district judge's holding circuit court.
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973);
Frankfurt er & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32,
79- 80 & n. 107 ( 1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 371, 376- 377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and ·
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441,473
& n. 75 (19763).
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convictions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973).
See Bator, supra, n. 7, at 465-474.
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized,
powever, that if a habeas corpus court found that the
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process"
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d.,
at 333-336.
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S.
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. 8., at 482-487,:
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in :
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) . Compare Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105
(1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. No ia, 372 U.S. 391, 42!
& n. 30; id., at 457-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct review had refused to consider the appeal because the
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458, 486.
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in Fay v. N oia, 372 U. S. 391
{1963).10 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confession. N oia's codefendants,
but not N oia himself, appealed their convictions.. Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to establish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipulated that N oia's confession also had been coerced, but
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that Noia's
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183
·10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. !d., at
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' " id., at 346,
quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).

I
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and
that he be released from custody or a new trial be
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims.11
During the period in which the substantive scope of
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The
In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.'
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis
v. Henderson, U. S. (1976), holding that a state prisoner
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a postconviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual
prejudice, we emphasized:
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426."
:u Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965);
De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), ccrt denied, 388
U. S. 919 (1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA9,
11

I
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge
, evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." !d., at 224. See
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368
F. 2d 822 (1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that searchand-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings.
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,",
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that there was no basis for restricting "access by'
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U. S., at 226.
Although in recent years the view has been expressed
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250
1962); Armstead v. United Stat es, 318 F . 2d 725 (CA5 1963), \Yith,
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 317 F . 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v.
Unit ed Stat es, 125 U. S. App . D. C. 114, 368 F . 2d 822 (1966)
(search-and-seizure claims not cognizable under § 2255 absent special
circumstances ).

/
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(1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) / 3 the Court, without
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefk
20 U. S. 283 (1975); Cardwell
(1974 i '

See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal,
and did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 420
U. S., at 287 n . 4. Similarly, in Cardwell m1d Cady the question
considered here was not presented in the petition for certiorari, and
in neither case was relief granted on the basis of a search-andseizure claim. In Cardwell the plurality expressly noted that it was
not addre38ing the issue of the substantive scole of the writ. See
417 U.S., at 596 and n. 12.
1. 5 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unit ed
States, 394 U. S. 217, 231, 239 (1969) , the Kaufman majority made
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Mancusi v. D e.Forte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that ease, as
well as in TV arden, the issue of the substantiYe scope of the writ
was not presented to the Court in the petition for writ of certioran.
MoreoYer, of the other "numerous occa sions" cit ed by Mn. JusTICE
BREN NAN 's dissent , post, at - , in which the Court has accept ed
juri ~diction over colbteral attacks by state prisoners raising Fourth
Amendment claims, in only one case--Whitley v. Ward en, 401 U.S.
560-\Yas relief grant ed on that basis. And in Whitl ey, as in Mancusi, the issue of the substantive scope of the writ was not pre ent ed
in the petition for certiorari. As empha;;ized by ::--Ir. Ju sti ce Black,
only in the most exceptional ca ses will we consider issues not raised
in the petition. 394 U.S., at 239 and n . 7.
13
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The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
habeas corpus rests on the view that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review. 15 Until this case we have not
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this view'£)
See, e. g., ardwell v. Lewis su ra at 596 and n. 12f..Sclinec ' ot 1 v. ustamonte, supra, at 249 n. 38· Upon
examination, we cone u e, in light o t 1e nature and
purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
that this view is unjustified. 1 6 We hold, therefore, that
where the State has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. 17

l

IG The issue in Kaufman was the scope of § 2255.
Our decision
today rejects the dictum in Kaufman concerning the app li ~[\b ility
of the exclusionary rule in federal h[lbeas corpu3 reYiew of state
court decisions pursuant to § 2254. To the extent the applic[ltion
of the exclusionary rule in Kaufman did not rely upon the sup rrvi5ory role of this Court OYer the lower federal courts, cf. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), seep.-, infra, the rationale
for it s application in that context is also rejected.
17 'Ve find it unnece>sary to consider the other issues concerning
the exclusion:uy rule, or the statutory scope of the habeas corpus
statute, raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be a.pplied on a per se
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police a.ction.

r
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III
The Fourth Amendment assures the 11right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England and
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the 11 sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
searches under unchecked general authority.' 8
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-'
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in W ecks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 ( 1914), and Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 (1921), there existed no barrier to the
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment. See A dams v. New York,
192 U. S. 585 ( 1904) .19 In Weeks the Court held that
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of
. uSee generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court (1966); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937).
19 The rootS of the lVerks decision Jay in an early decision, Boyd
.v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 ( 1886), where the Court held that
.the compulsory production of a person's pri,·ate books and papers
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the
' defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered
to the common-Jaw rule that a trial court must not inquire, on
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v,
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841).

.• ,
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property secured through an illegal search or seizure conducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., at 27- 28.
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as .
"an essentinl ingredient of that right." !d., at 29. The
full force of Wolf was . ~roded in subsequent decisions,
see Elkins v. United ·s tates, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); R ea
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
u. s. 643 (1961).
Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. The
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special
supervisory role over the lo"·er federal courts, referred to
the "imperatiYe of judicial integrity," suggesting that
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contamination of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222. ~ But
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was
emphasized:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
0

Set> Terru v. Oh io, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1968) ; W eeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 4i0 (1928) (Holmes, J., di s~ enting); id., at 484
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20
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Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." !d., at 217.
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds, 21 but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.
Although our decisions often have .alluded to the
"imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States
v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 ( 1975), they demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a particular
con text. 22 Logically extended this justification would
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant,
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may object to
.the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings
See 367 U. S., at 656 (prcYention of introdu ction of eYidence
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial integrity).
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment
. itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized eYidence in
state criminal trials. Sec 367 U. S., at 656, 666. l\Ir. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
was not suflicicnt, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949 )
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
for requiring exclusion. 367 U.S., at 661. Sec n. 19 , supra.
22 See 1\Ionagh:m, Fore\\·ard: Con~titutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975).
21
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need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119
( 1975) ; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S.
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases
is clear. vVhile courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial
process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence. 23
The importance of this justification becomes minimal
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner '
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at
trial and on direct review.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. TValker,
381 U. S. ~18, 637 (1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
23 As we recognized bst Term , judicial integrity is "not offr nded
if law enforcement officials rea son::~b ly believed in good faith that
their condurt was in accordance with the bw even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type
engnged in by the law enforcement offi('i::lls is not permitted by the
Constitution." Unit ed States v. Peltier, supra, at 538 (emphasis
omitted).
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safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect ...." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539;
T erry v. Ohio, 302 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S.
406, 416 (1966).
M app involved the enforcement of the exclusionary
rule at state trials and on direct review. The decision in
Kaufman, as noted above, is premised on the view that
implementation of the Fourth Amendment also requires
\ the consideration of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of state convictions. But despite the broad
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rult, it has never
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.
As in the case of any remedial device, "the application of
the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. 2 '1 Thus, our
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings \vas based on a balancing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
As Profe5sor Amsterdam h:~ s obsen·cd:
"The rule is un supportable as reparation or compensatory dispensation to the injured crimiual; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert [ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ...
law-enforcing officers.' As it sen·es this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be
swallo\\·ed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering,
pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity
inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest . . . ." Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev.
378, 388-389 ( 1964) (footnotes omitted).
24
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by such extension against the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through deterrence of police misconduct:
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation ....
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." !d., at 351 (footnote omitted).
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in
determination of truth at trial 25 '.Yas deemed to out25

See gencmlly Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal

I
:

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION
STONE v. POWELL

21

weigh the incremental contribution that might have been
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by
application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist
only when the Government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view that the "additional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174-175. 26

IV
We turn now to the specific question presented by these
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth AmendView, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar
' of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 1974.
26 Cases aclclre~sing the question whet her search-and-seizure holdings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the
· deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context. See D esist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965).
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968). The "attenuation. of-the-taint" doctrine also is consistent with the balancing approach.
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 591-!92 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 24, at
389-390.
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ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question is whether state prisonerswho have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial
and on direct review-may invoke their claim again on
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found
by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims.
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at
trial and on direct review are well known: 27 the focus
of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein,
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. 28 Moreover, the physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
27 See, e. g., Ervine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Bi vens
v. Six Unkno1un Nam ed Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971)
(BURGEH, C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On EYidcnce § 2184a, at
51-52 (:\lc~au ~ hton ed . 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 24, at 383-391;
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P . S. 255, 256 (1961) ;
Wright, l\1ust the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?,
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972) .
28 Sec address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
dcliYered at the National ConfC'rencc on the Causes of Popular
Dissati~faction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8,
1976; cf. Frankrl, n. 25, supra.
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other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty."
394 U. S., at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. 29 Thus,
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 30
29 I\Iany of the propo>als for modification of the scope of the
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of proportionality in the criminal justice system and the potential nlue of
establishing a direct relat ionship betwren the nature of the violation and the decision whether to im·oke the rule. See A. L. I., A
I\Iodcl Code of Pre-:maignment Proc-edure, :i\Iay 20, 1975, § 290.2, at
181-183 (" ~ ub --tantial Yiolations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262
(1967) (eYen at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of
activity int entionally or flagrantly illegal."); l'i'igmore, supra, n. 26,
at 52-53. See n. 17, supra.
30 In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed:
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the lrgal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals."
Ethics, :.!orality nnd Profesional Rc.;ponsibil ity, 3 B. Y. U. L. Rev.
591, 596 (1975).
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These long-recognized costs of the rule persist '"hen a
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on coll&tcrall eYicw on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state
courts."'
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations \vill decrease. Despite
the ab!::ence of supportive empirical eviclence, 32 we have
31 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purpc3es other than to
assure that no inuocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal
trials, (iii) the min imization of fri ction bct\\·een our fed e>rn l and state
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of fed ernlism is founded." ,
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., conClJrring). See also K aufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231
(Black, J ., dis~enting); Friendly, supra, n. 13.
We ne\'erth e l e~s nffo rd broad h:1beas corpus relief , recognizing ·
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against
compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconst itutional loss of
liberty. The Court in Fay v. Noia, supra, described hnbeas corpus
as a remedy for "whate\'er ~ociety deems to be intolerable restraints," and recognized thnt those to whom the writ should be
granted "are persons whom society has grie\'ouoly wronged." 372
U.S., at 401, 441. But in the case of a typical Fourth Amendment
claim, asserted on colla tern! attack, a convicted defendant is usually
asking society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the
basic justice of his incarceration.
32 The efficacy of the exclmionary rule has long been the subject
of sharp debate. Until recently, scholarly empirical research
was unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S . 206, 218 (1960).
And, the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still
inconclusiw. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 27: Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 Journ. L€gal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon,
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be
to disc9urage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system. 33
We adhere to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered
may add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of
the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished
if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state conYictions. ~·' Nor
is there reason to assume that any specific disincentive
already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence
a Plea Agninst a Preri pitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. R ev. 681 (1974) .
See United Stat es v. Janis,-- U.S.--,-- n. 22 (197G; Amsterdam, Per.spertiYes on the Fourth Amendment, 58 l\Iinn. L. Rev.
349, 475 n. 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of EmpiricnJ
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Crit ique of the Spiotto
Resea rch and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974).
• 3a See Oak ~, supra, n. '27, at 756.
34 "As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time. it serrns
that its deterrent eflicacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a
public nui ~a nce." Amsterd:un, supra, n. 23, at 389.
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at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct review
would be enhanced if there were the further risk that
a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceed\ ings often occurring years after the incarceration of the
defendant. The view that the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations IYould be furthered rests on the
dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities
would fear that federal habeas review might reveal fio11·s
in a search or seizure that went undetected at trial and
on appcaJ.3 5 Even if one rationally could assume that
some additional incremental deterrent effect would be
present in isolated cases, the resulting advance of the

I~

s:; The policy arguments that respondents marshal in sumJOrt
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a ba sic mistrust of
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphnsizes the broad diiTerences in the respective
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal con8titutional claims of some state
judges in years past , we are unwilling to asstm1e that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights
in th e trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts,
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. Mart in v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U. S. ( 1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 ( 1816). MoreoYer, the argument
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure
claims, since they arc dealt with on a daily basis by trial
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or con,;cient iou ~, or k :t rn ccl \\'it h rr~pert to t hP [ con:;ider::~tioll of Fomih Amendment <ft\ln~] than his neighbor in the ~tat e
courthouse." Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.
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legitimate goal of furthering Fourth Amendment rights
would be outweightd by the acknowledged costs to other
values vital to a rational system of criminal justice.
In sum, we conclude that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, 36 a state prisoner may not
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
•
seizure was Introduced at his trial. 37 In this context the
36

Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).

37

I
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The dissent characterizes the Court's opinion as laying the
ground\York for a "drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction,
if not for all grounds, then at lrast [for many] . . . . " Post, at
- . It refers variously to our opinion as a "novel reinterpretation ,
of the habeas statute," post, at - ; as a "harbinger of future e\'iscerations of the habras statutes," post, a t - ; as "rewrit[ing] Congress' jurisdictional :;tatutes . . . and [barring] access to federal
courts by state priooners with constitutional clims distasteful to a
majority" of the Court, post, at - ; and as a "denigration of constitutional guarantees [that] must appall citizens taught to expect
judicial respect" of constitutional rights. Post, at - .
}Vith all respect, the hyjlerbole of the dissenting opinion is misdiQectcd. Our deci~ion today is not concerned with the scope
of the habras corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional
cl::tims generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary rule is a
.iudiriall~· created rc'medy rnther ~Ian a per_<ona l constitutional
right,]~me empha~izP the minim
1tility of the rule \Yhrn sought
to be npplird to Fourth Amendm 1t claim~ in a habeas corp1s
procreding. As l\Ir. Jn::;tirc Black recognized in this context, "ordinarily the e\·idence ~ci;~rd can in no \\'ay ha"e been untru~t
worthy ... and indeed often ... alone establishes be~·ond Yirtually
any shado\1· of a doubt that the defendant i~ guilty• " iJ:f· 1: ~t;(
In sum, \\'e hold only that a federal court need not apply the C'(clusionary rule on habras re\·ie\\' of a Fourth Amrnclment claim absrnt
a showing that the ~tate prisoner was denied an opportunity for a
full and fair litigation of that claim :1t trial and on direct re\'iew.
Our cl eci,-ion clors not mran th:lt the federal comt lacks jmi~diction
over such a claim, but only that the application of the rule is limited to ca~rs in which there has been both such a sho\\'ing and a
Fourth Amendment violation.
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contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fouith Amendment is minimal and the
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist
with special force. 38
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals
are
Reversed.

Set.
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3 81R e~pondcnts contend th[lt since they filed 11ctitions for federal habeas corpus r[lther than seeking direct review by this Court
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in their
ability to obtain habeas corpus relid on the ground evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials
should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (1964). We reject these
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior
decisions, sec Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course,
free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal
habeas corpus relief.
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~ubsequently sought relief in a federal district court by
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether
a feder~J court should consider, in ruling on a petition for
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of considerable importance to the administration of criminal
justice.
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I
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.
A
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a ,38 caliber revolver with six expended car..
tridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
the liquor stor~ testified against him. A criminologist
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the·
The ordinance provides:
"Every person is a vagrant who:
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police
officer to do so (3] if surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such
:identification."
1
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error,
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson officer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Supreme Court of California 'denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S.C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-trict of California, contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the
alternative, that court agreed with the California District
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence concerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, 2 that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 4Q5 U. S. 156 (1972), where'
we invalidated a city ordinance in part defining vagrants as ..."pe~

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION
4

STONE v. POWELL

that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
. the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98.. After an independent review of the evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
~complices. Id., at 99.
B
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
·a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone call that a woman haa been heard screaming at
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a
15-yea.r-old member ·of the National Committee to Combat Fascism ( 11 NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant
was issued· for- Peak's alTest. The investigation also
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m.
that night and found lights and a television on, but there
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object. . , ."· Jd·.; at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see
n. 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that t he second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Petitioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition of the case we need not consider this issue.
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obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials useful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing
at that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite particles.
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted planting the suitcase and making the telephone call, aJ;ld
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced items seized during the
search, as well 88 the results of the chemical analysis of
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebr88ka affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habe88 corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebr88ka. Rice's sole contention w88 that his incarceration w88 unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974). 8 The court
The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's homa
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF
8
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also rejected the State's contention that even if thewarrant was invalid the search was justified because of
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the
exigent circumstances of the situation-d~tnger to Peak
and search for bombs and explosives believed in possession of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry as the police lacked
probable cause to believe . Peak was in the house, and
further concluded that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. /d., at 194-202.' The Court of Appeals for·the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past
that Rice possessed weapons a.nd explosives, which he said should
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in the
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion) . The
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff oontends that police should
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, a
contention that we have several times rejected, see, e. g., Whitely v.
Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 565 n. 8 (1971); Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at
109 n. 1, and need not reach again here.
~ The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite
particles found ·on Rice's· clothing should have been suppressed as
the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne
Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
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petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975). 6 We
now reverse.
11
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The original statutory authorization did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall
have power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus. . . ."
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
6 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that
counsel in PoweU v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions:
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254."
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C.
§ 2254."
11 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.).
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar·
"'hall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all
cases where a..ny person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States .... " But the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g.,
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S~ 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner had claimed-in the state courts ~hat
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for murPrior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
in federal criminal ·cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote
b-ecause of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court.
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, &' Wechsler, Hart & WechSler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973);
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32,
79-80 & n. 107 ( 1928). Pressure naturally developed for expansion
of the scope of ·habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv, L. Rev. 441, 473
& n. 75 (19763).
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convictions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex part~
Siebold, supra, or (ii) ' detentions based upon an allegedly illegal
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973). '
See .Bator, .supra, . n. 7, at 46_5-474.
7
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su•
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess·
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a compe·
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized,
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process"
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d.,
at 333-336.
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487,
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the
result in Brown v. Allen wa.s foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105
(1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 42I
& n. 30; id .• a.t 457-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re~
view had refused to consider the appeal because the
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458,486.
This final.barrier to broad colla~eral re-examination of
state criminal convictions. in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in, Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963)."~0 Noia
and
two codefendants
had been convicted
.
'
'
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendal'lt was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants,
but not Noia him~elf, appealed their convictions., Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to establish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipulated that N oia's confession also had been coerced, but
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183
10

Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
·no change in tne established rule with respect to nonconstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 22~5, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947) . For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could nave been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. Id., at
178--179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15
(1974). Even tnose nonconstitutional claims that could not have
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only
if the alleged error constituted "'a fundamental defect which inp
herently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' " id., at 346.•
'(j_Uoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962) .
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F. Supp. 222; 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re'"
versed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and
that he be released from custody or a new trial be
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims.11
.
During the period in which the substantive scope of
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider·
whether exceptions to full revfew might exist with respect
to particuiar categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decis1on in Kau/man v. United States, 394
tJ. S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of th~
federal courts of appea1s had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C.
§' 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available'
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The
In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
<l'Onsider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and. justice require.;'
28 U. S. C. § 2243.'' 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis
v. Henderson, ..-- U. S. (1976), holding that a state prisoner
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a postconviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actuai
prejudice, we emphasized:
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426.''
2
l Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F . 2d 55 (CA6 1965) ;
De WeUes v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388'
l]L S. 919 (1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA91
11
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge
evidence as· inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." . Id., at 224. See
Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D. C. 114, 368
F. 2d 822 (1i)66).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that searchand-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings.
The Court noted that "th~ ·federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. (}., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 .
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that there was no basis for restricting "access by
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U. S., at 226.
Although in recent years the view has been expressed
that the Court should · re-examine the substantive scope
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 250
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F . 2d 725 (CA5 1963), with,
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 31'T·F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963) . See also Thornton v.
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966)
(~earch-and-seizure claims not cognizable under § 2255 absent special
circumstances) .
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) ,18 the Court, without
discussion or consideration of the issue, ha.s continued to
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U. S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion) ,14
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
habeas corpus rests on the view that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, a.s applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner ha.s been convicted in sta.te court on the basis of evidence obtained in
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review.13 Until this case we have not
See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev.'142 (1970) .
H In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal,
and did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 420
U. S., at 287 n. 4. Similarly, in Ca1'dwell and Cady the question
considered her~) was not presented in the petition for certiorari, and
in neither case was relief granted on the basis of a search-andseizure claim. In Cardwell the plurality expressly noted that it was
not addressing the issue of the substantive scole of the writ. See
417 U.S., at 596 and n. 12.
u As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitecl
States, 394 U. S. 217, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U, S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeaa
18

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION

14

STONE v. POWELL

had occasion fully to consider the validity of this view.
See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at 249 n. 38;
Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, 'at 596 and n. 12. Upon
examination, we conclude, in light of the nature and
purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
that this view is unjustified. 16 We hold, therefore, that
where the State has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Con~
stitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was in~
troduced at his trial. 17
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as
well as in Warden, the issue of the ..substantive scope of the writ
was not presented to the Co~rt in the petition for writ of certiorari.
Moreover, of the other "numerous occasions" cited by MR. JusTICE
BRENNAN's dissent, post, at - , in which the Court has accepted
jurisdiction over collateral attacks by state prisoners raising Fourth
Amendment cbims, in only one case-Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560-was relief granted on that basis. And in Whitley, as in Mancusi, the issue of the substantive scope of the writ was not presented
in the petition for certiorari. As emphasized by Mr. Justice Black,
only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised
in the petition. 394 U.S., at 239 and n. 7.
10 The issue in Kaufman was the scope of § 2255.
Our decision
today rejects the dictum in Kaufman concerning the applicability
of the exclusiol!ary rule in federal habeas corpus review of state
court decisions pursuant to § 2254. To the extent the application
of the exclusionary rule in Kaufman did not rely upon the supervisory role of this Court over the lower federal courts, cf. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), seep.-, infra, the rationale
for its application in that context is also rejected.
17 We find it unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning
the exclusionary rule, or the statutory scope of the habeas corpus
statute, raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per· se
basis without regard to the nature of · the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police action,
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III
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England and
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
searches under unchecked general authority. 18
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 (1921), there existed no barrier to the
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New Y ark,
192 U. S. 585 (1904). 19 In Weeks the Court held that
the defendant coqld petition before trial for the return of
"ls See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court ( 1966) ; lason, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937).
19 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendme~ts. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams w.
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the
defendant io furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v.
Dana~. 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841).
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property secured through an illegal search or seizure con~
ducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., at 27-28.
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusiona,ry rule would not be imposed upon the States as
"an essential ingredient of that right." !d., at 29. The
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions,
see Elkins v. United States, . 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
u. s. 643 (1961).
Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. ·The
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contamination of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222. 20 But
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was
emphasized:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
20 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) ; Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); id., at 484;,
{6randeis, J., dissenting).
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Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail·
able w~y-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." ld., at 217.
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds/ 1 but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.
Although our decisions often have alluded to the
"imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States
v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), they demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a particular
context. 22 Logically extended this justification would
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant,
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may object to
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings
21 See 367 U. S., at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidence
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial integrity).
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment
itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
state criminal trials. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949)
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
for requiring exclusion. 367 U.S., at 661. Seen. 19, supra.
22 See Monaghan, Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975),
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need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does
,not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand
jury proceedihgs. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S.
338 ( 1974). Nor does it require that the trial court
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial
process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence. 23
The importance of this justification becomes minimal
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at
trial and on direct review.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
'' [r] eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to,
28

As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the
Constitution."· United States v. Peltier, supra,. at 538 (emphasis:
omitted).

-
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safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect ...." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539;
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 416 (1966).
Mapp involved the enforcement of the exclusionary
rule at state trials and on direct review. The decision iri
Kaufman, as noted above, is premised on th~ view that
implementation of the Fourth Amendment also requires
the consideration of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of state convictions. But despite the broad
deterrent purpo~e of the exclusionary rult, it has never
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.
As in the case of any remediai device, "the application of
the rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-'
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. 24 Thus, our·
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
u As Professor Amsterdam has observed:

"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispensation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . , .
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed· than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering,
pursuance of thiS policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity
inflicts gratwtous harm on the public interest . . . ."· Amsterdam;
Search, Sei;mre, and. Section 2255.: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev,
378, 388-389 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
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by such extension against the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de·
terrence of police misconduct:
'
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the· rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation ....
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." /d., at 351 (footnote omitted) .
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion&y rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial'
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not.
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in
determination of truth at trial 25 was deemed to out25

See

gen~rally

Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal
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weigh the incremental contribution that might have been
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by
application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also
finds e~pression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist
only when the Government attempts to use illegaUy obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view that the "additional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174-175,26

IV
We turn now to the specific question presented by these
eases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth AmendView, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar
of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 1974.
2 ° Cases aqdressing the question whether search-and-seizure holdings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the
deterrent purpose sei'Ved by the exclusionary rule, consistently with
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context, See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965).
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968). The "attenuationof-the-taint"' doctrine also is consistent with the balancing approach.
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. Unitea
States, 371 U. S.. 411, 591-492 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 24, at.
~.9-390.
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ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteen'tht
Amendment. The question is whether state prisoners-who llave been afforded the opportunity for full and ·fair
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule
with respect ~o seized evidence by the state courts at trial
and on direct review...:_may ·invoke their claim again on
federal habeas.corpus review. The answer is to be found
by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims.
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at
trial and on direct review are well known : 27 the focus
of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein,
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. 28 Moreover, the physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
11
A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
27

See, e. g., Ervine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 441 (1971)
(BuRGER, C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On Evidence§ 2184a, at
51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 24, at 388-391;
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev."665, 736-754 (1970), and
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961);
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?,
50 Texas L. ReV'. '736 (1972).
28
See address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8,..
m7&;; cf. Frankel, n. 25, supra.
'
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other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty."
394 U.S., at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. 29 Thus,
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through 't he nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 30
29 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of proportionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of
establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the violation and the decision whether to ·invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at
181-183 ("substantial violations"); H . Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal."); Wigmore, supra, n. 26,
at 52-53. Seen. 17, supra.
80 In a different context, Dallin H . Oaks has observed:
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedurt>..s are but means to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these · goals. "
Ethics, Morality and Profesional Responsibility, 3 B. Y. U. L. Rev.
591. 596 (1975).
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These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state
courts. 31
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite
the absence of supportive empirical evidence/ 2 we have
31 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of
limited judicial resou11ces, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., concurring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 13.
We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against
compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of
liberty. The Court in Fay v. Noia, supra, described habeas corpus:
as a remedy for "whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints," and recognized that those to whom the writ should begranted "are persons whom society has grievously wronged." 372
U. S., at 401, 441. But in the case of a typical Fourth Amendment
claim, asserted on collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually
asking society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the
basic justice of his incarceration.
82 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject
of sharp debate. Until recently, scholarly empirical research
was unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
And, the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still'
inconclusive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 27; Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its·
Alternatives, 2 Journ. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon,
Is thll Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and
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·assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequenoes to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, a..nd the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth .A..mendment ideals into their value
systern,. 88
We adhere to · the view that · these considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered
may add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of
the exclusionary ru1e woU1d be appreciably diminished
if search-a.nd-sei~ure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. 34 Nor
is there reason to assume that any specific disincen~ive
already created by the risk of exclusion of evidepce
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974).
See United States v. Janis,-- U.S.--,-- n. 22 (1976; , Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 475 n, 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empirica:J
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule : A Critique of the Spiotto
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 n974).
88 See Oaks, supra, n. 27, at 756.
84 "As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns, · and beyond that ·point its continued application is a
public nuisance." Amsterd.<tm, St[.pra, n. 23, at 389.
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at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct re.view
would be enhanced if there were the further risk that
a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings often occurring years after the incarceration of the
defendant. The view that the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the
dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities
would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flows
in a search or ~izure that went undetected at trial and
on appeaP 5 Even if one rationally could assume that
some additional incremental deterrent effect would be
present in isolated cases, the resulting advance of the
3 ~ The policy arguments
that respondents marshal in support
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the state courts as fair .and competent forums for the adjudication
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts,
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argument
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the [ consideration of Fourth Amendment claims] than his neighbor in the statecourthouse." Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION

STONE v. POWELL

27

legitimate goal of furthering Fourth Amendment rights
would be outweightd by the acknowledged costs to other
values vital to a rational system of criminal justice.
In sum, we conclude that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim/ 6 a state prisoner may not
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial. 37 In this context the
Cf. Townsend v. Sairi, 372 U. S. 293 (1963).
The dissent characterizes the Court's opinion as laying the
groundwork for a "drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction,
if not for all grounds, then at least [for many] . . . . " Post, at
- . It refers variously to our opinion as a "novel reinterpretation
of the habeas st~t~te," post, at ·- -; as a "harbinger of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes," post, at - ; as "rewrit[ing] Congress' jurisdictional statutes . . . and [barring] access to federal
courts by state prisoners with constitutional claims distasteful to a
majority" of the Court, post, at - ; and as a "denigration of constitutional guarantees [that] must appall citizens taught to expect
judicial respect" of constitutional rights. Post, at - .
With all respect, the hyperbole of the dissenting opinion is mis9-irected. Our decision today is not concerned with the scope of the
habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims
generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary rule is a judicially
created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right, see p. 18,
supra, and we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule when sought
to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus
proceeding. As Mr. Justice Black recognized in this context, "ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way have been untrustworthy . . . and indeed often . . . alone establishes beyond virtually
any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 394 U. S., at
237. In sum, we hold only that a federal court need not apply tpe exclusionary rule on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent
a showing that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a
full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct review.
Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction
over such a claim, but only that the application of the rule is lim~
ited to cases in which there has been both such a showing and a
Fourth Amendment violation.
86

37
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contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effec...
tuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the·
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist,
with special force. 38
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals
are

Reversed..

See n. 31, supra. Respondents contend that since they filed peti-tions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by
this Court through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since
the time to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in
t heir ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their
trials should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 422-423 (1964) . We reject these
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course~
free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal
habeas corpus relief.
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I
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.
A

Respondent, Lloyd Powell, was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. He
and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store
in San Bernadino, Cal., at about midnight on February
17, 1968, where Powell became involved in an altercation
with Gerald Parsons, the store manager. In the scuffling
·that followed Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten
hours later, on Sunday morning, an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for viola. tion of the Henderson vagrancy ordinance/ and in the
search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 caliber
revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and tried for
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
' the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
·police officer as to the search and discovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In July 1969, the conviction wa.s affirmed by a California District Court of
1 The ordina.nce provides:
"Every person is a vagrant who:
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself a.nd to account for his presence when asked by any peace
officer to do so, [3] if the surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such
identification."
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Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because it concluded that even if it
was error to admit the testimony of the Henderson officer,
this was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed a petition for a writ of
federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the
United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, contending that the testimony concerning
the .38 caliber revolver should have been excluded as
fruit of an illegal search. He argued that his arrest had
been unlawful because the Henderson vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe that he was
violating it. The District Court did not reach the ques"
tion of the constitutionality of the ordinance, although it
did conclude that the arresting officer had probable cause.
The Court agreed with the California District Court
that the admission of the evidence concernirtg Poweli's
arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court alternatively held that even if the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional, the deterrent purpose
of the exclusionary rule does not require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits of a search incident
to an otherwise valid arrest.
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and
2

In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principly
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972) , where
we invalidated a city ordinance defining vagrants as "persons wander-
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no
deterrent purpose ·with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. !d., at 98. After an independent review of the evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
accomplices. Id., at 99.
B
Respondent, David Rice, was convicted of murder in
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone call that a woman was heard screaming at 2865
Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that address
examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded,
killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of
the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 15-year-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism
("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant was issued for
Peak's arrest. The investigation also focused on other
known members of the NCCF, including respondent Rice,
some of whom were believed planning to kill Peak
before he could incriminate them. Upon arriving at
Rice's home at 10:30 p. m., the police found lights and
television on but there was no response to their repeated
knocking. While officers were left to watch the premises,
a warrant was obtained to search for explosives and
ing or strolling around from plarc to place without any lawful
purpose or object ...." !d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the similarity
between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see n. 1,
supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded tha.t the second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Petitioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition of the case we need not consider this issue.
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illegal weapons believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak
was not in the house but upon entry the police discovered, in plain view, dynamite, blasting caps, wire, a
battery, and a pair of long nosed pliers. Peak subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice voluntarily
surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing at that time
were subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite
particles.
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted planting the suitcase and making the telephone call, and
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced items sci2led in the search,
as well as the results of the chemical analysis of his
clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress
this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a va.lid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration was unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was fatally defective under Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U. S. 108 (1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1973). 3
3

The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home
because (1) Rice was an active member of the NCCF, (2) a violent
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past
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The court also rejected the State's contention that even
if the warrant was invalid the search was justified because of the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because
of the exigent circumstances of the situation. The court
reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry
as the police lacked probable cause to believe Peak was
in the house, and further concluded that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless search. !d., at 194-202.4 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affrrmed, substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court.
513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the State
prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions con. oerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their
that Rice possessed weapoiLS and explosives, which he said should
be used against the police. See Appendix to Petitioner's Cert.
:34 n. Z. In concluding there existed probable cause for issuance of
the warrant, the state trial court on the motion to suppress and
the State Supreme Court on appeal relied in pa.rt on information
contained in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing that was
not included in the affidavit. The District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the affida.vit, see Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U. S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969) ; Aguilar v. T exas, 378 U. S.
108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause was lacking.
P etitioner Wolff contends that police should be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit for a search warrant
at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an issue we need not reach.
4
The District Court furth er held that the evidence of dynamite
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as
tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued
but for the unlawful search of hi home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silv erthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
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petitions for certiorari.
now reverse.

411 U. S. 1055 (1975). 5

7
We

II

The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciedum 6 was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The original statutory authorization did not define its substantive reach. It merely
stated that the courts of the United States "shall have
power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ... " Ibid.
The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance
with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as to
the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act
5 In granting certiorari in these cases we requested that counsel
in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions:
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's clajm that the gun ruscovered as a result of
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254.
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a question properly cognizable under U. S. C.
§ 2254."
6
It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciedum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.).
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of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act relief by federal courts was authorized in "all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law
of the United States. . . ." The principle that federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited to consideration of
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, however, remained the touchstone in this area. See, e. g., In re
Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545
(1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 ( 1906). And, although the concept
of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain as
the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangnum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-der had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccessPrior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
"in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was rare
because of the practice of single district judges holding circuit court.
See Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court
31-32, 7!}-80 ( 1927). Pressure naturally developed for expansion
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 473 and
n. 75. See generally Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973).
8 The expansion occurred primarily where there were (i) convic-tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879), and (ii) detentions based upon an
allegedly illegal sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18
Wall.) 163 (1873). See Bator, supra, n. 7, at 465-474.
1
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fully sought habeas corpus relief in the Federal District
Court. On direct review, the Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of relief because Frank's federal claims had been
considered fully by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, however, that if a habeas
corpus court finds that the State has failed to provide
adequate "corrective process" for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether or not "jurisdictional," the
court may inquire into the merits to determine whether
the detention is lawful. I d., at 333-336.
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 ( 1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487,
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9
In these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling
certain confessions admissible. In Brown, on direct appeal from the conviction these claims had been rejected
on the merits by the highest court of the State, State v.
Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99 (1951), and this
Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct reThere has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsy, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) . Compare Fay v. Noia,
372 U. S. 39 1, 421 and n. 30; Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 (1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas
Corpus: Impact of Abortive States proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev.
1315, 1328-1329 (1961) with Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S., at 457-460
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Bator, supra, n. 7, at 488-491.
9

1
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view had refused to consider the appeal because the
papers were filed out-of-time. This Court held that
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458, 486.
This final barrier to full collateral re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in F'ay v. N oia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963). Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants,
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to establish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, although it was
stipulated that his confession also had been coerced, the
District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's
failure to appeal barred habeas review. The Court of
Appeals reversed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set
aside and he be released from custody or a new trial
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court in its discretion may refuse to consider the merits
of federal constitutional claims 10 to cases involving de•o Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. Id., at
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liberate bypass of state procedural rules or failure to exhaust available state remedies. 11
Throughout the period in which the substantive scope
of the writ was expanded the Court did not consider
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appeal had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizur.e claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C.
§' 2255. 12 The primary rationale advanced in support of
178-179. Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 and n. 15
( 1974). Even those claims that could not have been asserted on
direct appeal ~an be raised in collateral review only if the alleged
error constituted "a fundamental defect which 'inherently results in
a complete miscarriage of justice.'" !d., at 346. See Hill v. United
States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962).
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a writ of habeas corpus,
the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the writ,
noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command that
the judge 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 28
U. S. C. § 2242." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis v.
Henderson, U. S. (1976), holding that absent a claim of
actual prejudice a state prisoner who fails to make a timely challenge to the composition of the grand jury that indicted him cannot
bring that challenge in a post-conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding, we emphasized that:
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of corruty and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to forego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426."
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied, 389 U. S. 820 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d
193 (CA3 1960); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CAS
1963) ; Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965); De Welles
v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert. denied, 388 U. S. 919
(1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA9 1962), with,
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those decisions was that Fourth Amendment violations
are different in kind from denials of other constitutional
rights in that claims of illegal search and seizure do not
"impugne the integrity of the fact-finding process or
challenge the evidence as inherently unreliable; rather,
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a
prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth
Amendment violations by law enforcement officers."
Id., at 224. See Thornton v. United States, U. S.
App. D. C. - , 368 F. 2d 822 (1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that searchand-seizure claims are cognizable in § 225·5 proceedings.
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"
id., at 225~226, see, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392- U. S.
364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968),
anci concluded that there was no basis for restricting
"access by federal prisoners with illegal search-andseizure claims to federal collateral remedies, while placing
no similar restriction on access by state prisoners."
Although in recent years the view has been expressed
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
of Fourth Amendment claims "solely to the question
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250
(1973) (PowELL, J., concurring), 1 3 the Court without
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v.
United States, U. A. App. D. C. - , 368 F . 2d 822 (1966)
(search-and-seizure claims not cognizable under § 2255 absent special
circumstances) .
u See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
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discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
a-ccept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975).
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
liabeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectuati_on of the Fourth Amendment requires the granting of
habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted
in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an
illegal search or seizure as the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require exclusion of such evidence, under
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), at trial and reversal
of such a conviction upon direct review?4 Until this
case we have not had occasion fully to consider the
rationale underlying this assumption. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at 249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of the nature and purpose of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that the
assumption is unjustified.15
As Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U. S. 217, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made no
effort to justify its result in light of the long-re.cogn.izcd deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure clajms are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Mancusi v. De.Forte, 39·2 U. S. 364 (1968);
'Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi was habeas relief ordered
<on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as well
as in Warden, the issue was not presented to the Court in the
petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized by Justice Black,
only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised
·in the petition. 394 U.S., at 237 and n. 7.
J.s Ail we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence
·should have been excluded because it was obtained in an illegal
·search and seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full
<consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke the
·exclusionary rule on federal habeas corpus review, we find it unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary
14
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III
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England and
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
searches under unchecked general authority. 16
The exclusionary rule was adopted to effectuate the
rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the
Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383
(1914), evidence obtained in violation of the Amendment generally could be introduced in both state and
federal criminal trials. See Adams v. New York, 192
U. S. 585 (1904).1.7 In Weeks the Court held that evirule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police action. See Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U. S, 433, 446 (1974) ("the deterrent. purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in
willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right") ; Brown v. !Uinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606
(1975) (PowELL, J., concurring in part); Cf. United States v,
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
Hl See generally Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937); Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966).
17
The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd
'v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (18 6), where the Court, forging a
link between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, held that the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers for
introduction against him at trial was unconstitutional. Boyd was
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dence secured through an illegal search and seizure could
not be introduced in a federal prosecution. The prohibition soon was extended to the fruits of the illega.Uy
seized evidence. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). Thirty-five years after
Weeks the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25
(1949), that the right of privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
As such enforceable against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." /d., at 27.
'The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as
"an essential ingredient of that right." /d., at 27. The
full force of Wolf was steadily eroded in subsequent
decisions, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206
(1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and
a little more than a decade later the exclusiona.ry rule
was held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643.
Decisions prior to M app advanced two reasons for
application of the rule in federal trials. In Elkins, for
example, the Court referred to the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of illegally
seized evidence prevents contamination of the judicial
process. 364 U. S., at 222.1 8 But a more pragmatic
ground was emphasized:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
severely limited in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where
the Court, emphasizing that the "law held unconstitutional [in
Boydj virtually compelled the defendant to furnish testimony
against himself," id., at 598, adhered to the common-law rule that
a trial court must not inquire into the method by which otherwise
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v.
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass. ) 329 (1841).
18 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United
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Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail~
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." 364 U. S., at 217.
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds,' 9 but relied principa.Ily
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw~
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.
Although decisions subsequent to M app often have al~
luded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," e. g.,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975),
they also demonstrate the limited role of that justifica~
tion in the determination whether to apply the rule in a
particular context. 20 Logically extended this justification would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defend~nt, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon~
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to
'States, 23S U. S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting), 484 (Brandeis, J.,
'dissenting).
19 See 367 U. S., at 356 (prevention of introduction of evidence
where introduction is "tantamount " to a coerced confession); id., at
'658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial integrity).
Only four JuRtices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment
alone requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
state criminal trials. See 367 U.S., at CA3, 666. Mr. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949)
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban
· against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
for requiring exclusion. 367 U. S., at 661. Seen. 1, supra.
20 See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 n. 33 (1975).
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unconstitutionally seized evidence, see Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and the abatement
of judicial proceedings when the defendant's person is
unconstitutionally seized, a proposition we rejected in
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975). Last Term,
we recognized that judicial integrity is "not offended
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good
faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law
even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure
have held that conduct of the type engaged in by the
law enforce;ment officials is not permitted by the Constitution." United States v. Peltier, supr~, at 53S ( emphasis omitted) 1 Similarly, the interest in promoting j udicial integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized
evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Nor does it require
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for
impeachment of the defendant, even though its introduction is certain to result in convictions in some cases.
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The teaching
of these cases is clear. While courts, of course, must
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the
)udicial process, this concern has limited force as a justiJication for the exclusion of highly probative evidence
without regard to the circumstances that may have made
its seizure violative of the letter of the Fourth Amendment. The force of this justification becomes minimal
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for a
full consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at trial
and on direct review.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule is
the deterrance of unlawful police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-M app decisions have
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established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the search victim, for any "[r] eparation comes
too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637
(1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
sa.feguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect ...." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott,
382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417
u.s. 433,446 (1974).
Mapp involved the application of the exclusionary rule
at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of
·state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-·
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in'terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
' evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in
' the case of any remedial device, "the application of the
· rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 348. 21 Thus,
As Professor Amsterdam has observed:
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensation dispensation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ...
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly taken, medicament; no more should be swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many
21
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our refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a weighing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
of such extension against the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through deterrance of police misconduct:
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
of police misconduct may result from criminal trials,
it is unrealistic to assume that application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation ....
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrance of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." /d., at 351.
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
necessity in a particular context was evident earlier in
Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, where the Court
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionary rule were outweighed in that context by the need
to prevent perjury and assure the integrity of the trial
criminals must go free as will deter constables from blundering,
pursuance of this policy beyond the confines of necessity inflicts a
gratuitous harm on the public interest .... " Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 388389 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
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process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, their utility must be evaluated in
light of competing policies. In that case, the public
interest in determination of truth at trial 22 was deemed
to outweigh the incremental contribution that might
·have been made to the protection of Fourth Amendment
values by application of the rule.
·The balancing process at work in these cases 23 also
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been restricted to
situations in which the Government attemp~s to .use such
cevidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal search.
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 2.29 (1973); Alderman
v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362
U. S. 257 (1960). The standing r_equire:g:~ent .is premised
on the view that the "additional benefits of extending
the ruie" to defendants other than the victim of the
search are outweighed by the "further encroachment
upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of
22 See generally Frankel, The Search Jfor Truth-An Unpireal
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozd Lecture, Assn. Of the Bar
of the city of New York, Dec. 16, 1974.
23 The focus on the deterrent purpose s,e'rved . by the exclusionary
rule in those cases addressing the question whether that purpose
would be served through retroactive application of the rule despite·
the costs associated with such application is in harinony ~ith the
balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context.
See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 254 n. 21
(1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-,-637 (1965); Fulle~
v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U. S., at 446. The "attenuation-of-the-taint". doctrine also is consistant with the balancing approach. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Amsterdam, supra,- n. 21-, at 3S9-390'.~f. Brown v. Illinois, supra.
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crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Al·
derman v. United States, 394 U.S., at 174-175.

IV
We return now to the questioh presented by these
cases. Respondents allege viblations of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question is whether these state prisoners-whose reliance upon the exclusionary rule with
respect to the seized evidence has been fairly considered
and rejected by the state courts at trial and on direct
review-may be granted federal habeas corpus relief by
invoking again the exclusionary rule on such collateral
review. The answer is to be found through the balancing process identified above in Part III.
Even where the exclusionary rule is applied at trial
and on direct review, the costs are well known: '24 the
focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants
therein, is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or
innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
24 See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 411 (BURGER,
C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585
(1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On Evidence § 2184, at 51-52
(McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 21, at 388-391;
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961);
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?,
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972).
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of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty:)'
394 U. S., at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
applica'tion of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality 't hat is essential the concept of justice. 25 Thus,
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
the rule may well have the opposite eff-ect of generating
disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 26
Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the
exclusionary rule at least implicitly recognize the role of proportionality in the criminal ju;stice system and the potential value of
establishing a national relationship between the nature of the vio~
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2
("substantial violations"); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2184, pp. 5152 (J. McNaughton ed., 1961); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 26-261
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal."). See n. 15, supra.
26 In a different context, Dallino Oaks has observed:
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
25
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These long recognized costs of the rule persist with
peculiar force when the rule is extended to collateral
review of Fourth Amendment claims already considered
by two or more tiers of state courts. 27
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite
the absence of supportive empiric evidence, 28 we have
Jleople, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals."
Ethics, Morality and Professionals Responsibility, Convocation and
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975.
27 Resort to habeas corpus for purposes other than to assure that
no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty results
in serious intrusions on values important to our system of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials,
fiii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., concurring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 237
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 14.
28 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has been the subject of
sharp debate since its inception. Until recently, scholarly empirical
research was unavailable. Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206,
218 (1960). And, although certain empirical research has cast doubt
on the efficacy of the rule, the evidence is still inconclusive. Cf.,
e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 20; Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 Journ. Leg.
St. 243 (1973) with, e. g., Cannon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitious
Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974). United States v. Janis,
U. S., at n. - . See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 475 n. 593 (1974);
Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United
States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974).
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, nad the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system. 29
We adhere to these assumptions as supportive of the
exclusionary rule at trial and on direct appeal.
But at the collateral review stage of the judicial process
not only is there no empiric evidence supporting the rule
but the incremental contribution, if any, of the consideration of search-and-seizure claims to the effectuation
of the Fourth Amendment is small in relation to the
costs. To be sure, each case in which such a claim is
considered contributes to the community's awareness and
understanding of the values protected by the Fourth
Amendment. But the marginal contribution at some
stage reaches a point of sharply diminishing returns. We
do not believe the long-term moral and educative effect
of overturning convictions based on evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment would be significantly diminished if search-and-seizure claims were restricted to trial and direct appeal.B 0 Moreover, it cannot
rationally be assumed that any disincentive created by
the risk of exclusion at trial or on direct review would
be further increased in any meaningful way if a policeSee Oaks, supra, n. 29, at 756.
"As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 21, at 389.
29

30
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man, tempted to seize evidence unlawfully to obtain a
conviction, also were told that the conviction might be
overturned in collateral proceedings years after incarceration of the defendant. The view that the policeman's incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment is
significantly decreased by the possibility of federal habeas corpus review rests on the doubtful assumption that
such review may reveal flaws in a search or seizure that
will go undetected at trial or on appeaJ.3 1 Even if one
could assume some additional incremental deterrent
effect in isolated cases, the resulting speculative advance
of this legitimate goal would be outweighed by the
costs to other values that are vital to a rational system
of criminal justice.
State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U. S. (1 Wheat) 304, 341-344
(1816). The policy arguments that respondents marshall in support of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the institutional setting which federal judges operate. Despite differences in
institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude of some
state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume a general
lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial
and appellate courts of the several States. Indeed, the argument
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional
law is especially limited in the Fourth Amendment context, since
search-and-seizure claims are dealt with on a daily basis by trial
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competant, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the application of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse."
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.
81
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In sum, in view of the substantial costs as·
sociated with collateral review of state court judg·
ments and particularly with the exclusionary rule itself,
we conclude that where the state has provided an ade·
.q uate process for full and fair litigation of Fourth
Amendment claims, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was
introduced at his trial. At that stage the contribution of
such review, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth
Amendment is minimal and the recognized costs of appli·
cation of the exclusionary rule persist in full force.a 2
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals
:Me

Reversed.

82 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed. eral habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any change in the substantive scope of collateral review should be prospective. Cf. England
' V. Louisiana State Board of M edical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422423 (1964). We reject these contentions. Although not required
·to do so under the Court's prior decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, respondents were, of course, free to file a timely petition for
certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas corpus relief. More importantly, an untimely filing in a state or federal criminal case is
not a jurisdictional defect, and, under appropriate circumstnnces,
plenary review in this Court is appropriate. E. g., Taglianetti v.
United States, 394 U. S. 316, n. 1 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393
U. S. 80 (1968); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1969).
Respondents' remedy, therefore, lies in the filing of an out-of-time
petition for certiorari. At that time we can assess whether the
claimed prejudice arising from our decision in this case justifies the
·maiver of the time rule, and whether we should exercise our discretion to ,review the merits of the issues raised in the petitions.

2d

~AMBERS DRAFT
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 74-1055

AND

74-1222

W. T. Stone, Warden,)
Petitioner
On Writ of Certiorari to t:P~
74-1055
'
United States Court of Appeals
v. p
for the Ninth Circuit.
Lloyd Ch aries owell.
Charles L. Wolff, Jr.,
Warden, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
f4-122?, v.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit.
David L. Rice.
[May -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were affirmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied
upon evidence obtained -;6- searches and seizures alleged b y
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by
filing a petition for / federal habeas corpus under 28
U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is wrh!!:e~th!!.e~r:....!!:a:__-c-;::--;--;-:sta.te pFisefief ma.y be gra.nted-h
lit!f-on- f-ec\ e rG..\ c 0 v.'l"'\ :::."- 0"'\:}
tho greas.Q 4;ft&t evidence obtained¥ an unconstitutional
Cc:IVI~i~eor, i Y'l f"VI ''"'5
search ~seizure was introduced at his trial, when he
Crr\ o. \>e\-\ 'n~ ~(
has previously been afforded an opportunity for full
"1"1 ..Joe"'~ CH\>"'1 n.\.,&
~· and fair litigation of his claimt"in the state courts. The
-fi \e 'o 'I C\ c-~a..4-e.
n,-'sr..r..~) o- c\c.i-M
' issue is of consi derable importance to the administration
,of criminal justice.
~....t

.J

.

.:

·,,.

.

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION
STONE v. POWELL

2

I
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.
A
Respondent{Lloyd Powelllwas convicted of murder
~
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court.
e
and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store
in San BernaJ:!ino, Cal.:Jit about midnight on February
(17, 1968,]Where Powell became involved in an altercation -with Gerald
- Parsons, the store manage~nr-T::
"~ c.
In the scuffling -r'>ove.:r ~ ~e~
0~ vJ \ vo.t..
that followed Powell shotjnd killed Parson's wife. Ten
'oo
----hours later ,.O:Q ~HBday meiiliB~' an officer of the Render~
son, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy ordinance/ and in the
search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 caliber
revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
_Powell was extradicted to California and MieeKfot
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's -accomplices at
the liquor store testified against him. A criminoiogist
testified that the revolver found on PoweU was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
police officer as to the search andldiscovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In ~ 1969, the conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of

+/

I

I

The ordinance provides:
"Every person is a vagrant who:
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any
officer to do soT[3] if~ surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such
identification."
1

*""

·:
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Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
( ihe arrest and search because it concluded that
· ·
wtte-erPer to admit the testimony of the Henderson officer f. ~ was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed -i:, petition for a writ of
1 federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the
· United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, contending that the testimony concerning
the .38 caliber revolver should have been excluded as)
fruit of an illegal search. He argued that his arrest had'
been unlawful because the Henderson vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and that the arrest' ing officer lacked probable cause to believe that he was
violating it. The District Court did Bet Pea,el:t tao EJ:l:lOB
tion of tho ~itu~nalit;y of tfie ordinance, ::dthoaghit
:;::--::::::::-...L__:di4::' conclud~that the arresting officer had probable caus
¢ourt agreed with the California District Court.-t--that the admission of the evidence concerning Powell's
arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Tfie CeHrj/a,ltQn.Ultiw~l~r held that even if the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional, the deterrent purpose
of the exclusionary rule does not require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits of a search incident
to _an otherwise valid arrest .. / - - -.. -·rn December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, 2 that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and

I

In support of the vagueness holding the court relied princi~y
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where
we invalidated a city ordinance/defining vagrants as ~ersons wande6)
2
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. !d., at 98. After an independent review of the evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
accomplices. !d., at 99.
B
Respondentfnavid Ricefoas convicted of murder in
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telep~one call that a wom_an ~ heard screaming at 286t
Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that address
examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded,
killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of
the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 15-year-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism
("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant was issued for
_Peak's arrest. The . investigation also focuse~ other
known members of the NCCF, including reepe.t Rice,
.some of whom were believed)planning to kill Peak
before he could incriminate them.
Rice's home at 10:30 p. m., *e pehQe found lights and
/..television onLbut there was no response to their repeated
1
knocking. Whilekfficers were left to watch the premises,
a warrant was obtained to search for explosives and

(

ing or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object .... " !d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the similarity
between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see n. 1,
supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not. sufficiently
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Petitioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition of the case we need not consider this issue .
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illegal weapons believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak
was not in the house but upon ~ the police discovered, in plain view, dynamite, blasting caps, wire, a
battery, and a pair of long nosed pliers. Peak subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice voluntarily
surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing at that time
were subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite
particles.
Rice was tried. for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant,ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced. ite!lls seized ¢'the search,
as well as the results of the chemical analysis of ~
clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress
(_
this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a va.lid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration was unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was fa.taU:y- defective under Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U. S. 108 (1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (197~). 3
3 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home
because (1) Rice was an aetivek-t>Hililer of the NCCF, (2) a violent
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past

',.
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The court also rejected the State's contention that even
if the warrant .was invalid the search was justified because of the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because
of the exigent circumstances of the situatio
e court --~~e.r +o ?ec-~
"'-Yl-J. s~ ~r
reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry
~ ~ "'f/(\as,\Jt,l.
as the police lacked probable cause to believe Peak was
}.e.\\~~ ... ,c.:.~~iin the house, and further concluded that the circum6lf- NC..C:.f.
stances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless search. Id., at 194-202. 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court.
513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
l'etitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of theJ/tate
prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, peti( tioned for review of these decisions, raising questions concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role~-----
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of caseS*
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We grante.d their

I

~

~
Q \-\-'>-lo "")"- ~e.
~clo-t~~... S'-'pv-ew.e
Co"'"'~ ~11\V\J ~
~ c-..."; -t o. \ a-ne

5'-'.+f.it.i e.V\"'.i \-\- 0\\~
nfe.N'tJ +-o

.,

that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should
.--be used against the police. See
·
··
'
.
-64 B. ~. In concluding{there existed probable cause for issuance of
·
·
the warran ,
'Ml;H~;e-t~~~~~.._.~:i.pj,~u~·~·w...p.u~~ information 'ov::lf
contained in testimony adduced at tl:~~l?ression hearing ~hat> ;~
..--\-$.-S-~-e.-:-'o-,--=;;;-:2.8')not included in the affidavit./..The District Court limit€d its probable cause inquiry to the face of the affida.vit, see Spinelli v. United
13R-1 3.l ~ \C\Cj
States, 393 U. S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S.
\\1. W, ~ 4 \\0)
108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause was lacking.
81-"\8& ~ ~
Petitioner Wolff contends that police should be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit for a searrh warrant
o..\'?1 \~ ~.
at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an issue we need not reach.
..br
IS".t\) \'\ w.w, cd ~
4 The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite
4"\S (c:.rJV\~or\ ~
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as
/tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued
()~\"''""' ). _
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
_ _ .,
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne
Lumber Colv. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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petitions for certiorari.
now reverse.

4/i U. S. 1055 (1975).

5

We

II
Yl

-

1

\

The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciifjum o was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdictio!}(made by the Judiciary ...f'J'
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
b'y the United States. The original statutory authorization did · not define
substantive reaclj. It merely
~ J ~ -\W v-~"'"'
stated that the courts of the United States "shall have
power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus. . . ." Ibid.
The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance
with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as to
the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
Ex parte Watkins/'28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar,.;,____ _
shall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act

*

J 5 In.( granting certiorari in these cases we requested that counsel)
in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions:
11
Whether, in light of the fact that tho District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is ~
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254i
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum28
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under/u. S. C.
§ 2254."
;...
" 6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicie-1,
-n
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.).

•'
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of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act Felief ey federal courts ~authorizedfin "all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law
ptinciple that federal
of the United States... .
habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited to consideration of
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court,-hewe¥9#, Pe
m~illi!Q llbe lle~eH:ellene in thil!! IUeftl. See, e. g., 1n re
Wood, 'i40 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, "140 U.S. 545
(1891); Andrews v. Swartz, i56 U.S. 272 (1895); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept
of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain as
·the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this
'---expansion was limite~to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Man~m, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for murder had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-

"/:..the

~~

J(wc. \\ N'' ~

~ tlr

(' eN"~-~0

Prior to 1889 there was, in practiral effect, no appellate review
' in federal criminal cases. The po sibility of Supreme Court review
--on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was ....
because of the practice of single district judg~ holding circuit court. ~
See rankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court
L 31-32, 79-80~ (192\) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable
decisions involving fundamental rights. .;See Ex pa1·te Siebold, 100
·U. S.@76-377 (1879); 'Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal,_----.~~_;_::.:-----7

'Ba\M> ~\~l(.i'(l> S~"~\"o> h-~~_j[:;~abije;a~C~o~rip~s~F~or~S~ta~re~Pir~is~on~ecl:Je;.{f~~~~~~;~~~~-~~~
I
~
~,~Hart & Wechsler
We.c.'-' \
Fed~ralJ:lystem 153.9-1540 ' (2d ed. 19

~

$

e¥"
)~)o't"'

8 The expansion occurred pnmarily··-~--(i) convictions based on asscrtedly unconstitutional st atutes, e. g~ Ex parte
Siebold, lee U. S. S'i'l (lfj9), 1tnd (ii) detentions based upon an
allegedly illegal senrence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, "'85 U. S. (18
!.-Wall.) 163 (1873) . See Bator, supra, n. 7, at 465-474.

·:
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fully sought habeas corpus relief in the .Federal :y{istrict
(/ourt. On eliFeet Feview, t"'¥:. Ottprenrn Court affirmed the
denial of relief because Frank's federal claims had been
considered fully by a competent and unbiased state tribunal'. The Court recognized, however, that if a habeas
failed to provide
corpus court. that the State
adequate "corrective process" for the full and fair litigation of federal Claims, whether·or not "j"urisdictional," the
court ~ inquire into the merits to determine whether
~detention if. lawful. !d., 'a t 333-:336.
In the landmark decisionTin Brown v. A'llen, 344 U.S.
443 ( 1953), ~ Df1;mB~B v. All9\tl;, ~44 U. 8., at-482-489',
the scope of the writ was expanded stiTI further. 9
In these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the tria1 courts had erred in
failing to quash their indictments due to a1leged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling
certain confessions admissible. In Brown,~~~·~l!:;.iloo~--\
peal from the conviction-these elf.Mms.lwl ~; }ejeet.ed:
en the met its by the-highest -eom+of the 8tf:l::te, State v.
Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, (195'5, and this
Court had 'denied certiorari, ./341 U. S. M3 (1951).
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of ~"''e.,\s. "· f\\\-~, -y.~
v '>·) ~ "\ Bl.">
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
t'--e c:. tl'I'V'~-N.t.H\ c e..•e..
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, incfuding, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Eederal District Court. In
~~_)
~t'lltivf, however, the s~ate supreme court on direct re-

+

I
1,.

__

9 There has been disagreement E
Ul}{}ng sc hol a r~ as to whether the
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's ~ision

r
I

J

8

~n?:;~o~ ;o~Ett:~!. ~s , 1r!~t,(~:;~~'a.r~~~:r~~:7! c~~i:~

the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas
Corpus : Impact ofJAbortive State'l-proceecling, 74 ~rv· L. Rev.
1315, 1328--1329 ~1~ with Fag :. Nota, SF! W. ~t U? t~i
' jaocl'"o 1 o i;m.Z::.11 BatoT, mpia, n.
at

7, 48&-4::.3

r

0\.\S'o
:!,C\1 )

~

..;.

4 2.1 ~

~) '37 l
V\ •

~Q

)

l&l,,

4S7- 41o 0 ( ~o.-r\c,.,~) j,) J ;'-S2V\-\;.,j)
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view had refused to consider the appeal because the
papers were filed outfo":r9Gime. This Court held that
since the state court juclgmcnt rested on a reasonable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court. the District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458, 486.
This final barriC'r to~ coiiatera] re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas rorpus proceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963).j Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants,
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to establish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, al~Lot1gl1 it was
) stipulated that.J:38: confession also had been coercedL the
District Court followed Daniels in holdi1~1g~t::.:h~a=t...:N:..:.;;:.~01!.:::.a::..:'s;__,--~-::-:---,
failure to appeal barred habea~review. The Court of
See. \9'3 ~ s~~~ ·
Appeals reversed. ordering that Noia's conviction be set
'2'2.'l.) zz.s (\, 40 ).
aside and)he be released from custody or a new trial,<
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court 4f.l its eiseretiorl"'may refuse to consider the merits
of federal constitutional claimsj h eMee in oel: iB@!!: ele
10 Despite the expan~ion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with rPSpect to nonronstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its fedrral countE>rpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowrd to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. I d., at

l/or'llf\""U"":
~e

~\'t!OI ~

1"\, \ \

b c.c.~

~ .W\\owi"''
~o..1e

·.
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libCI2!k bypMs of st2!k pwcedmttlldles 01 faihtn 18 8JI
Ballet so ailable sbate tttncdics?'
1f'H.rsH~9Y:i the period in which the substantive scope
of the writ was expanded~ the Court did not consider
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appea}(had concluded that collateral
review of search-and~seizur.e claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. ·C. ·
§ 225F The primary rationale advanced in support of
r178-179~ Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 345-346 ~ n. 15

}

(1974). Even thoseLclaims that could not have been asserted on
direct appeal can be raised ~ collateral review only if the alleged
error constituted/a fundamental defect which "'inherently results in
a complete miscarriage of justice.'" !d., at 346. See Hill v. United
States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962).
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a Jwrit of habeas corpus,
he Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the writ,
noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command that
the judgeJ.:dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 28
U. S. C. § 224~." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis v .
..3
Henderson, U. S. (1976), holding that s:h~ent a: elairn of
ttetual p1ejudice--a state prisoner who fail.( to make a timely challenge to the composition of the grand jury that indicted him cannot
challenge i~J:.zROSt-conviction federal habeas corpus probring
f 0.:~'>"-"'T "'" -c..-;-b--:-,""'-......,__J_.:::.ceedin~ we emphasize~:
~(..~\ ~~wlice
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to Jforego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426.''
12 Compare, e. g., "United States v. Re, 372 F . 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
enied, ~ U. S. - (1967) · United tales v. J enkins .281 JL2d
193
0 · 'Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CA5
1963)1 ~sner v. Upited States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965); De Welles
v. nited States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert. denied, 388 U. S. 919

L

...

*

·,.
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those decisions was that Fourth Amendment violations
are different in kind from denials of/other constitutional mos.~
rights in that claims of illegal search and seizure do not
"impugn! the integrity of the fact-finding process or
challenge~ evidence as inherently unreliable; rather,
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a
prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth
Amendment violations by law enforcement officers."
I d., at 224. See Thornton v. United States,
U. S. \2.5
App. D. C.
368 F. 2d 822 (1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search~nd-seizure claims are cognizable in § 225·5 proceedings.
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained e~nce was admitted against them at trial,"
at 22~ ~e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968),
·--...-~~a:-::n~ coi1cludea }hat there was no basis for restricting
' 0.$
0.
MO.'¥r ~ of
~'access by federal prisoners with illegal search-and::,~~~~ <:.<MS~~CM)
.
~)/
se1zure
claims to fe deral collateral remedies, while placing
")~
3C14 \.) ,S ')
no similar restriction on access by state prisoners
Ithough in recent years the view has been expressed
'2.2 6 ·
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope
,----:---:---->----~o~f~federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
~ea--("c>.-- c...~ -~e:, t"'-.s~)
of F"'Z':1t !mtetHi~ claims "solely to the questiol}(
"of
}Vhether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250
(1973) (PowELL, J., concurring),u the Court,(_with~J

""'

-f

+.

e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
Unit ed States, 317 F . 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v.
·united States, -J;- U . .f... App. D. C.
368 F . 2d 822 (1966)
(search-and-seizure claims not cognizable under § 2255 absent special
circumstances) .
-ns See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).

*'
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discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
-accept Jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
/'Lefkowitz v-. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975). L
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
'habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendmen~uires the granting of
.habeas corpus relief when a pnsoner has been convicted
in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an
,
ille
al search or seizure ae i!fie Fotu th tttrd Fo arl.b.c:;:;h
~e,\t.ll \t'\
f"'"."j
I..).)
""'~
Amendments r quire......rucclusion of such evidence/ nndir
L-~~-------l'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (19Q!]~t trial and reversal
conviCtiOn upon direct review.~ Until this
o
case we have not had occasion fully to consider the
ratitmtde }itfrderly iHg this assumption. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at 249 n. 38. Upon examina~ tion, we conclude, in view of the nature and purpose of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that the
assumption is unjustified.~
A,.Jj

;,- If As l Justice

Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U. S. 217,L239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made no
effort to ju~tify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent J
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
, proceedings. See Mancusi v. De.Forte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
/Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayae.5. 387
. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi ~habeas relief orliere€1
· on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as well
as in Warden, the issue~was not presented to the Court in the
petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized by~ Justice Black,
only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised
in the petition. 394 U.S., at 23'/.
n. 7.
't / .
------...::::"':u=~~fA's we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence
1c.
hould have been excluded because it was obtained
an illegal 'ty
.
o< earch +seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full,.(
.,....,J ~,.,.
onsideration of that claim in the state cour~·F not invoke the
c.~~.\\V\!)~
,,..
xclusionary rule
federal habeas corpus
. ' we find it un~~
ecessary to cons1der the other issues concermng the exclusionary

afft

..tf

r

i.s.s~e

v.JY\e..~V.ev--

+-eAe.v'eo. \

n.rt

'v..o..\:>~s.

~c:..\os.t

Co~~'t ~\J. V1-t~+
See.

·..

.·

4~ 0

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION
STONE v. POWELL

14

III

-\-V.ex~ ~i..:.\-e6
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'f'oO
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u111· ~
25S
(\~2.1
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s.+...te.~)

r---:::::. .
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v.s.

t.~&
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;/ITJ

The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant
in England and
./
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); 'Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life/'
'~Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
'if
searches under unchecked general authority:;.;..·J,A'~--,-r-o--.(--:-----:--:--:-"7.--....
The exclusionary rule was
,
Q.
~ ....~It-\~\~
rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the
c:.\'ec:o.t"~ -e.c-~
~~-~'~ecisio~in Weeks v. United 'States, 232 U. S. 383
°~ e.~c..-+...c..-\"\V\t:_)
~
d
(1914), e~idence obtained in violation of the Amen mentJgeBePaJJy Eleulel be inbtodaeed in 88ta state !Mt~
feeleflti-· criminal trials. See Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585 (1904).Y In Weeks the Court held that-ef-

-~

__

(_

rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in
.view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police action. See Michigan v. Titcker)
417 U. S, 433,
(1974) ('/he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in
willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right"); Bmwn v. /Uinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606
(1975) (PowELL, J., concurring in part); /jf. United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.~31 (19.75)..
~See generally ~Lasson, The History and Development o~~!-r---1...·
ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937)
& nskL__ §ear and Seizure andthe Su reme Court Q966)•
)If The roots of
ee .;s ecision lay in an early decision, Boyd
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court/TePgiHg !t
li'Ak blltnrilu~. (he Fs1uth ~tnd Fifth Ame!'lel:msBts; held that the comvio\~~~ ~
pulsory production of a person's private books aJJ.d papers i.or
introduction against him at trial '~~'ail
Boyd
~ . . .-~"'"' O.V\c.\ ~;-;{'\'\.

«i,

v.

\IR8SBBtitlfMi

~-tMc:~W.

__......,

Jf'\ Goo...\tJ -\~~ C..o~AoV'\'
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~~ ~
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secured through an illegal scarch~re~~'(")
:Ret 8@ i:RtrQduced in a, federa.l prosecutiQU.
· ·
eCH'Id.M.
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ii!:eM" seeR: WI*! e!ttenEI:ee te the ft. ·
~e,v.J ~-\\~
sei:;;;id. i"id!ince [Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. Unitedl ~

Sl7if'es, 251 . S. 385 (1920). Thirty-five years after ~
Weeks the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25
..J.
(1949), that the right efpPi\!tCJ agljlni5b
arbitrary intru- .L...
'\"' 'Pe ~~ ~
sion by the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment is "implicit inlthe concept of ordered liberty~and
as such enforceable against the States through the [Foureenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., a.t 27~ -l8
The Court concluded, however, that the W eek.s exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as
'an essential ingr·edient of that right." Id., at 2'f.. The
full force of Wolf was stettelily eroded in subsequent
decisions, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206
(1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), and
a little more than a decade later the exclusionary rule
was held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643~
Decisions prior to Mapp advanced two/.reasons for
application of the rule in federal trials. In Elkins, for
example, the Court referred to the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of illegally
seized evidence prevents contamination of the judicial
process. 364 U. S., at 222.)1 But a more pragmatic
_ ground was emphasized:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.

n
I

{

severely limited in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where
the Court, emphasizing that the "law held unconstitutional [in
BoydJ virtually compelled the defendant to furnish testimony
against himself," id., at 598, adhered to the common-law rule that
a trial court must not inquire/into the method by which otherwise
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v.
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United

j

..
l

~
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Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it," e64~8:-,at217.
'J;'he Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the $tates on several grounds,.JI but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.
Aithough decisions subsequent to M app often have alluded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," e. g.,
United § _tates v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975),
they~ demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a
particular context.~ Logically extended this justification wouid require that courts exclude unconstitutionally
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may obj'ect to
I

--

J.

2.

-

~

-\"vv.,.~ \A~~~

~

States, 23A U. S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United _ ~ ~.
S~ates, .277 U. S. 438, 470j_(Holmes, J., dissenting)j484 (Brandeis, J.,
~
Ld1ssentmg).
)I See 367 U. S., at ~ (prevention of introduction of evidence
where introduction is "tantamount" to a c'Oerced confession); id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial integrity).
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment
alone requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence 'in
state criminal trials. See 367 U.S., at~ 666. Mr. Justice Black
t;.!)
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) ___..(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendm,ent is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
for requiring exclusion. 367 U.S., at 661. See n.i.,, supra.
II
~See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1,
33 (1975).

f
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~

unconstitutionally seized evidence, .:-Alderman
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), and .tft.t~~~~:--tr:'f;;~~~~e~ ~ ~
~.ra{l•s\~""" ~
_l.,.d.\c..\ ol

-oj

'1\UJ.

even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure
have held that conduct of the type engaged in by the
law enforcement officials is not permitted by the Constitution." United States v. Peltier su ra at 538 em hasis omitted . Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized
evidence in grand jury proceedings. "United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Nor does it require
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for
~
impeachment of ~ defendant, even though its introduction is certain to result in convictions in some cases.
"Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The teaching
of these cases is clear. While courts, of course, must
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the
judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence
without regard to the circumstances that may have made
its seizure violative of ilhe leilt af the Fourth Amend.-men . The force of this justification becomes minimal
! where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for a
full consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at trial
and on direct review.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule}J.s
e. the deterrince of -luilhawfuJ.. police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have

L

·.·
,..
·.

~ ~(..'U ' yto ~~
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established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the~ victi:nt, for any "[r]eparation comes
too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637
( 1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect ...." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.

'

Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 53-fo-539
~;"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; ./Tehan v. Shott,
382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). -/Cf. Michigan v. Tucke~, 417
U.S. 433,446 (1974).
~involved the 6filplic'fiee of the exclusionary rul'
at:srit;; trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as J
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in
the case of any remedial device, "the application of the
l"ule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
{ objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
nited States v. Calandra, 41~ U. ~., at 348." Thus,

[

,!. As Professor Amsterdam has observed:

(sic::)

"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensa~ dispensation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'cxcrt[ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ...
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudinglyltaken, medicament; no more should be swal- J
lowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many
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our refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a wei~.B~ of the potential
bo..\~c:.\'f\~
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
~ such extension against the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through deterr,ince of police misconduct:
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
~e.. e...)(.c..\"'s ~ «1\'\ ~
of police misconduct may result from · riminal trials,
\ \\e..so.\\'1 se\ reJ
it is unrealistic to assume tl).at,4pplication of the
e..·.li~~e. ~
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation ....
_ _ _ - ''We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minie.
mal advance in the deter~nce of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." !d., at 351./
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
HeeesA.it"! in a particular context was evident earlier in 'I
Walder v. United States, ~47 U ~where the Cour~
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguar:ded b the exclusionary ruletwere outweighed in that context by the need
to prevent perjury and~ssure the integn y of the trial
criminals must go free as will deter ~onstables from blundering,
pursuance of this policyJbeyond the confines of necessity inflicts ~
gratuitous harm on the public interest .... " 'Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378,388389 (1964) (footnotes omitted) .

.•

'
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process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, ~ir ttl)fity must be evaluated in
light of competing policies. In that case, the public
interest in determination of truth at trial' was deemed
to outweigh the incremental contribution that might
have been made to the protection of Fourth Amendment
values by application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases ralso
./
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule ha.s been i'ef'~*d=~-::;f fo\MI\~
sitnatieftB in vehieh the Government attempts to use
~~":>~ c:.MV.,
evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal search.
w~
"Brown V. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman
\\\~o,\\) o-.-\-e.:\f\&c\
v. United States, 394 U. S. !,65; "wong Sun v. United
/
-0 ~
States, 371 U. S. 47 (1963) ~Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257/.(1960). The standing requirement is premised
on the view that the "additional benefits of extending
the rule" to defendants other than the victim of the
search} are outweighed by the "further encroachment
upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of'_ ......_ _ _
~_.,( See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Ulpireal
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N . Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of tt'e Bar
C"fr f the city of New York, Dec. 16, 1974 .
.al~he feet1~ on _t!Hl d'i'ter~ent fRU!38f:l8 ~e¥¥eEl B) the exemeieB&Py

z
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C\6-~v-e.> \'t\.~

~ ctl..,e~~on
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~
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rime and having them acquitted or convicted on the
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth," Alerman v. United States,~ at 174-175.A

IV
s~..-.)
We
now to thei question presented by these
•cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question is whether~ state pris-oners-wh~pon the exclusiona rule wit
respect to ~ seized evidence "'ftf!bS-1~~1111111!1!!11
&aEl PejeeteEl by the state courts at trial and on direct
·review-i:ay B~ g~eti- feeleP&l lia,bea,e 88Ffll:l8-PeHef BY

~m

<;; ...., " " 0.. ~ ._:, '(\
Ool'

~

- - .- -

"'"~tl>.) U'C9~ '(W\~'

· iaveking again the ex:c]lli.i.Qaa,py rttle-tm ueh eollater!M
II@; ie~.
The answer is to be found through the balanc. ing process identified above in Part III.
E-vl ll vvrfl:ere the exclusionary rule is !:b}9+d at trial ~
and on direct review~~ ciG are well known: ~ the
~
focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants
therein, is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt orj
innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceedingi Moreover, the physical evidence sough
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence

~See, e. g., 'Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954 ·Biven
v. Six Unknown .Pe~. Naleo&ie.,.Agents, 403 U. S. 388,411 (BuRGER,
C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585
(1926) (Cardozo, J.); "'8 Wigmore On Evidence § 218~ at 51-52
(McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 4Y, at 388-391;
"Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Daks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi . L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct bY/Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961);
'Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?,
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972).

-

c~

(\<ill)
o..
2

.
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of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty."
394 U. S., at 237.

'

\

Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in par, ticular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant b~
' application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor~
, tionality that is essentiallthe concept of justice.~ Thus,
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police--. activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
\~ ilie P"f.9 may well have the opposite effect of generating
disrespect for the 1aw and administration of justice.JM'
~
~Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the
' exclusionary rule at east Imp ICI y recognize the role of propor- 'W
tionality in the criminal justice system an
e potential value of
establishing a /;p+jgpaL relationship between the nature of the vioI 6\-18'3
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2
("substantial violations") ; 84. Wig~Bero{i;"itlsnee, § 2184, pp. 6iL
8~ (J. MeNaugM6R o8., 1Q81), H. Friendly, Benchmarks ~--------
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fr:~it of~ . Wi~IMoft) ~
·activity intentionally or flagra~Jy illegal."){""See n. 1 , supra.
J ~~ 2.4) 4
1
~In a different context, DallinTOaks has observed:
~
S2. -S3.
'"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedurt:S, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
tO
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION
c;, c_,-~,.,.,,~\ ~\)~<..-\;"""'

STONE v. POWELL

23

i~

~e.~~

a.~~......e J

These long~recognized costs of the rule persist~
veet~lia.F fePee when
·
collateral
review of FoHFia 1A..,meaamoHt eltliims !MFe9.ey eeB~;;,d;.;.e::.;;Fe.;;El~--by two or more tiers of state courts ..il'f
~
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despit.!t..,._- the absence of supportive empiricj evidence,~ we have

Of\

4-o \:)Q
CfY\

~ ~f"o-J

~ e.. ~~-.th·c.~i
~~'i'"'ve c..~""'
W"'-~

e ('('~UI.U \j

people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals."
Ethics, Morality and Professionalt Responsibility, Convocation and
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975.
;tf Resort to habeas corpus for purposes other than to assure that
no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty results
in serious intrusions on values important to our system of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials,
(iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J ., concurring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 23(
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. ~ .
\'l
\c.M,
~The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has[been the subjec~- ·
. j
sharp debate siacjte iR~iea. Until recently, scholarly empirical
~e. e~~ ~~"~,...)
research was unavailable . .,.-Elkins."'· United States. 3£=l U. S. 206
~~ ve~ ~~'""
218 (1960). And, slthOI.l8Aot!IIFtBjf®pi;ic~l re~aa~bJaao ~~t !i:ee:bl!
~~::,'~,.,e.
r;;:;r---r........:tffi:~~~~~-81- tHe Pttle, tJHe e •l!i:eft88 Iii sehll mco&u:lmave. ~
-e. g., Oaks, supra, n. ~i ,~Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical
C. 0
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 Journ. Le~ ..,...~ ...,..
----s't 243 (1973).. with, e. g./Cannon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, ~orne New Data and a Plea Against a Prccipitious _., Se~
Conclusion .t62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974 . /United States v. Janis,
U. S. ·
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
- \_)2.2
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 475 n. 593 (1974);
(
":}
~'Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Ex(O<M ,
clusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United '
States v. Calandrii;\69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974).

~

r--------~. (lct~Il.
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, fil&:l the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system.'
We adhere te te ese &BBl:l:'Fft}3tieR~ alil ~HIJFH~rtiue ef tlu~
.Qxcluliliten~a:uy rttle &i tried e:nel SH: Elire9t 8;}3}3eaJ..
]~wt at t};}e 9ellateral fQHlQW Biage Sf the j1:1:ei9ial l'JF9QQiillil
·not on lJ, ii tliePe ne ctnfJii ie c viderrce SUJJpot ~il'lg tke FW19
'but the inCI emen tal c011 tr ibtttieR, if ft:H) , sf t};}e 99BBiEl
·QratioFJ: ef sea:reh ~tnel: seii!tl:t'e eiaiw~ te tl'!e effectuation

t-t'·

cie set selieve ifie hmg ter'Fft 'Fftsrad &na eeitteaii ve dfeetgf t;urertvrnins QQRz:ieiiens 6tteed ott eo ider.tee e8i&ine8: ill
ldQllltiQR g£ tlle }\;;JWFtlxl Atntttdtntti~ n Ot!lli ee ei~t'iift
"·Qfiin +l J' di mini shed jf search anS: ecizare claitns wete re~- etPie1;e8: ~o ~rial anel elit ce~ ftllJJ'ettl }ttt Pwior eo vet , it can11o+i
oflltiQRll ll J' be 8 SS1l m ed th at a p3r 8isinGtitLive creahcel by
bftt tielr: sf QXQ}ugjqp at t rjQ l QF 811 8iPee~ ICViCVV VCOtt}ft
:.Qe fl:l:P~fteP illCfifilliliQ iJOI fiiPY aiQQBingfwl Wlij' jf a police=

3l!/

J

.r;j,

~See Oaks, supra, n .
at 756.
2A
P'"As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n.
at 389.

2l

;.

.®

Y .adhere to the view that these .considerations support

the implementation oflll the exclusionary rule at trial and
its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions.
But the

additi~contribution,

if any, of the consideration

of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral
review is

small in relation to the costs.

To be sure,
'

each case in which such a claim is

t ee

e zwm~i ~

J\

considered~

awareness of the values protected by the

Fourth Amendment.

But there is no reason til to believe that
effectt~a

the overall educative

of overturning convictions

based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
would be

apprecia~ly

diminished if search-and-seizure claims

could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state

3i.

convictions.

~~~~¢;;

\."'~!·~')

lR- a8ditian, ue earuc ~ assume that

disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of
evidence at trial or . . . the reversal of convictions on
direct review would be

ei:~ui:f

·

A..
if there were the further risk that a conviction obtained
in state court and affirmed on direct review might be overturned
in collateral proceedings years after the incarceration of
the defendant.
•

Fourth

alt-~~

The view that the ~ ~·~-~~~
- rt~~~~~
~,~

Amendment~

~"E:.~~
~

~

1 nc~ea~e d rests on theAI"l:fanhtfnl assumption thatJ tit

pQJ.iaemaC

#~

would fear that federal habeas

reviewA~ ~e l~ksl¥

reveal flaws in a search or seizure

~

that~ ~W

ee

go undetected

at trial

a.··-Q
~

on appeal.

~~

Even if one . . could assume
'\

that some additional incremental deterrent effect would
be present in isolated cases, the resulting advance of
the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth Amendment rights

ou~eighed by the ~--~~~~--

would be

a.dc.c.~A.,....J...
costs Eo other values vital to a rational system

"

of criminal justice.

·.
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~ftn,

ternt'ieel te seitJe eo idence unlawfully te obtain a.
Gollvieiion, ftlso vvere told that the conviction might he·
.Q'I'OFtuFned in eolia teral proceedings y eaa ~ afteF iaea&-,
..eeraiioa of the defendant. The view that tao police.maa's ir:teentive to violate the Fourth Amendmen:t is
.sig11ifieaatly d8eFoaseel: by the possibility of f8d8rt;~) hac
b8as eorptt~ review rests on the doubtful assmnptiofi taat
st1:eh r e ,·iew ffl:ay re oeal B:a ovs i11: a seMes gr iii~ivu:e th Qt
will go uadeieeteel: a:t tr ia;l 01 on a:pl'e8:I:..C EYeR if gao
f!ould asswJ:Ro soffl:e 8:dditional inet emeaial el:eterren~
effect. in isolated. eases, tse reiiiulticg ilpeenlQtive advance.
of t:bis legitiJ:Raie goal would be ottineighed by t:be
~sis to othet va;} ues that are vital to a r atiot1:8il sysieRr
Q£ crjmjp al j IiticQ ,
1

}II{ tate courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U. S. (1 Wheat) 304, 341-344
(1816).
e po 1cy argumen s iat responaents marshall m -support of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal ra- ~s~~vt.
1ionale for this view emphrusizes the broad differences in thelinstitutional settingj.which federal judgesloperate. Despite differences in
institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitud~of some
state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume a general
lack of appropriate sensitivity t.o constitutipnal ri.J;t;;::;ts~in::_:~e_:::.r_:,:la~l--.,..-~~!..:~~ -=~
nd a
c.ru,1t£; of the several Stat~
the argument
t at federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional
law IS especially ~ in the FsuPts !.mBJH;lmon~ context/,Since J
~ t\tHI BBiBIUB t~IAiJBI!< are dealt with on a daily basis
trial
~CAl\
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason
~
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competJ{'nt, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the applicae
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse."
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.

ty
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In sum, in view of the substantial~ costs associated with eoHa:to al t e cie'" ef ebate com t j ael~
·meRiB ttM:tt }'3ttPiiewlaJAl) n i~h the exclusionary rule,~
we conclude that where the ~tate has provided an ade, quate process for full and fair litigation of Fourth
Amendment claims, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
' obtained in an unconstitutional search ~ seizure was
mtroduced at his tria~ ts&i sia~e the contribution of
Y-1fl:l1fft~~·ew, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth
Amendment is minimal and the recognized costs of appli. ation of the enelw~.lt'eqr rule persist in f""ll"1eree ..M"
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals

are
Reversed.

~ Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time
t---,.---to apply for certiorari has now passed, any ~~e-i!'HM-~;;;;-"""1r.~·,-"'·,-t-\ol\ \"
ti•e eeel"e ef colla:tual t01ien should be prospective. Cf. ngland
~.C..w· e-.'0.\~~ ~
v. Louisiana State Board of M edical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 422o'o-\o:,-n '(\-..\oe.-.~
423 (1964). We reject these contentions. Although not required
~~~'I\\ ~\\e~
.to do so under the Court's prior decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
.,, ~ ":>~~~
391, respondents were, of course, free to file a timely petition for
-t,...) ia\MC.t
.,~\ ).
certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas corpus relief. More im\"' o.tf'\ VMC.~J.A\v. T
portantly, an untimely filing in a state or federal criminal case is
~W\~ ~t~ o-t
not a jurisdictional defect, and, under appropriate circumstances,
~Q.l.lMo
wo..s. ..L.
plenary review in this Court is appropriate. E. g., Taglianetti v.
\.
.
\ ~
\-...~r»At•,
United States, 394 U. S. 316, n. 1 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 ll
. o( ~~\l.
:U. S. 80 (1968); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (196f>r'
Respondents' remedy, therefore, lies in the filing of an out-of-time
petition for certiorari. At that time we can assess whether the
claimed prejudice arising from our decision in this case justifies the
j ~"· ~
waiver of the time rule, and whether we should exercise our discre~e-:.) 'lS! 0. ~.
- - - --tion to review the merits of the issues raised in the petitions.
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(,,s~) .

.

. ,..

V'\ I

7

~d

CHAMBERS DRAFt

SUPREME COURT Ofl, TilE U:NITED STATES
Nos. 74-1055 AND 74- 1222
W. T. Stone, Warden, !
.
.
.
·
P~titioner,
On W
. nt. of Cer t 10r~n t o t h-e
U~1ted St~tes C~urt_of Appea.ls
74-1055 v.
. for the Nmth Ciromt.
Lloyd Char1es Powe11.
,
, .
.
.
'
Cll.arles L. Wolff, Jr.,l
W!lrden, Petitio.ner, On ~n t of Cert10ran to the
74-1222 v.
Umted S~ates C~urt.of Appeals
'd L R'
for the E~ghth'Circmt.
D av1 . 1ce.
[May -, 1976]
1\{R. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
'Court.
Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal
offenses in st~te courts, and their convictions were !lf:firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each· case relied
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged
by respondents to have peen 11.nl~wful. Each respondent
s11.bsequently sought relief in ~ federal district court by
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether
a federf\1 court should consider, in ruling on a petition for
habeas corpus relief filed by ~ st~te prisoner, ~ claim that
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure' was introd"!lced at his trial, when he hltS previously
been afforded an opportunity for full and ffl,ir,litigation
of his claim in the state courts. The isst~.e 1s of considerable importance to the administration of criminal
justJCe.
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I
We summarize first the relevant facts and procequral
history of these cases.

A
Respondent Lloyd. P'owell was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a Californi~ state court. At
about mid.p.ight on February 17, 1968, he aQd three com~
panions entered tpe Bon.anza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. · Ten hours later
an officer of the I{enderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 .caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of
second-degree murder in the Superior Court· of San Bernardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
the liqum; store testified against him. A criminologist
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the
The ordinance provides:
"Every person is a vagrant who:
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such
..Identification/'
1
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eonviction was affirmed by a California District Court of
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error,
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi~
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (l967). The Su·
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed ~n amended petition for a
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the
alternative, that court agreed with the California District
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence con-·
cerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, 2 that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where
W(>" invalidated a CJty ordinance m part defining vagrants as ..."per-·
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that although exclusion of the evideQce would ~rve Qo
d~terrent purpose with regard to poli~ officers w~o were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
the public interest by deterring legislators from eha.cting
unconstitutiona.l statutes. l d., !tt .98. After an independent review of the .evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it Sl\pported the testimony of PjU'sons and Powell's
accomplices. · ld., at 99.
B
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omah.a police received a telephone call that a woman had been heard screaming at
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, killing him instantly. By August ~2 the investigation of the ~urder centered on Duane Peak, a
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant
was issued for Peak's arrest. The investigation also
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m.
that night and found lights and a television on, but there
was no response to their repeated knocking. . While some
officers remained to watch the premises, a warra.nt was
sons wandering or strolling around from pla.ce to place without any
lawful purpose or object. . . . " !d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see
n, 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F . 2d, at 95-97. Petitioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi:tion of the case we need not consider this issue.

.'
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obtp,ined to search for explosives and illegal wep,pons to
be in Rice's poasession. Peak w~s not in tht'l house but
upon entering the police discovered, in plain view, dynamite, blasting caps, wire, a battery, and a pair of long
nosed pliers. Peak subsequently was arrested, and on
August 27, Rice volu~tarily surrendered. The clothes
Rice was wearing at that time were subjected to che:rnical
analysis, disclosing dynfl,mite pp,rticles.
Rice was tried for :ijrst-degree murder in .the District
Court of Douglas County. At triaJ Peak admitted plp,nting the suitcase and making the telephone c~tll, a.nd
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corrobora-tive
evidence the State introducep items seized during the
search, as well ~ the results of the chemicp,l analysis of
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress this evidence. On' appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska a.flinned the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a va-lid search
wa-rrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2q 480
(1972).
.
In September 1972 Rice filed ~ petition for It writ of
habeas corpus in the U:p.ited States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incf~-rcera
tion WitS unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had peen discovered a.s the result of an illega-l
sea-rch of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warr~nt wa.s inva-lid, ItS the supporting affida-vit was defective under Spi'fl,elli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410 (196~), and Aguilar v. Texqs, 378 U. S. 108
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974). 3 The court
8

The sole evidence presented to the ma.gistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent
killing of an officer had occurred and it appear~ that the NCCF
w~ involved, and (3) police had received information in the past

.. :
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also rejected the St&te's contention that even if the
warrant was invalid the search was· justified because of
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Pe&k
and search for bombs and explosives believed in possession of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry as the police lacked
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi..
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. !d., at 194-202.4 ·The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the fleasons
stated by the District Court. 5!3 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should
be used agajnst the police See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In
concludmg that there existed probable cause for issuance of the
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in the
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the
affidav1t, see Spm.elli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should
be perm.1tted to supplement the mformation contained in an affidavit
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an
ibi>ue we need not reach.
4
The Distnct Court further held that the evidence of dynamite
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as
the tainted fnut of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne
Lumber Co., Inc . v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) .
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of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases
involving Fourth A:rnendment claims. We granted their
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975). 5 We
now reverse.
II
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corp'l.fs ad subjiciendum 6 W!lS included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judici&ry
Act of 1789, p. 20 § 14, 1 St~tt. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The originlll statutory authorization did not define the supstantive reach of the writ. It
merely stated that the courts of the United States 1'shall
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ..."
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance with the common law and lilllited it to an inquiry as
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
D In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that
counsel in PoweU v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions :
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of
arrest had not been · authoritatively determined to be unconstitut ional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution iS"
one cogruzable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254n
"'Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of thiS case 1s a question properly cogniza.ble under 28 U.S. C.
§ 2254."
6 It is now well estabhshed that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the 0 Great Writ." Ex parte BoUr,nan, 8 U. S. (4ICmnch) .75, 95 (1807) {Nla.rshal.l, C. J .).
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
In 1867 the writ was extende.d to state prisoners. Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in ' 1all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States .... '' But the limitation of fed,.
, eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the'
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g.,
In re Wood, 140 U. 8. ,278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this
expansion was limited ·to only ~. few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur1 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of division of opinion in th11 circuit court was remote
beC!\.USe of the practice of single district judge's holding circuti court.
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 19,73) .
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32,
79-80 & n. 107 (1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach Gtherwise unreviewable
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 473
& n. 75 (19763).
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convictions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal
sentence, e. (} ., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973).
See Bator, supra., n. 7, at 466-474.
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because
Frank's federal claims h&d been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized,
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process"
for the full and fair litigati9n of federal claims, whether
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d.,
at 333- 336.
In the landmark decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S.
443 ( 1953), the scope of the writ was expanded still further.9 In these cases st&te prisoners app1ied for federal
habeas corpus relief claiming that the trial cou,rts had
erred in failing to qul;\sh their indictments due to alleged
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct
·appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the apparent ·adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482, the companion case to
There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Ha.rt, Foreward : The T1me Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105
(1959); Re1tz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive Stateproceedmg, 74 Harv. L. R.ev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S . 39-1, 4~1
& n, 30i id , at 457-46.0 (Harlan 1 .J., dissenting) .
8
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Brown, however, the state supreme court on direct review had refused to consider the appeal because the
papers were filed out of time. This Court held' that
since the state court jqdgment rested on a reasop&ble
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court, tlle District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458,486.
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removeq in Ji'ay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963).'1° Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confessi~n. N oia's codefendants,
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subseq11ent
state proceedings they were able to establish that ·their
confessions h&d been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipulated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but
the District Court followed Daniels in holdililg that Noia's
f&ilure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183
10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with respect to noncpnstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be &llowed to do service for an appeaL"
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. !d., at
178-179; Davis v. United States 1 417 U. S. 333, 34&-346 & n. 15
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional chums that could not have
been asserted on d1rect appeal can be raised on collateral review only
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in'herently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" /d., 11-t 346.
'See HiU v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962).
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set ·asid~ and
that he be released from custody or a new .trial be
granted. This Court affirmed the gr~tnt of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a fed~ral
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional clairns.n
During the period in which the sttbstantive scope of
the writ was expanded, the Court did not cpnsider
whether ex~ptions to full review might exist with n~spect
to particular categories of constitutional cl~· Prior
to the Cottrt's decision in K(lufman v. United States, 394
U. S. 217 (1969), however, ~substantial majority of the
federal co\}rts of appeals had concluded that coll~tteral
review of search-and-seizure cla~ms was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners . under 28 U. S. G.
§ 2255, the modern post:..conviction procedure available'
to federal prisop.ers in lieu of habe~tS corpus}2 The
:u In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the Court ·in Fay also' reaffirmed the equitab\e na.ture of the
writ, noting that " [ d] iscretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge , . . 'dispose of the matter as l&.w and jus~ice require.''
28 U. S. C. § 22'43.' 1 372 U. S., at 438. More re~ntly,' in Francis
v. Henderson, - U. S. - · (1976), holding that a state prisoner
who failed to make a timely challenge to t~e composition of the·
grand jury that indicted hffn cannot bring such a challenge in a post~
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual
prejudice, we emphasized:
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to the fareg.o exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. s: 391, 425-426."
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied , 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United Sta~es v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965);
De Welles v. United States,
F. ~ 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388'
U.S. 919 (1967) ; Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CM

an
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions
· was that Fourth Amendment violations are different iQ.
kind from denials of most other constitutional rights in
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn
the integrity of the failt..:finding process or challenge
evidence as inherently unreliable; rathrr, the exclusie:>n
of illegally seized evidence is si:q1ply a prophylactic de~.
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." !d., at 224. See
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368
F. 2d 822 ( 1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search·and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings,
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. Lafallee, 391 U. S. 234·
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that there was no basis for restricting "access by
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims
to federal collateral remedies, while- placing no similar
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U. S., at 226.
Although in recent years the view has been expressed
that the Court shotJld re-examine the substantive scope·
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of
whether the petitioner was provided wi.th a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 250'
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CAS 1963), with,.
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v.
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966)'
(search-and-seizure claims nQt cog_nizablfl under ~ 2255 absent specia.Jl

.• r,il:ctU.nstances) •
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(1973) (POWELL, J., concurring),18 the Court, without
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). 14
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
habeas corpus rests on the assumption th~t the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review. ~ Until this case we have not
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assumption. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, S'ttpra, at
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of
1

See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innoce11ce Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state·
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal.
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See
420 U. S., at 287 n . 4.
16 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitea
States, 394 U.S. 217, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made·
no effort to justify Its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on ar
series of prtor cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that;
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpusproceedings. See Mancusi v. De.F'orte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) . But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas
relief on the basi~ of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as·
well as in Warden, the issue considered here was not presented to·
the Court in the petition for writ of certiora.ri. As emphasized by
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con~ider. issl.l.f>,s no.t. oused. in tb.e petition. a94 u . s.,, at 239 & n. 7.
13
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified.'(!

III
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, hoQ~s, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and 8eizures." · 'The
Amendment was primax:ily a reaction to the evils associw
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and
the writs of assistance in the Colonies,·Stanford v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Marylqnd, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), {rom
searches under unchecked general authority.17
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend..
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United
l 6 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full and
fair consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke
the exclusiOnary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it
unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary
rule raised by the parttes. These include, principally, whether in
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police action. See ¥ichigan v. Tucker,
417 U S 433, 447 (1974) "[T]he deterrent purpose of the exclustonary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in
willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right"); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606
(1975) (PowELL, J ., concurring in part); cf. United States v.
Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975).
17 See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court (1966); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourti}
Amendment to the Umted States Constitution (1937).
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States, 232 U. S. 383 (l914), and Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 (1921)~ ther~ existed no barrier to the
introduction in crimin11l trials of evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment. See Adqms v. New York,
192 U. S. 585 (1904) .18 In Weeks the Court held tha,t
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of
property secllred through an illegal search or seizure conducted by feder11l authorities. In Gouled the Cou~t held
br~adly that such evidence could not be introduced in a
feder&-1 prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 304-305. See ~tlso Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) (fruits of ill~gally
seized eviqence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the
Court held in Wolf
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment
is "implicit in 'the cpncept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforce~hle against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." Id., at 27-28'.
The CotJrt concltJded, howeyer, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not b~ imposed tJpon the States as
"an essenti11l ingredient of that right." /d., at 29. The'
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions,
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea:

v.

see

The roots of the Weeks decision l~:~y in an early decision, Boyd'
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers
for intrqduction against him at trial violated the .F ourth and Fifth,
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v.
New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing thatthe "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the
defendant to furnish testimpny against himself," id., at 598, adhered
to the conunon-law rule tha,t a trial court must not inquire o!ll.
Fourt,h Amendment grounds into the method by wpich otherwisecompetent evidence was ~tcquired. See, e. g., C:ommon.wealt·h v.~
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass,) 329 (1841).
18
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v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little
more than a decade later the e~clusionary rule was
Ohio, 367
held applicable to the States in Mapp
u. s. 643 (1961).
Decisions prior to Mapp advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. In
Elki:ns, for example, the Court referred to the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of
illegally seized evidence precents contamin.ation of the
judicial process. 364 U. S.; at 222.1 9 But a more pragmatic ground was emphasized:
11
The rule is calculated to prevent, not to rep·air.
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it/' ld., at 217,
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds/~ but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658 ..

v:

See Terry v. Ohio, 39·2 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) ;· Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. 8, 383, 391-392, 394 (19H); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J,, dissenting); id., at 4.84
(Brandeis, J ., dis:;enting) .
20 See 367 U. S, at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidence
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment viol~tions); id., at 659 (preservation of judi mal mtegrity). .
Only four JqstJC!_JS adopted the v~ew that the Fourth Amendment
alone requires the exclusion ·of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
state criminal trials. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,.
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. s:- ·25, 39 (1949)
(concurring opinion) , but concl{Ided that, when the Fourth Amend~·
ment is comndered in conjunction with the Fifth · Amendment ban
;against compelled self-incrimination, ·a constitutional ·basis emerges;
for :requiring exrluswn 367 U. 8 .1 at 661. See n. 18, supra ...
19
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Although decisions subsequent to M app often have alJuded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," e. g.,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975)r
they demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a.
particular context. 21 Logically extended this justification would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defend-·
ant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,.
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon-·
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to·
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119'
(1975). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial
integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized·
evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Nor does it require
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for
impeachment of a defendant, even though its introduction is certain to result in convictions in some cases.
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Har-·
ris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The teaching·
of these cases is clear. While courts, of course, must:
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the·
judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justi-"
ficatwn for the exclusion of highly probative evidence
without regard to the circumstances that may have .
made its seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment.
As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is
"not offended if law enforcement officials reasonably
21

See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
R,fv. 1, 5-6 & n., 3.1 (1975).

lf"l;r..v, 4.
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believed in good faith that their conduct was in accord..
ance with the law even if decisions subsequent to the
search and seizure have held that conduct of the type.
eugaged in by the la-w enforcement officials is not permitted by the Constitution." United States v. Peltier,
S'upra, at 538 (emphasis omitted). The force of this
justification becomes minimal where federal habeas
corpus relief is sought 'by a prisoner who previously
has been afforded the opportunity for a full consideration
of hi::; search-and-seizure claim at trial ' and on direct
rev1ew.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule
then 1s the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fou~th Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect ...." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord , United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539;
'Perry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; 'Pehan v. S.hott, 382 U.S.
406, 416 (1966) . Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
446 (1974)
Mapp mvolved the enforcement of the exclusionary
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-'
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in..

'·
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terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in ~tll proceedings or fl,gainst all persons. As in
the case of ~tny remedial device, ~'the application of the
rule has been restricted to those areas whefe its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. 22 Thus,
our refus!l-1 to extenq the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a bal!l-ncing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function of the gr~Wd jury
by such extension a.gainst the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendmei).t through deterrence of police misconduct:
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the r'ule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would signific!l-ntly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation . .. ,
As Professor Amsterdam has observed:
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen~
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . . .
law-enforcmg officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly lstc] taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many
crimmals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering,
pursuanct> of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity
inflicts gratuitollll hann on the public interest . . . ." Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa, L. Itev.
378, 388--389 (1964) (footnotes omitted),
22

I
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"We therefore decline to ·embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." 1d., at 351 (footnote omitted).
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized eviw
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionw
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in
determination of truth at trial 23 was deemed to outweigh the incremental contribution that might have been
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by
applioation of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also,
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist
only when the Government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal
search. Brown v. Vnited States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jonetr
v. United States, 36~ U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The standing requirement is Itermsed on the view that the "addi28 See generally Fran~el, The Search For Truth-An Umpirmi
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar
·<1>f the City of New Yo*, Dec. 16, 1974.

.....'
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tional benefits of extending the rule" to defendA-nts other
than the victim of the search or seizure are oqtweighed
by the "further enrofl,chment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and ha-ving them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174-175/4

IV
We turn now to the specific question presented by these
ca,ses. Respondents allege viot~tions of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourtee~th
Amendment. The question is whether st&,te prisOnerswho have been afforded the opportunity for fair consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule with
respect to seized evid~noe by the state courts at tria-l and
on direct review-m{l.y invoke their claim again on federal habeas corpus review. The answer il!l to be found
through the balancing process' identified above in Part

III.
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at
trial and on direct review are well known: ~ the focus
2

114 Cases addressing the question whether search-1\.nd-seizure hold,.
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the
d!lterrent purpose serveq by the exclusioq.ary rule, consistently with
the balancing a,nalysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context. See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965).
Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S., at 446. Fuller v. AlaskOJ, 393
U. S. 80, 81 (1968). The ('attenuation-of-the-taint" doctrine also is
consistent with the balancing approach. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at
389-390. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, supra.
2 ~ See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971)
(BURGER, C. J ., dissenting); People v. Defore, 2.42 N. Y. 13, 150
N . E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, .J.); 8 Wismore On Evidtmce § 2184a, at
.51-52 (McNaughton edo 1961); A,msterdam, $Upra, n. 22, at 388-391~

......
•

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION

STONE v. POWELL

of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein,
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno~
cence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. 26 Moreover, the physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typ:ioally reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
other con&titutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the mea.ns of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtua-lly any
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty."
394 U. S., at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. 27 Thus,
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 73&-754 (1970), and
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J . Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961);
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?,
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972).
:!ti Cf. Frankel, n. 22, s·upra.
27 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of proportionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of
' establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the violation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-arratgnment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at
181-183 ("substa.nt,ml violations");; H. Fnendly, Benchmarks 260-26~

,•
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 28
These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the groqnd that a search-and-seizure claim
was erroneously by t~o or more tiers of st~tte courts.29<
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despi~
P967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of
activity intentionally or flagrantly ille~al."); Wigmore, supra, n. 24,
at 52-53. See n 16, supra
:.!S In a different context, Dallm Oaks has observed:
"·I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the f4ct that our procedures
are not the ultimate goals of our leg~tl system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedures are but mea~s to these ends ....
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
.from these goals."
EthiC!:!, Morality and Profe:;sional Responsibility, Convocation and
DedicatiOn of the J Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, l975.
29 Resort to ha~ corpus for purposes other than to assure that
no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty results
in serious intrul:lions on values important to our system of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials,
(iii} the minimization of frwtion between our federal and state
systems of justice, and (iv) the mamtenance of the constitutional'
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded;"'
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U S., at 259 (PowELL, J ., concurring) See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 23l
(Blark, J ., d.tt<sflnting) ; Ft:'lt'ndl.y, S'lllpra, n. 13.

.'···
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the absence of supportive empirical evidence, 30 we have
assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will he
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment hy· removing the incentive to dis-.
regard it. More import&ntly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system..~,
We adhere to the view that these considera.tions support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions.. But the additional contribution, if any, of the
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in rela.tion to the costs.
To be sure, each case in which such cla.im is considered
may add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. But there is no
reason to believe tha.t the overall educative effect of overturning convictions based on evidence obtained in viola30

The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject
Until recently, schola.rly empirical research
was Ullavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 218 (1960).
And, the evidence denved from recent empirical research i~ i:itill
inconclu::;ive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 25; Spiotto, 8farch
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the E11clusiqnary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 Journ. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon,
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclmnon, 62 Ky L. Rev. 681 (1974).
See United States v. Janis,- ·- U. S. ·- , - n. ~Z (1976) . Amsterdam, Perspective::; on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 475 n, 593 (1974) ; Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical
Evaluation::; of the Excluswnary Rnle : A Critique of the Spiott()
Research and Umted States v. Calandra 69 Nw. L. Rev . 740 (1974).
31
See Oaks,, supra, n. 24, at 756 .
of :sharp debate.

•..
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tion of the Fourth Amendment would be appreciably
dimmished if search-and-seizure claims could not be
raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.32 Nor is there reason to assume that any specific
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of
evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct
review would be enhanced if there were the further risk
that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings ye~rs after the incarceration of the defendant. The
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure
that went undetected at trial and on appeaV:1 Even if
3 ~ "'As the exclusiona,ry rule is applied time after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389.
Ja The policy arguments that respondents marshall in support
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts·
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an inadeqt1ate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges>
opera.te. Despite differenc&; in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges m years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights
in the tna.l and appellate courts of the several States. State courts.
like federal courts, have a constitutiOnal obligation to safeguard personaJ liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U. S (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argument
tba.t fed.eralludges are more expert in applying federal constitutionan

,'
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one rationally could assume that some additional incremental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases,
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational
system of criminal justice.
In sum, in view of the substantial societal costs associated with the exclusionary rule, we conclude that where
the State has provided an adequate process for full and
fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitution·al
search or seizure was introduced at his trial. In this
context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any,
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal
and the recognized costs of application of the rule
persist.84
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure
claims, since they are dealth with on a daily basis by trial
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man Is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the applica..
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse."
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.
34
Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed ..
era! habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time
to apply for certiorari has now pa::;::;ed, any dimunit10n m their
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials
should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (1964) . We reject these
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, respondents were, of course,
free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal
habeas corpus relief. More importantly, an untimely filing in a
state or federal criminal case is not a jmisdictional defect, and, under
appropriate circumstances, plenary review in this Court is appro.

..

i.f.-1"055 & 74-1222-0PINION

STONE v. POWELL

Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals:
alle
Rever,sed~

priate. E. g., Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U. S. 316, n. l
(1969 ); Fuller v. Ala.ska, 393 U. S. 80 (1968); Arnold v. North
Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1964 ); Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S.
415, 418 n. 7 (1959) . Respondents' remedy, therefore, lies in the
"filing of an out-of-time petition for certiorari. At that time we can
assess whether the claimed prejudice arising from our decision in this
case justifies the waiver of the time rule, and whether we should
exercise our discretion to :teview the merits of the issues raised in
the petitions.
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I
We summ~trize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.
A
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. 'Ten hours later
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber~
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected
Powell's contention that testimony ·by the Henderson
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the revolver should have been excluded because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the·
1 The ordinance provides :
'"Every person is a vagrant who :
·" [ 1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as·
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands sucb
identification."'
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{JOnviction was affirmed by a California District Court of
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error,
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson officer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition for
habeas corpus relief.
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the
1\ltf')rnative, that court agreed with the California District
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence concerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, 2 that Powell's fl,rrest was therefore illegal, and
I

2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 4()5 U. S. 156 (1972), where
we: invalidated a city ordinance in part defining v~rants as . . ."pel"-
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98. After an independent review of the evidence the court concluded that
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's
accomplices. !d., at 99. ·
B
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murde11 in
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone call that a woman had been heard screaming at
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi-·
gation of the murder center~d on Duane Peak, a
15-yea.r-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF"), and _that afternoon a warrant
was issued for Peak's arrest. The investigation also·
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m.
that night and found lights and a television on, but there
was no response to their repeated knocking. · While some
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object.. .. " /d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see
n. 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti-·
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition. of the case we need. not consider this issue..
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obtained to search for explosives and ·illegal weapons
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain
view, dynamite, blasting caps, wire, a battery, and a pair
of long nosed pliers. Peak subsequently was arrested, and
on August 27, Rice voluntarily surrendered. The cloth~
Rice was wea,.ring at that time were subjected to chemical
analysis, disclosing dynamite particles.
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted planting the suitcase and making the telephone call, and
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative
evidence the State introduced items seized during the
search, a.s well as the results of the chemical analysis of
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480
(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration was unlawful because the evidence underlying his
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal
search of his home. The District Court concluded that
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410 ( 1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. lOS
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974). 3 The court
8

The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF
·was involved, and (3) police had received infonhation in the .past

74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINJON
STONE v. POWELL

also rejected the State's contention that even if the
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak
and search for bombs and explosives believed in possession of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry as the police lacked
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and
further concluded that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. !d., at 194-202! · The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testimony adduced at the suppression hea.ring but not included in the
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See·
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an a:ffi.davit
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an
issue we need not reach.
• The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite ·
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as
. the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Silverthorne;
i.a?Jrnber Co., Inc . v. United States, 251 U. S.. 385 (1920),
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of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975). 5 We
now reverse.
II
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. The original statutory authorization did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ... ',.
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g.,
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the
questions:
"'Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that
the· Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of'
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of
a. search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254."
""Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U. S. C.
§2254."
il It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte BoUman, 8 U. S. (4:
!Cmnch) 75, 95 (1807) (M.arshall, C. J .).
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Ex

parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
, .
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867
Act federal courts were authorized to gi~e relief in "all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States .... " But the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g.,
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In
Frank, the prisoner hacl claimed in the state courts that
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-

7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court.
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973);
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32,
79-80 & n. 107 (1928). Pressure naturally developed for expansion
· of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable
' decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100·
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv, L. Rev. 441,473
& n. 75 (19763).
8 The expansiOn occurred primarily with regard to (i) convictions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal '
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973) ~.
s~ Bator, 8U7_Jra, n. 7, a.t 46/t-414.
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state supreme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized,
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process"
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d.,
at 333-336.
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487,
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951).
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In
0 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105
(1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 421
& n. 30; id., at 457-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting) .
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re-view had refused to consider the appeal because the
papers were filed out of time. ' This Court held that
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a
ground that would have barred direct review of his
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S.,
at 458, 486.
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963).'-0 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants,
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions., Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent
state proceedings they were able to establish that their
confessions had been coerced and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipulated that N oia's confession also had been coerced, but
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that Noia's
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183
10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal CQunterpart, 28
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. ld., at
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 340--348 & n. 15
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in-.
herently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' " id., at 346,,
rquoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962) .

•
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F. Supp. 222, 225 ( 1960). The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and
that he be released from custody or a new trial be
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims.11
During the period in which the substantive scope of
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.'
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis
v. Henderson, U. S. (1976), holding that a state prisoner
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a postconviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual
prejudice, we emphasized :
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426."
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert.
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967) ; United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d
193 (CA3 1960) ;' Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965) ;
De WeUes v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388
U. S. 919 (1967) ; Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA9

.I
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in
kind from denials of most other constitutional rights in
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." I d., at 224. See
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368
F. 2d 822 ( 1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that searchand-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings.
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U. S. 364 (1968); Carajas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that there was no basis for restricting "access by
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226.
Although in recent years the view has been expressed
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CA5 1963), withr
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F . 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v.
United States, 317 F . 2d 494 (CAlO 1963) . See also Thornton v.
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966)
(search-and-seizure claims no.t. cogp..izable under § 2255 absent speciar
<mellm>tances) ..

.-
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) ,18 the Court, without
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). 14
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review.15 Until this case we have not
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assumption. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where·
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal.
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See
420 U. S., at 287 n. 4.
'1 6 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitea
States, 394 U. S. 217, 231, 239 (1969) , the Kaufm<m majority made
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpusproceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294 (1967) . But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as
well as in Warden, the issue considered here was not presented t~
the Court in the petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized by
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we conm®r issues not raised in the petition. 394 u. s.• a.t 239 & n. 7.
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified/ 6

III
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, .ho.uses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." - The
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England a.nd
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, S!aniord v. Texas,
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect
the "s~tnctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from
searches under unchecked general authority. 17
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United
·16 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full-and
fair consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we·find it
unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or
the circumstances of the police action. See Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U. S. 433, 447 (1974) "[T]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in
willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right") ; Brown v. !Uinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606
(1975) (PowELL, J., concurring in part); cf. United States v.
Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975) ..
17
See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
·Court (1966); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937) .
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States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 (1921) , there existed no barrier to the
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New Y ark,
192 U. S. 585 (1904).18 In Weeks the Court held that
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of
property secured through an illegal search or seizure conducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co ..
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the·
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment
is. "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., at 27-28.
'The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as
"an essential ingredient of that right." !d., at 29. ·The·
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions,
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea
18

The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boya
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 ( 1886) , where the Court held that
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams :v.
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwis~
cor~petent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v.
Dana~ 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841).
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v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
u. s. 643 (1961).
Decision prior to M app advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. In
Elkins, for example, the Court referred to the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of
illegally seized evidence prevents contamination of the
judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222?9 But a more pragmatic ground was emphasized:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail~
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." I d., at 217.
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule
to the States on several grounds, 20 but relied principally
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658.,
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J.., dissenting); id., at 484
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) .
20
'
See 367 U. S., at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidence·
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-·
ervation of judicial integrity).
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment
itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
state criminal trials. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,.
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949)
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges;
f_q:r: :r:eq_uiring exclusion. 367 U. S., at 661. See n .. 18, supra.
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Although decisions subsequent to M app often have alluded to the "imper!ltive of judicial integrity," e. g.,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975),
they demonstrate the limited role of that justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a
particular context. 21 Logically extended this justincation would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may object to·
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119
{1975). Similarly,, the interest in promoting judicial
integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized
evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), Nor does it require
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for
impeachment of a defendant, even though its introduction is certain to result in convictions in some cases.
Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). Cf. Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The teaching
of these cases is clel'l-r. While courts, of course, must
ever be concerned w!th preserving the integrity of the
judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly proba.tive evidence.22
See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975).
_
22 As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended
•
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions sub.sequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type
·engaged in by the law enforcement officials is. not permitted by the
21

I
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The importance of this justification becomes minimal
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at
trial and on direct review.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judichtlly created remedy designed to•
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect ...." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539;
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S.
406, 416 (1966). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
446 (1974).
M app involved the enforcement of the exclusionary
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-'·
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has nevet been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized·
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in
the case of any remedial device, "the application of the ·
Constitution."
{)mitted).

United Sta,tes v.. Peltier, supra, at 53.8 (emphasis.:
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rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."'
United States v. Calandra, supra at 348. 23 Thus, our
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
by such extension against the potential contribution to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through deterrence of police misconduct:
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence
0f police misconduct may result from the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal. Such an extension would deter
only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
fury investigation . .. .
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
As Professor Amsterdam has observed :
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispensation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . . .
Taw-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted tha.t so many·
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering,
pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity·
inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest ... .'' Amsterdam,.
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev ..
318; 3'88-389' (!9'64) (.footllOtes omitted.) .
28
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at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." Id., at 351 (footnote omitted).
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held,
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in
determination of truth at trial 24 was deemed to outweigh the incremental contribution that might have been
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by
application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist
only when the Government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones
v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 261 (1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view that the "additional benefits of extending the rule" to defenaants other
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in
'2 4

See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Ba_r:
'Ql the. City of New York, Dec. 16, 1914.

I
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prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth ." Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174-175.25

IV
We turn now to the specific question presented by these
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question is whether state prisoners-who have been afforded the opportunity for fair consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule with
respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial and
on direct review-may invoke their claim again on federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found
through the balancing process identified above in Part

III.
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at
trial and on direct review are well known: ·26 the focus
25

Cases addressing the question whether search-and-seizure holdings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the
deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context. See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254
& n. 21 (1969) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636-637 (1965) .
Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. 8., at 446 ; Fuller v. Alaska, 393
U. S. 80, 81 (1008). The "attenuation-of-the-taint" doctrine also is
consistent with the balancing approach. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at
389--390. Cf. Brown v. Illirwis, supra.
26
See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens
v. Six Unkrwwn Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971)
(BURGER, C. J. , dissenting) ; People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ; 8 Wigmore On Evidence§ 2184a, at
51- 52 (McNaughton ed. 1961) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391 ;
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 7.36-754 (1970), and
.sources cited therein ; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis·
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein,
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. 27 Moreover, the physical evidence ,sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in
his dissent in Kaufman:
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence
seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty."
394 U. S., at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. 28 Thus,.
conduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P . S. 255, 256 (1961);
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?,
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 ·(1972).
27 Cf. Frankel, n. 22, supra.
28 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the·
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of proportionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of
establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the violation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at
181-183 ("substantial violations"); H. Frienc!Jy, Benchmarks 260-262·
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal." ); Wigmore, supra, n. 25,
.a~~ 5~-53 . s~ n. 16, supra.
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately
it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 29
These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state
eourts. 30
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite
the absence of supportive empirical evidence, 31 we have
In a different context, Dallin Oaks has observed :
IJ,I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures
are· not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth
and justice, and procedurt>.s are but means to these ends .. ..
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals."
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and'
Dedication of the J . Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young·
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975.
80 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to·
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system
0f government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal
t rials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state·
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
oalance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.""
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. 8., at 259 (PowELL, J ., concurring) . See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. 8., at 231
(Black, J ., dissenting) ; Friendly, supra, n. 13.
81 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject:
•co.f sharp debate. Until Jtecently, scholarly empirical research
29
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the inoontive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this
demonstration that our society attaches serious consequenoos to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system. 32
We adhere to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered
may add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. But there is no
reason to believe that the overall educative effect of overturning convictions based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment would be appreciably
diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be·
raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convicwas unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
And, the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still
inconclusive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 26; Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 Journ. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon,
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and'
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974) .
See United States v. Janis , - - U. S. - - , - - n. 22 (1976; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 475 n, 59·3 (1974) ; Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical'
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule : A Critique of the Spiotto
Research and Umted States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974) 32 See Oaks, supm, n. 26, at 756.
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tions. 33 Nor is there reason to assume that any specific
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of
evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct
review would be enhanced if there were the further risk
that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on
direct review migh~ be overturned in collateral proceedings years after the incarceration of the defendant. The
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure
that went undetected at trial and on appeaP 4 Even if
83 "As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389.
34 The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts.
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816) . Moreover, the argument
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional
law IS especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure
claims, smce they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial
level Judges in both system8. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason
why the fact th.at a man is a federal judge should make him more
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one rationally could assume that some additional incremental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases,
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational
system of criminal justice.
In sum, in view of the substantial societal costs associated with the exclusionary rule, we conclude that where
the State has provided an adequate process for full and
fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial. In this
context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any,
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal
and the recognized costs of application of the rule
persist,M
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the appli~·
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse."
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50.
85 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in their
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials
should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422'-423 (1964). We reject these
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course,
free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal
habeas corpus relief. More importantly, an untimely filing in a
state or federal criminal case is not a jurisdictional defect, and, under
some circumstances, plenary review in this Court is appropriate. E. g., Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U. S. 316, n. I
(1969) ; Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80 (1968); Arnold v. North
Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1964); Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S~
4:1.5, 418 n. 7 (1959 ). Respondents' remedy, therefore, lies in th~

14-1055 & 14-1222-0P!NION
STONE v. POWELL

27

Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals

are

Reversed.

filing of an out-of-time petition· for certiorari. At that time we can
assess whether the claimed prejudice arising from our decision in this
case justifies the waiver of the time rule, and whether we should.
exercise our disctetion to :tevlll.w the merits oJ the is,sues raised in:
t.he.· petitioliU'!.

fli

4-12-76

-~ -

Respondents
criminal

of

offenses in state courts, and their convictions

were affirmed on appeal.

The prosecution in each case

a

respondent subsequently sought relief in/federal district
court by filing a petition for federal habeas corpus
under

28

u.s.c.

§

2254.

The question presented is

a state prisoner
may be granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that
·evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure
when he has - -previously been ~i-----------------------------afforded an
\ was introduced at his trial~ The issue is of considerable
oppportuni ty for '
/
full
and
fair
I
litigation · l
importance to the administration of criminal justice •
.· of his claims
in the state
I.
. courts.

j

We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural
history of these cases.

-------. -

(:\.

2.

Respondent, Lloyd Powell, was convicted of murder

in June 1968 after trial in

~'california}ftate ;6urt.

He and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store
in San Bernadino, California, at about midnight on February
17, 1968, where Powell became involved in an altercation
with Gerald Parsons, the store manager.

In the scuffling

that followed Powell shot and killed Parson's wife.

Ten

hours later, on Sunday morning, an officer of the Henderson,
Nevada, Police Department

..

, __ '"

"

· - - • - '7 -

.

~--·

··-------t.

.

~
the Henderson vagrancy ordinance,

~~
search_.

and~~

~.~~t-~<J J'Le- ~ ~4~~
h~~ ~eover~ng

a .38 caliber revolver with six expended

cartridges in the cylinder.
Powell was extradicted to California anp tried
for second degree murder in the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County.

7~ ek~
,.,. I
IO el! C. ... ¥1 "}i:J:_@t_Jit'1)
1\ParsQ.Os a~ Powell's . acc0mplic~i(;.t

the liquor store testified against him.

A criminologist

.;

I

..
.

..

testified that the
the

lver found on Powell was

gun that killed Parsons' wife.

The trial court

. rejected Powell's contention that -testimony by the Henderson
aA-1" Yo~ ~~A- ~
police officerAeeneern4ag-ehe-cireumstances of

th~

discovery

of the revolver should have been excluded because the
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional.

~ conviction was

I
1

In July, 1969,

affirmed by a California District Court

\

Although the- issue -was
of Appeal.

1

the arrest and search because it concluded that even if ;\.a..·...~ a

,.

•

•

.,

• •

A

, •

~

vJ "~

I\
I

th~- t~stim,q~y -~f ~he,A this was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt
{1967}a ~

________.

....,.,....

m~der

Chapman

v. California, 386 U.S. 18

-3.

(

(
The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition
for habeas corpus relief.
· In August 1971 Powell filed a petition for a writ

..

of federal habeas corpus under 28

u.s.c.

§

2254 in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of California,
contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber
revolver should have been excluded as fruit of an illegal
had been unlawful

Henderson

1<4

vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, an

l~~
arresting officer lacked probable causethat
he was violating
it.

The District Court did not reach the question of the

~onstitutionality

of the

ordinance, although it

did conclude that the arresting officer had probable cause

••

4.

The Court agreed with the
California District Court that the admission of the evidence
concerni

error, was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt
the Court

E

alternatively held that even if the vagrancy ordinance
· L~ 'Pu.nf~cf/4;

was unconstitutional, thelexclusionary rule
applied to bar admission of the fruits of a search incident
to an otherwise valid arrest.
· In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed.

507 F. 2d 93.

The Court concluded

t

that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague,

that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and that although
exclusion of the evidence
would serve no

deterrent purpose with regard to

police officers who were enforcing statutes in good faith,
exclusion would serve the public interest by deterring
legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes.

..,...........,.,......._.,..__

~·-

.,.,.

.. ...

Id. at 98.

' ;:;

5.

After an independent review of the evidence the court
concluded that the admission of the evidence
was not harmless error since it supported
the testimony .of Parsons and Powell's accomplices
•

~·

at 99.

Respondent, David Rice, was convicted of murder in
April 1971 after triaL in a Nebraska state court.

At 2:05

a.m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone
call that a woman was heard screaming at 2865 Ohio Street.
As ·one of the officers sent to that address examined
a suitcase lying in :the doorway, it exploded, killing him

instantl~

.

By August 22 the investigation of the murder
centered on Duane Peak, a fifteen-year-old member of the
National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF").J

arrest.

~hat afternoon a warrant was issuedfor Peak's

....
f\

,.

..

.

,' '•

•

focused on other known members of the NCCF, including
respondent Rice,

I

some of whom were believed planning

·!

to kill Peak before he could incriminate them.

I
f

Upon

arriving at Rice's home at 10:30 p.m., the police found

response to their repeated knocking.

While officers were

left to watch the premises, a warrant was obtained to search

..
for explosives and illegal weapons believed to be in Rice's
,

possession.

Peak was not in the house but upon entry the

police discovered, in plain view, dynamite, blasting caps,
wire, a battery, and a pair of long nosed pliers.

Peak

;

subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice voluntarily
surrendered.

The clothes Rice was wearing at that time were

i

··.,. subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite particles •

._________

1.

Rice was tried for first degree murder in the
District Court of Douglas County.

court denied

At trial Peak admitted planting the
suitcase and making the telephone call, and implicated Rice
in the bombing plot.

As corroborative evidence the State

introduced items seized in the search, as well as the results

..
of the

~hemica~

analysis

~f

his clothing.

Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed

On appeal ' the

conviction, holding

that the search of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid
·search warrant.

State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W. 2d 480

(1972).
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
I

I

l.

for Nebraska.

.

Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration

•,

i.

8.

was unlawful because . the evidence underlying his conviction
had been discovered as the result of an illegal search of
his home.

The District Court concluded that the search

warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was
fatally defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393
410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378
388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194

~

(19~3).

u.s.

u.s.

108 (1964).

The court also rejected

the State's content"ion that even if the warrant was invalid
.'

the search was justified because of the valid arrest
warrant for Peak and because of the exigent circumstances
of the situation.

The court reasoned that the arrest warrant

did not justify the entry as the police lacked probable
cause to believe Peak was in the house, and further concluded
that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to
justify an immediate warrantless search.

Id. at 194-202.

4

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court.
513 F. 2d 1280 (1975).

''·

· Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the
State prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated,
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the~'(~

·
~c.tb.4,~
exclusionary rule~b9-Gasee ~~
·

.....
Co.tt)

'"'"•'"'~'

~ 6-f

t:::l-•<..e··.4... ·.~

uii.C.On&tiWt'.iona~ar-eh-aad-s~.

petitions for certiorari.
We now reverse.

,

·-- . . -:. fit.

422

u.s.

c.\&\~.t •

e grant

their

. I

1055 (1975).

. -~II

.

· The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of

~

habeas corpus ad subjiciedum

was included in the first

·grant of federal court juris'diction made by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation
that the writ-extend only to@llllllfprisoners he.l d in
custody by the United States.

The original statutory

authorization did not define its substantive reach.

It

merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall
have power to issue writs of • . . habeas corpus . . . . "
Ibid.

The courts

~-- defined

the scope of the writ in

accordance with . the common law and limited

it-~w«aek
l-

to
j

an inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the sentencing
tribunal.

.See_L e.g. , Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)

193 (1830)(Marshall1 C.J.).

In 1867 the writ wa$ extended

~soners.
5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.

Act of February

Under the 1867 Act

relief by federal courts was authorized in "all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law

-

.
fpliaak••
~••a..•l~,......~p~zws~,

t

1

-H.e

\2.

federal district court.

n~however,

In~'

on direct review the state supreme
~

'

had refused to consider

appeal because the papers were filed out-of-time.

This

Court held that since the state court judgment rested on a
reasonable application of the state's

legitimate
f · : procedural rules,

have barred
·~ b~ this CDur'!J
a ground that would : I direct review of his federal claim~ .
j

the district court lacked authority to grant habeas corpus
relief.

See 344

u.s.

at 458, 486.

This final barrier to full collateral reexamination
of state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus
proceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Noia and two co-defendants had been convicted of felony
murder.

The sole evidence against each defendant was a

. r,;o!s

signed confession.

J

~.. co-defendants, but not ;Noi) Ai~{f,

appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were
.
.
.
~-\ ·
unsuccessfu~ in subsequent- proceedings they were
able to establish that their confessions had been coerced

although it was stipulated that his confessioealsoA

\
. '•

.
;

...

•

..!

\

.
14.

~

'~

on motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
p~marq

was

.

iixl rationale advanced in support of those decisions

The s
~R@

view that Fourth Amendment violations are different
$

in kind from

deni~f

other constitutional rights in that
.,t..

claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn the
.

"

..

integrity

the fact-finding process or challenge the

o~

,.
'.•

evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of
illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device
intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations
by law enforcement officers."
v. United States, 368 F.2d 822

at 224.

See Thornton
ufman rejected

and lae/J
.
this rationale1J ldtng that search-and-seizure claims are
.. cognizable in § 2255 proceedings_;; · Ift Pe;j eet?i..ft~ this

.C-r.--

reeserri:ag the Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy

extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"

~·

at

225-226~

.

_,_

'/

concluded that there was no basis

for restricting "access by federal prisoners with illegal
search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies,
while placing no similar restriction on access by state
prisoners."

......

-.

Although in recent years the view has been

of the United States • . . • "

·The principle that federal

habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited to consideration of
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, however,
[ the touchstone in this area.

ren~ined

~ee. e.g .• In re Wood, 140

U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); Andrews

v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Bergemann v. Backer, 157
U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192

(1906).

was subjected
the substantive
expansion was limited to only a

'9

·few classes of cases until \'ett•lllllll•il'_.._ _.._,•) Frank v. Mangnum,

-----· -··
237 U.S. 309, in 1915. · In Frank, the prisoner had claimed
in the state courts that the proceedings which resulted in

~s

conviction for murder had been dominated by a mob.

41-~
~the ftate jupreme .fourt rejected his contentions~--·

Frank .-.a unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus
' ·-

relief in the federal district court.

------~

-·-- ~...

g'

,

i

'It

l On ; '!.
1 fhe Svprem e. Courf_.)
F'I'CLhk ~ federal ela.ims
affirmed the de~ial of reji..ef because ~p
·ned

:Z

, ;, o.J
1 -

6een_
{&1~:J;.~n;i;;T:?J.
..._..~. by a competant
------.iii
-·--- il
I---~ii-~ L 3
.

- .-

~bu~~ArecognizedAtnat
~7L.~.~
if a habeas corpus
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The court of appeals reversed, ordering

~, ....$.)

that'i

a conviction

be set aside and he be released from

custody or a new trial granted.

~
~ Court affirmed the

grant of the writ, narrowly restricting
in· which a federal court

.
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r:eeu:BfR1-ae
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~

~he

circumstances
- ~v

in its discretion refuse
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the period in which the substantive scope of the writ was
expa~ded(

~

the Court did not address ehe

iss~Awhether ~

~~~--~~

exceptions to full review mightA-be-e~d 'l!ii.tb. r.eg-aro to
' particular categories of constitutional claims.

Prior

.

to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the
federal courts of appeal had concluded that collateral
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate

; '

0

~
·
court finds that the :tate has failed to Asupply adequate
".c orrect1ve

proces~'

for

the full and fair litigation of

federal claiinS, w\lether or not "jurisdiCtionatf\J ioa a

• •••• ••imlnal pzoceeettug, the court

the detention is lawful.

)l)·3~.

!d. at

In the landmark decisions in

U.

t'~f.V953),

may~

~rgwn

v. Allen, 344

,

and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S., at 482-487,
,.

the scope of the writ was expanded still further.

In

these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas
corpus relief claiming that the trial

cour~had

erred in

their
failing to quash l · indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of

grand

juro~~~ ruling

certain

confessions admissible. \ ,In l3t'ownj ~·~i .·d::li'eot appeal ft'dm the

-·
.

. .

1

r-·-

. . _ ___

-

.
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,.

convic1Iio;' ~dtese claiins had been rej.iCted on . the. merits .b y
~-·

~he

ahig~t
I

court of . the State'

State v. Brown,
•

233 N.C. 202, 63 S.E . 2d 99 (\,Sf),

Court
. J( ,qsJ) 1
~had denied certiorari, 341 U.S.
Despite
and~

-

94f-

corrective process, the
hahea~

corpus

c~~

to a full reconsideration

L?a-r:q~~~

of these constitutional claims, including a

1\

hearing · ~

--

.. .

~

~

.

.

·~

,J.J

on motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

.

p~mar~

ilnl rationale advanced in support of those decisions

The

.

•I>'

was

~8@

Yiew that Fourth Amendment violations are different

.

$

in kind from

deni~f

other constitutional rights in that
A-

claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn the
.

.

~

..

integrity

the fact-finding process or challenge the

o~

evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of
illegally seized evidence is simply a

prophylac~ic

device

intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations
by law enforcement officers."
v. United States, 368 F.2d 822

at 224.

See Thornton
ufman rejected

and laeld
.
this rationale11 ldtng that search-and-seizure claims are
'· cognizable in § 2255 proceedings_;.> · Irt E"ej ee&i:ft~ ei'tis

·C-r:the

rea&eft'i.Rg

Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy

extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"
see)~)
'

"()\MC.\.1\j ...

l

~.,~ 1) . ~.

1?e~.,~)
!.~

~·

at

225-226~
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concluded that there was no basis

( \"\bi)~ c..~'(~~

v.
t... ... \1 ,.\\ tE> )
.

for restricting "access by federal prisoners with illegal

~',u.s ~ ~ 2~~

I

U'l~t )) \ ·,

search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies,
while placing no similar restriction on access by state
prisoners."

Although in recent years the view has been

_____
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\
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&pp_;£O~et:e.,. ,

The

in

n

f p lisztlksas t '

a federal district court.

n~ ·

=•••..•t-.:......t~p~aM&~•

In~,

however,

on direct review the state supreme court had refused to consider
~e.

~

appeal because the papers were filed out-of-time.

This

Court held that since the state court judgment rested on a
legitimate
·
reasonable application of the state's f · : procedural rules,
a ground that would

have barred
•
b~ thi$ Coor~
: I direct review of his federal claims,

the district court lacked authority to grant habeas corpus
relief.

See 344

u.s.

at 458, 486.

This final barrier to full collateral reexamination
of state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus
proceedings was removed in Fay

V ·.

Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

Noia and two co-defendants had been convicted of felony
murder.

The sole evidence against each defendant was a

. rt>io!s
J
,.. co-defendants,

signed confession.

appealed their convictions.
.

.

.

but not Noi) lu"wt-«{f.J

Although their appeals were
~-\ '

unsuccessful, in subsequent- proceedings they were
able to establish that their confessions had been coerced
'.

and
the Constitution.
although it was stipulated that his

,·,,

confession&'also~

'

..
14.

~
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on motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 •
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in kind from
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claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn the
1\

integrity
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the fact-finding process or challenge the

evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of
illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device
intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations
by law enforcement officers."

at 224.

See Thornton
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v. United States, 368 F.2d 822
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and /ae/J
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this rationale11 ldtng that search-and-seizure claims are
.. cognizable in§ 2255 proceedings;.; · Ift

·C-r.the

~

Pejeet-:ia~

t!ftis

Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy

extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,"

~·

at

v

225-226~

concluded that there was no basis

for restricting "access by federal prisoners with illegal
search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies,
,·

while placing no similar restriction on access by state
prisoners."

.,_,....,...____ 1._

Although in recent years the view has been

-

IS.
expressed that the Court should reexamine the substantive
scope of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral
review of Fourth Amendment claims "solely to the question
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity
to raise and have adjudicated the question in state courts,"

.\3

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U..S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell,

,--.

4!--~~
J., concurring)," the Court without discuss~on o the issue,
j

.

has continued to accept jurisdiction in cases raising such
claims.
I

'

~----·]

;~

habeas
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~ ,.

.l.
.. , ... ,._ :"'! (

,

See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
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The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal
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rests On the assumption that
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in state court on the

I
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eviden~~ ob~~ined i~llegal searc

fo"".-,~ CA~ lro\A~1-een~ AW\~·~
-~equire• ~~ion of s~ch evidence

'

eizur

as

t trial and ~

suc~onvictione upon dir~ct review~IIIIIIIIIIIIIBI
Mapp v. Ohio, 367

u.s.

have
this case we/

643

this assumption
See, ~' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

----~~~~'

supra, at 249 n.38.

Upon examination, we. conclude, in view of the

nature and

purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule

~ssumption

,·.,

is

unjustified.~~

.

.

'

that

-~ 14'41.A-;(..;.t..,_

III.'
The Fourth Amendment~o*d s a.ltl.

~ecure in their persons,

~i:Q.a.eR£ ~be ''agh£

houses, papers,

against unreasonable · searches and seizures."

an~ effects,
The Amendment

was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the
use of the general

war~ant

in England and the writs of

assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas ., 379 U.S. 476,
481-485 (a•4S); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-365
( I'St ) ,

a~d

a
was intended to protect the "sanctity of/man's

home and the privacies of life," Boyd v . . United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886), from searches under unchecked general
authority.

li

The exclusionary rule was adopted

~~

erdec to effectuate

·the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.

Prior to the

Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), evidence obtained in violation of the

.·.

¥ew~6h

Amendment

.,.,
generally could be introduced
and federa .

,,.

criminal trials both state

See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585

In Weeks the Court held that evidence

secu~ed

(1904).

through an

illegal search and seizure could not be introduced in a
federal prosecution . . The prohibition~extended to
the fruits of the illegally seized evidence.

Silverthorne

Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).

Thirty-

five years after Heeks the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25

(1949~

that the right of privacy against

arbitrary intrusion by the police ' that is protected by
the Fourth Amendment is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty and as such enforceable against the States through
the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause."

27.

v?

Id., at
the Court

.ft.. uloolCs e.o<'l.u ;.,.,..') .-..lo
concluded tat ~would not e ~mposed upon the States as
"an essential ingredient of that right."
full force of

Wolf

Id. at 27.

The

steadily eroded in

subsequent decisions, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), and

II •

-
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.es:z}.y a little more than a decade later the exclusionary rule

.

was

~-~-U.ok
··-----~&-QR

the States in~ v. Ohio, 367 U.S. ~.

Decisions prior to

advanced two reasons

~

,;. federal
for application of the rul .

In ---=~

~oF

to the "imperative of judicial integrity"
.
) 1\

contamination of the judicial

process.~

~~'.

18

364 U.S. at 222. ~ut e~hai~ad a more pragmatic ground:

.·

.

A

The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter- to compel~respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way- by removing the incentive to
disregard it. 364 U.S., at 217.
'

/

~~ustified the application of the rule to
the States on several grounds,

~
~
but)\principallyAthe belief

deter future unlawful police

.· /,.

}

'

I

\o.

(!)__J

-
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,

-~-

~lthough -:....~e~isioiiSAfubsE.quent

to

\., oH-eN\ . LJ

.
.
Xhave alluded to the "imperative of judicial

~

.{ilSJ?

~J
1.. "'U o.s. S:!.l,u
integrity," ~d Stat~s v. Peltier, WQ j(
536-539

.-

~~""". desbi<>As 11also demonstrate the

~-

·

~

~rifte

.

in the determination whether to apply the ......

A. .

~;

? . .- .. .

1J

.

rule in. a particular context.
'

limited role of that

~

Logically extended

~&r~e

~~k.w.
.
.
would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized
.
.

"'

evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even
over his assent.

(1965).

Compare

Henry

v. Mississippi , .379 U.S. 443

It/fould(aisj\ require abando~ent of the standing limi-

tations on who may object to unconstitutionally seized evidence,
see Alderman v. United States, 394

......

u.s.

165 (1969), and the

__ _
••

abatement of judicial proceedings when the defendant's ~
•> .

is unconstitutionally seized, a
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420

u.s.

proposition we rejected in

103, 119 (1975).

Last Term, we

~~

recognized that judicial ?U;;-i&y is "not offended
4\

if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good
faith that their conduct was
---..........-.---~

in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent . to
the search and seizure have held that _conduct of the type
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted
by the Constitution."
"f.. .-1 :

~-5_38

(emphasis omitted).

--~~~ p ·s#S
~;judicial

>•

eat.

. - -

Similarly, the."Prinei:pl:e

-ff-hr* .. ;t=!.,.,

integrity does not prevent the use of illegally

. seized evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States

v.

Calandra, 414 U.So 338
require

to result in convictions in some cases.

that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for
impeachment of the defendant},

u.s.
62.
__.-;;;>

\

"-----.........-·----

(1954.).

Cf.

Walder v.

~ited

States, 347

Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) ,

The teaching of these cases in clear.

While courts, of

course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity
of the judicial process, this concern has limited force
as a justification for the exclusion of
highly probative evidence without regard to the

..

circumstances that may have made its seizure violative
of the letter of the Fourth Amendment.

The force of this

justification becomes minimal where federal habeas corpus
relief is sought by a prisoner who previously has been

~~vu

afforded the opportunity for a full aad

""

fai~~itigation

"

of his search - and ~
- seizure claim at trial and on direct
'~
review.

.

, • '·

••

I

/'

I

-xeei~t!FB

claims at trial aAd ga dil.r8Silt reujew,

The primary justification for the exclusionary rule
is the deterrance of unlawful police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights.

..

Post-~

decisions have established

'

that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It

..

is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the
search victim, for any "'[r]eparation
~

Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
'

...

comes too late."

____ _

Instead,

t

----- ----

----- -

/

rule is

Accord United States v. Peltier,

$~)ad~
• .
7
5); Terry

Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,' 446 (1974).
-~ .
?'

~

-------

-

-

~

-

J'i-'--_ . . . __

J~involved the application of the;'xclusionary
'--~

)_·. ~~~~) •

a~iaifand on direct review.

~n Kaufman \the Court
1

assumed that implementation of the Fourth Amendment also

-~

.....

__

requires

~e. c.ot\S\cle-rc.:h"~.-oL~~-~-se\~(~ ~~
77- ·
i ~ I upon collateral

L...A./~ U'>t.Vt d> ·ems
-

~

i ;trli - -,. - ,

..

J

eview?

the broad deterrent

purpose of

interpreted to

proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in
•

all proceedings or against all persons.

As in the case of

any remedial device, "the application of the rule has been

---· -..
...

21.
restricted to those areas where its remedi.al
objectives
'Ow#

-

United States v.

are thought most efficaciously served."

-u ·

cd' 1>49.
Calandra, 4l~ _ u.s ~
....~

... __...

..~ r-·

1

~
• •

.

refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings was based on a weighing of the potential
injury to the historic role and functionJ of the grand
jucy of such extension against the potential contribution
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through
;.·

deterrance of police misconduct:

·------------- --- ----_. __........._.....__

~--~

-

i ..,._
·

Any incremental deterrent effect which
might be achieved by extending the rule to grand
jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever
deterrence of police misconduct may result from
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from
·criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that
application of the rule to grand jury proceedings
would significantly further that goal. Such an
extension would deter only police investigation
consciously directed toward the discovery of
evidenc 7-~olely for use in a grand jury investigation_. •••
_
__ __.) We ~herefore decline to embrace a view
tha~ wouio achLe~e a speculative and undoubtedly
minLmal advance Ln the deterrence of police
misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding
the role of the grand jury • .IJ. o:t :3.5'1.

--------

------

~ · The

same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's

-t.a.~

necessity in a particular context ..._ was evidentAin Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62

)

where the Court

permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence
to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had

---

..

~

.•-

...

€ir~~

..

t.

I
l

ZJ..

I
testified broadly in his own defense.

The Court held, in

effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionary
rule were outweighed in that context by the need to prevent
perjury and assure the integrity of the trial process.

The

I

I

I

·~udgment in Walder revealed most clearly that the -~olici~s__

·

-@

~ehind

<

the exclusionary rule are.

n~; abs~ . .

Rather, thf'utility

_C

.

t be evaluated

policies.

in light of competing

In that case, the

1..,.
public interest in determination of truth at trial
was
deemed to outweigh the incremental contribution that might
have been made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values
application of the rule.

by

The balancing process at work in these cases also finds
the standing requirement.

•

Standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been restricted
to situations in which the Government attempts to use such
evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal search.
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v.

- \'-5"

United States, 394 U.S •. 1111..111; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
•
(1960).

The standing requirement is premised on the view

that the~additional benefits of extending the rule~to
defendants other than the victim of the search . Qre outweighed
. . . .. ,

by theNfurther

encroachment~he

public interest in

· f;rosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted
or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes

l

.

.....

l

-

.. . -

-

IV
We return now to the question presented by these
cases . . . . ~espondents allege _................ violations
of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed •
Fourteenth Amendment.

them through the

The question is whether these state

prisoners---whose reliance upon the exclusionary rule with
respect to the seized evidence has been fairly considered

A""
and rejected by the 's tate courts
...

-w"ic.\

W

~~

Ot\

may be granted federal

habeas corpus relief by invoking again the exclusionary rule

~.

on~uch

...

• collateral review.

The answer - - ·~~·

.

--

.

is

to be found through the balancing process identified
above in Part III.
Even where the exclusionary rule is applied at trial

1A

and on direct review, the costs are well known:

the focus

of the trial,
from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that
should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.

,....... u-~~
reliable and often the most probative information bearing
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Black emphasized in his dissent in Kaufman:

·.

As Mr. Justice

"A claim of illegal search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment is crucially different
from many other constitutional rights; ordinarily
the evidence seized can in no way have been
rendered untrustworthy by the means of its
seizure and indeed often this evidence alone
establishes beyond virtually any shadow of a
doubt that the defendant is guilty." 394 U.S.,
at 237.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding

process~and

often frees the guilty.

The disparity in

particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
application

~f

the rule is contrary to the idea of

z.S
- ess~~~
the
concept
of
justice.
,..
.

proportionality that

Thus, although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police

..

activity in part through the nurturing of respect for
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately ·
the rule may well have the opposite effect of generating

zc..
disrespect for the law and administration of justice.
These long recognized costs of the rule persist with
peculiar force when the rule is extended to collateral
review of Fourth Amendment claims already considered by
1.7

two or more tiers of state courts.
Evidence obtained by

·.

p~lice

officers in violation

of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope
that the frequency of future violations will decrease .

.,
.,.·

1.8
Despite the absence of supportive empiric evidence, we
have assumed
enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment
Lmo~e. ·.vW\~W\+1~,J
by removing the incentive to disregard it.z~er the long

term, this demonstration that our society attaches serious
consequences to violation of constitutional rights is
thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate

2.CJ
Fourth Amendment ideals into their value

.'

~

) We adhere to these assumptions as supportive of the

&-.. .·---

appea~.

exclusionary rule at trial and on direct

But

at the collateral review stage of the judicial pr.ocessynot only is there no
' JC JMe
, CAMS~"-\~
Df~~ ..
Se.i~ c).A;wt.S

but the
h Amendment is

small in relation to the acost.·

f\h\

\;..bo O.SS"'~e~J
rationallyJCthat any

·w

n2.~n.t:iye . creat~d .
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'·

r • •
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on direct review would be further increased in any
.
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To be sure, each case in which
is considered contributes to the
-

-

.

awareness and understanding of the values protected
by the Fourth Amendment.
\-;._
$•~ejtstage

Vle.

But the marginal contribution

~

-

reaches a point of sharply diminishing returns.
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.. years
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in a search
at trial or

or seizure

Even if one could assume some additional incremental
deterrent effect in isolated cases, the resulting speculative

..

advance of this legitimate goal would be outweighed by the
c~~~~her values that are vital to a rational system

.

'

....

of criminal justice .

In sum, in view of the substantial costs associated

. .''
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with collateral review of state court judgments and
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particularly with the exclusionary rule itself, we conclude
that where the state has provided an adequate process for
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state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search and seizure was . introduced at his

... _A94J!

...

t;

·-'•

........

::

I
I

l
'

~-

;<'

.

,_

:

,• \

, r,

'l •

I "

.

'

I

I

""

·•

l •

•

-

• r1 • 1.1

.
-I

..

.!

~ L.: .

..

.l

~:..Ja.c-:.

I
. .· .

j_ •. L .

j

'

.-

.~.

.. ..

.I.

. . ! .

.. ·..

·--

: ... \

~· ~

-- -

..... ' "'·~ "":.

.

trial.

At that stage the contribution of such review, if

·any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal
and the recognized costs of application of the exclusionary
X'\lle per!l ... ,. . t in full force.
· ~ Accordingly,
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The ordinance provides:

"Every person is a vagrant who:
[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or
from place to place without apparent reason
or business and [2] who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when
asked by any peace officer to do so [3] if
the surrounding circumstances are s~ch as to
indicate to a reasonable man that the public
safety demands such identification,"

.~

llf

In support of the vagueness holding the court

rel~ed princi~ly on Papachristou v.
405 U.S. 156 (1972), where
~ ..
lUi~

City of Jacksonville,

~~.~

we~~k=dewn

es

aneonstituti~nally

a city ordinance defining vagrants as "persons

wandering or strolling around from place to place without
any lawful purpose or object.

"

-

Id. at 156-157 n. 1.

Noting the similarity between the first element of the

._I

-~

\

Henderson ordinance and~~e.-a~p"e•a. ..-. ..a~~~--·
6 s• •']the '
7

·it concluded that
CN=C J (.,.

the second and third elements of the Henderson ordinance 4i6
-'\
~

not aQ4 sufficient
.

-

ef

~

~ ~~8$~~~.

specific~

to cure

·.

507 F.2d at 95-97.

•,j;,.

"overall vagueness •

~

Petitioner Stone

challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition
of the case we need not consider this issue.

3·

Jhe affidavit in support of the warrant

Whiea wes !he sole evidence . pre~ented to the magistr~

,.+

Aindicated that the police. believed explosives and

..

illegal

weap~ns

were present in Rice's home because (1)

Rice was an active .member of the NCCF, (2) a violent killing
.

of

..__

•«~po~~~~·~e~officer

had occurred and it appeared that the

.NCCF was involved, and (3)

~d received

information

in the past that Rice possessed weapons and explosives,
which he said should be used against the police.
App. to Pet. Cert. 34 n. 2.

In concl?ding

See

the,-.e

•

existed probable cause for issuance of the warrant, the
state trial court on the motion to suppress and the state
supreme Court on appeal relied in part on information contained

-

. :;:

...

___

__

...__...

... '··

••

.

in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing that was
not included in the affidavit.

-- -

The district court limited

its probable cause inquiry to the faee of the affidavit,

~ Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n:'3(\~~~j
\. (aq~) J . _
Aguilar v. Texas,378 U.S. 108, 109, n:::lJtand concluded
probable cause was lacking.

Petitioner Wolff contends that

.

police should be permitted to supplement the information
contained in .an affidavit for a search warrant at the
hearing on a motion to suppress, an issue we need not reach • .

4.
of

--

The district ...court further held that the evidence

dynam~te

-

particles found
&~ader

RiQ.Q -was WQaring

should have been suppressed as

tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have
been issued but for the unlawful search of his home.
F . .supp. 202-207.
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See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.

471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
u.s. 385 (1920).

Jr.

In granting certiorari in these cases we requested

that counsel in Powell v. Stoner Ne, 74
~)

v.

·---,____...,...--

...

-·r·

~r=Uo.

74-f

lQO~

addre~espectively)

--

and Wolff v.

the questions:

--·-~r ~·

.~

. . . . . *...-

•~et~~r the constitutional validity of the entry and ~care~

of respondent's premises by. Ohmaha police offic~rs un lr ~le
circumstances of this c~se is a question proper Y cogn za e
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
..

"Whether, in light of the fact that the District
Court found that the Henderson, Nev.) ·- police
officer had probable cause to arrest respondent
for violation of an ordinance which at the time
of arrest had not been authoritatively determined
to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that
the gun discovered as a result of a search
incident to that arrest violated his rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution is one cognizable
under 28 U.S. C. § 2254.'"

-

AwA
b.

I

~,-

It is now well-estab

corpus" ~sed alone

·-ref~ to

..

"Great Writ."

the common law writ of habeas corpus ad

Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95

(1807)(Marshall,

fi'here still CJtis t, heue uer,

Rletny

\

/.

Stati&i;

1.

J6w 'Ll 5 i

5

8 ll (1981) · (ha'Beas eel! pas uti preoegaendaM:f.

Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no

appellate review in federal criminal cases.

The possibility

of Supreme Court review on certificate of division
opinion in the circuit court was

~aderee

practice of single district judges holding circuit court.

See

. '·
I,

... ;;. ~ .

a-5
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court
lnord±mree Fressure 1Mt,. ~aturall1'~'

31-32, 79-80 (1927).

of the scope of habeas corpus

~

e5aec to reach otherwise unreviewqble decisions involving

fundamental rights ·.

See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 376-377

.

(1879); Bator, Finality · in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 473 &

:..

n. 75.

See generally Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts

and the Federal System

ie The expansion occurred primarily ~

..

J

~ tf.,«eA(.... ~A (}.
~~ convictions based on assertedlY, unconstitutional
A
. '-( I 31, ).;.~

statutes, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 37l~, and ~~)

de~entions

based upon

an~~egal~

sentence, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163

nt71e ..,,
(1873).

Cf·

See Bator, supra, flOte

~at

465-474.
a~._,~

to whether the

There has

result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's
decision in Moore v. Dempsy, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 421 & n.

301il~r~,

Compare

Foreward:

The

Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 1q5 (1959);
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus:

Impact of Abortive States

proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961)

~\~

.'

L~

N-6

~')

V.

I

L372 U.S., at 457-460

(Harlan, J., .d issenting) j

Bator,

7

)r, at

supra, note
\~. • .

In construing broadly the power of a federal

court to consider constitutional claims presented

~istrict

~

~'E

488-491.

a writ of habeas corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed

:-.~-:lu':l: L· the equitable nature of.. . the. writ,
noting
that "[d) iscretion
.
.
.
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I 2242." 372 U.S. at 438. ·More :t:ecently, in -Francis v .

..·

•
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Q __

•

:J·~.L:~\·

:.·~

..

implicit in the statutory command that the Judge 'dispose

.: ~-?f».~ ~;<( [:· r-oJ· :·~h~
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.

-··

·.: :···
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. ..: .

q~s.

_

of •actual
., ·.

:.·:~

::_~:
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.• J

·-
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• -~

(1976), . . holding that absent

~~ej~dice ·~ . stat~; ~;is~ne; ~hO . f~l~
·: St

•.

:. ~~

.. '·· : , ··~

. :

t:

. : ·ro~

<. to : make a timely challenge to the composition of the

'r;~-. "· ._·::'~'" ....~1

:L.(·

,-.:-

.,

··- ·

grand jury that indicted
. ....... -

. .

":.

.

~·

•· ....

bring that challenge in

corpus , p;oceeding,

we emphasized that:
"This Court has long recognized that in some
circumstances considerations of comity and
concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to
forego exercise of its habeas corpus power.
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 425-426."
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jilt Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ,.there has been
1 ••

}no change in the.J
· · established rule with respect to nonconstitutional

claims.~~

The · writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28

- ~

§ 2255,

"will not be allowed to do service for an appeaJ.:'

v. Large,

u.s.c.
Sunal

332 . u.s •. 174, 178 (l'i17 ) •

For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that
_,{_2-J

· · · 368

u.s.· 424,

428

J
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Compare, ~' United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641
, uc .t,..;•..a, ~a .. u.s. eao(a,~?

\J.-,
(CA 2)

; United States v. Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193 ~ (CA 3 1960);

Armstead v. United States, 318 F.2d 725 (CA 5 1963); Eisner v.
k

·United States, 351 F.2d 55 (CA 6 1965); De Welles v. Un1ted
eM· cle.~ocl, 18t0 v.~. ~,._ (~1
States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA 7) _
- ; Williams v. United States,
307 Fo2d 366 (CA 9

1962~

with,

~'

United States

v. Sutton,

321 F.2d 221 (CA 4 1963); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d
494 (CA 10 1963).
·

368 F.2d 822

See also

Thorton v. United States ,

CAlX.

~96~)(search-and-s~izure

. ·

.

claims not cognizable

under § 2255 absent special circumstances).

.. .

:r..~ ~VlO'-~~ :t:vt"etev~ ? Co 1\G\-ieN-J
Cr-\'vw\1\~ . ~~ ) ~t Ct.-t,·l
\.q~
~. ~Jt.

·c\C11o),

.

.

As Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United

States, 394

u.s.

217, 239 (1969), the Kaufman

•

majority made no effort to justify its result in light of
the long-recognized deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule.

Ins tea') the Court relied . on a series of prior cases

as implicitly establishing the proposition that search-andseizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings.

See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968);

Carafas v. · LaValee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967).

But only in Mancusi was habeas relief

ordered on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in

'.j l...;~.:::::!.:~~_:_""l'-:--=~-:-......-<.~~E~;.:::==::.::.:r~_;:;..~~;...,;_..-.;;;..._;.....,.<J~

.,

in

.... t"'

.\
:/I

y) ..

exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised in the

,..

petition.

----..

15.

As we conclude that a , state prisoner asserting

that evidence should have been excluded

\..."rt vJCa.!. o\o\tV."eJ iv:J

because~

an

~~eeN\ o-.~~,\e.J ·~ )

illegal search and seizure, who,._ '
' s s )f
fti p],r
o~\lO'Mw-M·
~'(" ~\\ C-W\~\c\~""' J; ~c.X~'I\" \~ ·t\Na
state courts, may not invoke
the exclusionary rule on federal habeas corpus review, we
find it unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning
the exclusionary rule raised by the parti€s.
principally, whether in view of the
it should be applied on a

~r ~

p~rpose

These include,
of the rule,

'basis without regard to

the nature of the constitutional claim or the circumstances
of the police action.

See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,

446 (1974) ("the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged
' •

in willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right"); Brown v. Illinois,

422 U.S. 590,

6~6

(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part);

Cf. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) .

..

1
.

'·

See generally

Lasson, The History and Development

of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(1937); Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court
(1966).

~-

The roots of the Weeks decision

United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where the Court,

..

forCing a· link between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, held
~

that the compulsory production of a person's private books
and papers for introduction against him at trial was

.

unconstitutional.

Boyd

~_;,;J_J.

was~repHdiaeed

\.

""

New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court,

in Adams v.

~,~--~\~V\~ J
~
C tliat

,-.

· 7:. C/n ~J
the "law held

unconstitutional~fvirtual

b

y compelled the defen-

~

dant to furnisp tgstimony against himselfj' il.
· --, ~at 598
adhered
to the common-law rule
-A

'

that a trial court must not

11111111111111111111111111111

~inquire into the method by which otherwise
/""'\

•'

competent evidence was acquired. See., ~ Corr.mon wealth v. ~'
..,
''-'
2•Met. (~ss.) 329 (l81l)e

J

'.

N-10

\f.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968);

Weeks v. United States, 233 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914);
Olmstead v. United States, 277

~.S.

438, 470 (Holmes, J.,

dissenting), 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
-'"
:=··---_

See 367 U.S., at

. _.,

--

-- ·_-:_----~-==--

-~

••

'!SC.

·-~

-

- 'liiJ

~---.JI

--: - -

~

(prevention of introduction

of evidence where introduction "tantamount" to a coerced
1\

confession);

~

at 658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment

, violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial integrity) .

. '\fo4A't' .,",.+i~
Only
t,
adopted

Jtl•t!i

. --the view that the Fourth

alone

:--;--;----:--~A~m!!:e~n~d~mentkequires

1n s lalfl criminal fria Is

the exclusion of unconstitutionally
--~;wit.·~4~~~~-fP..,.~'fP"P?
367 U.s. at

C'A},

'"G, •

Mr. Justice Black adhered to his
view that the

338 U.S. 25,

-l:JL

"
see Wolf v. Colorado,

), .

(1949)(concurring opinion),

L u-x.dv. cf.t d...J
but~that;, when

~ ~lllAtd11t €Ad .

cons~

i

~JJ

Fourth Amendment, standing alone, was not ,_•

ered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban against
~

compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerg~

I

,c,,

U.S. at
.J
for requiring exclusion.7 See note l~ supra •
~67
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'
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I

•

As Professor Amsterdam has

J,
'\

1·

-.

\

----

'-

~.........

observed:

"The rule is ~nsupportable as reparation or compensation
dispensation to the injured criminal; its sole rational
ification is the experience of its indispensibility
exert-f:l.ng] general legal pressures to secure obedience
to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ••• law-enforcing
officers) As it serves this function, the rule is a needed,
but grudgingly taken-, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted
that so many criminals must go free as will deter
constables from blundering, pursuance of this policy beyond
the confines of necessity inflicts a gratuitous harm on
the public interest •• o." ~~fbi.
•
. 388-389ll1111~ C~ncste.s

(\%-4)

I
1

~'-

I

Se"'rc..-l) S.~.c. v... -rt) ~ S<!C'h-o:-V'\ t~sr.. A Ccr"-'"'~;
llt.. u. \' c,. . L. ~·
31g

-

~

~

See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth--An Umpireal View,

Jlst Annual
Benjamin N.
Cardozo Lectur~
, Ass 'n of theL..'
Bar of the City
of New York
\
. , Dec • 16 , 19 74.

·..

. .

(

!

"·

.. ,

on the

)

purpose

l. in -lAos e casts Adti~.J·;,:t ..;,..e
served by the exclusionary rule~ wnether

I"~ s Hon

·.

..6-/ ~ .r<.A.A..-.-

.

)that purpose would be served through retroactive

despite

J

/ anO~the
I

costs associated with such

applicatio~

is

..._in

.

harmony with the balancing analysis applied generally in

I
! the exclusionary rule context.

I

See Desist v. United States,

394 U.S. 244, ;49-251, 254 _n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v.

!

.

: Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965); Fuller v. Alaska,
, I
l

1 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968).

I

.

.•

446.

If

Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.s.)j

~·

"

The attenuation-of-the-taint doctrine~
consistant with the balancing at~roacho See
1 Wong Sun v.
Un~ted States,. 371 0:$.: ?f./1 (19 _ JjJ...
-

•?

SS I 4

.,
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.

~

..

)
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2~. See,~-~·;

/

136 (1954);

;

_

Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,

.

403 U.S. 388, 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);

People v .

. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926)(Cardozo, J.);
ks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Chi.

L~

Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and sources cited

.

Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule
and Misconduct by
.
Police, 52 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 255, 256 (1961); Wright,
Must the CrLminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50

.

Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972>;

.
,.···

. ~

-

- -~· ·~

., ,--

/

..,

-

-

liP-"~.

Many of the proposals for modification of

scope

recognize the

potential value

!r establishing

a ro'a of proportionality in

~··J<..eiZ--tf"'n.c-L .,~~~~~
the criminal justice system and · 'the 1-i-nM..ge between the
'\
nature of the violation and the decision whether to invoke the
rule.

See A.L.I., A Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure,

May 20, 1975,

§

290.2 ("substantial violations"); 8 J. Wigmore,

· Evidence, § 2184, pp. 51-52 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961); H.
Friendly," Benchmarks 26--261 (1967)(even at trial, exclusion
should be limited to "the fruit of activity intentionally

,s

or flagrantly il~. ").
'
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In a different context,

Pref~~:o~s
~~s ~~4MArH411rin
·I\
r"'VYV"'fY'~ ~

observed:
"I am criticizing ,,not our
concern with
procedures, but our preoccupation, in Which we may
lose sight of the fact that our procedures are not th
ultimate goals of our legal system. Our gmals are
truth and justice, and procedures are but means to
these ends •••••
Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood
by our people, and the law and the legal profession
will not be worthy of public respect and loyalty if
we allow our attention to be diverted from these
goals."

Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation
and Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham
Young University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975.

Z).

Resort to habeas corpus tor purposes other than to assure
that no innocent .person suffers an unconstitutional loss
of liberty ..._ resultsin serious intrusions on values
important ·
to our system of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of
limited jpdicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality
in criminal trials, (iii) the minimization of friction
between our federal and state systems of justice and (iv)
the maintenance of the constitutional balance up~n which
the doctrine of federalism is founded." Schneckloth v
Bustamante, 412 U.S., at 25~ (Powell, J., concurring). ··,e.~o-.1 ••
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The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has

been the subject of sharp debate since its inception. Until
recentl~

scholarly empirical research was unavailable.

Elkins v. United States, 364
-.\~+- c~"to.A~empi:t1\Ytl

U.~.

206, 218 (1960).

And,

research has cast doubt on the
~~IMJ~

conclusive.

Compare,~·~·,

Search and Seizure:

still
is /in-

Oaks, supra, note 20: Spiotto,

An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary

Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 Journ. Leg. St. 243 (1973) with,
~·.&·,

Cannon, _Is the

Exclusionary_ R~le_ i~ F~ilit)_g_ _He_aJ.th?_,_J)ome

Ne~ata and a Pleel: __Against a ~re. ~_!_Eiti~~~ Co_n_~_l_l!_sion, 62 Ky. L.
See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
(1974))
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"As the exclusionary rule is applied
. time after time, it seems that i\s deterrent
efficacy at some stage reaches a point of
diminishing returns, and beyond that point
its continued application is a public nuisance.'

~terd~,

supra, not.e

'IIIU~

~'
~'

at 389.
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courts,~ federal

courts,

have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal
liberties and to uphold federal law.

Martin v. Hunter's
,. /

Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 341-344 (1816).
The policy arguments that re.spondents marshall
· in support of the view
federal habeas corpus

that~. .~..............lal8

review is necessary to effectuate

the Fourth Amendment

.. :

' ••

:~

••

"¥

t

. -- stem from

a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair and competent
forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights.
argument is that
. The~tate courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth
Amendment value3

fair

through~pplication

of the rule, and the
-...L.·-- t
\ 01\C~.J.f't J
oversight jurisdiction of this Courtlis an inadequate safeguard.

The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad
federal

differences in the

federal constitutional law is especially
\

limited in the
l

Fourth Amendment context,

claims are dealt with on . a daily basis by
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·~espite differences in institutional environment
and the unsympathetic attitude of some state judges in

' <$~f'~rJ.._R_
years past, we are unwilling to assume a lack of appropriate
A
sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and
appellate courts of the several states.

Indeed, the

argument that federal judges are

\
\
~

·.-:s

,..

0
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In sum, there is

"no intrinsic reason why the fact that a
'

man is a federal judge should make him more competant, or

...

conscientious, or learned with respect to the application of
federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." Bator,
supra

note

1, at SO.••
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Respondents

contend that since they filed

petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct
·review by this Court through an application for a writ of
certiorari, and since the tLme to apply for certiorari has
now passed, any change in the substantive scope of collateral
review should be prospective.

Cf. England v. Louisiana State

Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (1964).
reject these contentions.

..

We

Although not required to do so under

the Court's prior decisions, see Fay v. Noia,. 372 U.S. 391,
·'

respondents were, of course, free to file a tLmely petition for
certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas corpus .relief.
More importantly, an untimely filing in a state or federal
criminal case is not a jurisdictional defect, and, under
~

tl.t.4 · ~_)

appropriate circumstances, plenary reviewjis appropriate.
Taglianetti v. United States, 394

u.s.

316, n. 1

E.~.,

(~'l);

Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (\'IC:R); Arnold v. North Carolina,
376

u.s.

' - - - - · - __.., --· -- .. --- _..,

773 ( ,,Ct1).

Respondents' remedy,

therefore~lies

__ _
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·---r~ --·~-·-q~~·'!!"".....,

\

in the filing of an

out-of-t~e

,

can assess whether the

cla~ed

prejudice arisingfrom ouc

decision in this case justifies the waiver of the time rule,
and whether we should exercise our discretion to review .
the. merits of the_ issues raised in the_ petitionso
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